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ABSTRACT
TWO MODAL PARADOXES AND THEIR SOLUTIONS
SEPTEMBER 1994
JUN REN, B.A., BEIJING NORMAL UNIVERSITY
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Edmund L. Gettier III
Chisholm’s Paradox and the Four Worlds Paradox are paradoxes
about the cross-world identity of artifacts that are made of parts. The
paradoxes are described as derivable in S5 modal logic from
principles concerning the essentiality of the original matter of an
artifact and the Tolerance Principle concerning possible changes in
the original matter. On one hand, the original matter is essential to
the artifact; on the other hand, bare identity or distinctness with
respect to the original matter can be inferred by applying the
Tolerance Principle in S5.
This dissertation analyzes two solutions that have been
proposed. Nathan Salmon developed an Intransitive Accessibility
Solution that rejects S5 as the logic for metaphysical modality. We
show that Salmon’s argument for the intransitivity of metaphysical
possibility is unsound. The fundamental problem in Salmon’s account
is his attempt to derive the mode of metaphysical possibility from the
accessibility relation between the possible worlds, which, by the
theory ot possible worlds that Salmon advocates, has to be
determined by metaphysical possibilities with a pre- determined
mode. The conclusion of Salmon’s argument only reiterates a
V
premise of the argument. We also discuss Salmon’s other defenses,
and show that these defenses are unsuccessful.
Graeme Forbes proposes a Counterpart Solution. His solution
replaces the standard two-valued semantics by a counterpart
semantics with infinitely many degrees of truth-value. Our view is
that Forbes’ solution is unsatisfactory. Forbes avoids the identity
problem by formulating the problem in terms of similarity relation.
We argue that the similarity relation must not be a semantic device
for representing identity.
Our analysis reveals two versions of tolerance principle that
have not been distinguished in literature. The paradoxes are
associated with the Strong Tolerance Principle. We argue that the
Strong Tolerance Principle is false. The intuition of tolerance is
sufficiently described by the Weak Tolerance Principle. Moreover, we
argue that the knowing of the possibilities about the origination of an
artifact is empirical. The knowledge of the historical background and
the origination of the artifact is needed for knowing the possibilities.
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This dissertation discusses the phenomena of paradoxical
modal inferences known as “Chisholm’s Paradox” and the “Four
Worlds Paradox.” These modal inferences are about the necessities
and possibilities in the origination of a certain artifact. The two
paradoxes arise from applying in the inferences of standard S5 modal
logic some essentialist principles concerning the essentiality of the
original matter of artifacts, together with the so-called “tolerance
principle” concerning possible variations in the original matter of
artifacts. The essentialist principles express the following intuitions:
(i) an artifact could not have been originally constructed from a
collection of components sufficiently different from the collection
from which the artifact is actually constructed, and (ii) any possible
artifact which is constructed from a possible collection of
components of a given artifact and shares all other properties (or
essential properties) with the given artifact is numerically identical
to the given artifact. On the other hand, the tolerance principle used
in the modal inferences expresses the intuition that an artifact
constructed according to plan P could have been constructed
according to the same plan P from any collection of components
which is qualitatively and quantitatively the same as, but slightly
different in its original components from, the actual collection of the
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artifact. Both the essentialist principles and the tolerance prineiple
are deemed as truths of metaphysieal neeessity.
Philosophers who participated in the diseussion of the two
paradoxes all find the tolerance principle inconsistent with the
essentialist principles in S4 or S5 modal logic. The tolerance
principle used in the modal inferences provides a suffieient
condition for inferring possible original collection of components for
a given artifact—an artifact could have been constructed aecording to
the same plan from any qualitatively and quantitatively identical
collection of components which is slightly different in its
components from the actual collection of the artifact. According to
this tolerance principle, by a certain quantitative measure, one can
always determine what is the possible variations in the original
matter of the artifact. This tolerance principle is inconsistent, in S4
or S5, with the essentialist principles concerning the original matter
of an artifact. The repeated use of the tolerance principle in modal
inferences and the transitivity of S4 and S5 together will derive
conclusions against essentialism on the issues of identity and
distinctness of artifacts.
The argument against essentialism on the issue of identity of
artifacts is as follows. Given an artifact made from a certain collection
of components C according to plan P in the actual world tv@, by the
tolerance principle, there is a possible world wi possible relative to
w@ in which the given artifact is made according to plan P from
collection of components C\ slightly different from C. By applying the
tolerance principle to lui, there is possible world W2 relative to iwi in
2
which the artifact is made according to plan P from collection of
components C2 which is slightly different from Ci and shares less
components with C than Ci does. Repeating this proeedure for eaeh
Wi, one can infer a sequenee of worlds such that in each Wi the
artifact is constructed from a collection Q, and as i increases, the
components in common between C and Q deerease. One ean finally
reach a world Wn in which the given artifact is made according to
plan P from collection of components Cn which shares no eomponent
with C and yet, by the transitivity of accessibility in S4 or S5 modal
logic, the artifact made from Cn is identical with the given artifaet
actually made from C. The acceptance of this identity eontradicts the
essentialist intuition that an artilact could not have been originally
constructed from a collection of components that significantly differs
from the collection of components from which the artifact is actually
constructed. This is Chisholm’s Paradox. The naming of the paradox
comes from the recognition that this kind of argument is initially
presented in current philosophy by Roderick Chisholm in his article
“Identity Through Possible Worlds: Some Questions” published in
1968.1 The version used in the discussion of Chisholm’s Paradox is
presented by Graeme Forbes in his paper, “Thisness and Vagueness
published in 1983, where he named this philosophical puzzlement
“Chisholm’s Paradox.”^
The argument against essentialism on the issue ol numerical
distinctness begins by considering two distinct artilacts A in world
wa and B in world wb- Artilacts A and B are assumed to be
' I>oiix[1979].82.
2 Forbes [1983], 236-237.
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qualitatively identical and made from the same plan P, but have
different collections of components—A is made from collection Ca
whereas B made from collection Cq. Applying the tolerance principle
to both A and B, one can construct worlds iwai and wb i such that the
difference between A’s collection Cai in world wm and B’s collection
Cbi in world idbi is smaller than the difference between Ca and Cb.
Repeating this process, one can reach a world u)Am in which A is
made according to P from collection CAm and a world UJBm in which
B is made according to P from collection CBm such that CAm is CBm-
The two artifacts, A in u^Am and B in tUBm» are qualitatively and
materially indiscernible, but they are distinct objects—one is A and
the other is B by the transitivity of S5 modal logic. The distinctness
between A in u)Am and B in lUBm contradicts the essentialist intuition
that any possible artifact constructed from a possible collection of
components of a given artifact and sharing all other properties (or
essential properties) with the given artifact is numerically identical
to the given artifact. This line of argument is the Four Worlds
Paradox. Chisholm in his paper of 1968 notices that an
antiessentialist argument on distinctness can be given by the same
consideration about tolerable variations as the one involved in the
antiessentialist argument on identity. In his paper “Parts as Essential
to Their Wholes” published in 1973, Chisholm presented and
discussed an antiessentialist argument on distinctness in term of the
components of objects. ^ Hugh. S. Chandler in his paper Plantinga
and the Contingently Possible” published in 1976 first presented an
3 Chisholm [19731, 585-586.
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argument for bare distinctness by a model of four worlds, namely,
two initial worlds and two qualitatively and materially identical
worlds differing only in their relative possibility relation to the two
initial worlds.^ Nathan Salmon provided a more detailed presentation
and a more adequate discussion of the Four Worlds Paradox in his
paper “How not to Derive Essentialism from the Theory of
Reference” published in 1979.5 Later, Salmon discusses the same
problem in Appendix 1 of his book of 1981, Reference and Essence.^
There are two solutions developed for solving the paradoxes.
One is Salmon’s Intransitive Accessibility Solution and the other is
Forbes’ Counterpart Solution. Salmon and Forbes both hold the view
that the essentialist principles and the tolerance principle involved
in the paradoxical inferences are all intuitively correct and equally
acceptable. More specifically, they both accept the sufficient
condition expressed in the tolerance principle. According to this
sufficient condition, a further possible matter of a given artifact can
be inferred from a known possible matter of the artifact and a certain
quantitative measure of “slightly different.” Salmon holds that there
is a quantitative threshold between tolerable variations and
intolerable variations such that any collection of components which
varies from the actual collection of components of the given artifact
in an amount within the threshold is a possible collection for the
origination of the artifact, otherwise, an impossible collection for the
artifact. Forbes denies that there is such a definite threshold, but he
^ Chandler [1976], 107-108.
5 Salmon [1979], 721-725.
5 Salmon [1981], 229-240.
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holds that a collection sharing more components with the actual
collection of the artifact is more possible, and less eomponents, less
possible, for the artifact to be originated from. If the variation in a
hunk of matter is sufficiently slight, the matter is suffieiently possible
for the given artifact to be originated from. Since Salmon and Forbes
do not challenge any of the premises of the paradoxical inferences,
and since the essentialist principles and the tolerance principle are
inconsistent in standard S5 modal logic, there are just two possible
approaches for solving the paradoxes: one is to reject S5 as the logic
of metaphysical modality, and the other is to adopt or develop some
apparatus with which the essentialist prineiples and the toleranee
principle can be rendered consistent in S5. Salmon’s Intransitive
Accessibility Solution takes the first approach whereas Forbes’
Counterpart Solution takes the second one.
Salmon’s Intransitive Accessibility Solution views the paradoxes
as arising from incorrectly accepting S5 modal logic as the logic of
metaphysical modality. Salmon argues that a possible world is defined
in terms of possibilities and necessities, and the metaphysically
possible worlds of a world w are determined by the possibilities and
necessities contained in w. The necessities and possibilities inferred
from the essentialist principles and the tolerance principle in the
real world determine that some world is not possible relative to the
real world but possibly possible, or possibly possibly ... possible
relative to the real world—the relative possibility relation is
intransitive. The axiom of S4 modal logic, UP^UUP, characterizes a
transitive accessibility relation between possible worlds, and is
6
inconsistent with the intransitive nature of metaphysical modality.
Therelore, the way of solving the paradoxes is to rejeet S4 and S5
modal logic and accept system T as the correct logic for
metaphysical modal reasoning. Salmon’s Intransitive Accessibility
Solution to the paradoxes is developed in Appendix 1 of his book,
Reference and Essence, of 1981.7 Later, he published two papers to
defend his position of rejecting S5, one is “Modal Paradox: Parts and
Counterparts, Points and Counterpoints” published in 1986 and the
other “The Logic of What Might Have Been” published in 1989.
Forbes’ Counterpart Solution has a different view on the nature
of the two paradoxes. Forbes holds that in S5 modal logic, the
intuition of tolerance is more naturally expressed by the conditional,
“if it is possible for a given artifact to be constructed from a
collection C, then it is possible for the artifact to be constructed from
collection C' where C' is slightly different in its components from C,”
than by the necessity, “necessarily if a given artifact is made from
collection C then it is possible for the artifact to be made from C'.”
The conditional and the necessity are equivalent in S5. Forbes holds
that the expression of the intuition of tolerance in the conditional
assimilates these two paradoxes to the Sorites Paradox, and the well-
known treatment of ordinary Sorites Paradoxes can be applied. This
treatment modifies the two-valued semantics by introducing a range
of intermediate degrees of truth between the absolute truth and the
absolute falsehood. Since it does not make good sense to view the
identity relation as intransitive and having degrees, Forbes
7 ScUinon [1981], 238-240.
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introduces a counterpart relation into the semantics to represent
identity. The counterpart relation is based on similarity relation
which is intransitive and can be viewed as having degrees. By
reformulating the paradoxical inferences in this counterpart and
degree-valued semantics, Forbes’ Counterpart Solution diagnoses the
paradoxical inferences as they commit a “fallacy of detachment.”
That is the fallacy of inferring by modus ponens the consequent of a
conditional which has its antecedent true in a higher degree than its
consequent. Forbes’ Counterpart Solution is first developed in his
paper, “Thisness and Vagueness,” published in 1983. He later
defended his solution in his paper of 1984, “Two Solutions to
Chisholm’s Paradox”, and in Chapter 7 of his book. The Metaphysics
of Modality, published in 1985.
This dissertation will contain our criticism of the solutions of
Salmon and Forbes and a further discussion of the paradoxes. Our
first focus will be on Salmon’s Intransitive Accessibility Solution.
Salmon’s solution views Chisholm’s Paradox and the Four Worlds
Paradox as a denial of the traditional belief that metaphysical
modality is characterized by S5 modal logic. According to Salmon’s
defense of his solution, the intransitiveness of the accessibility
relation between possible worlds is shown deductively in his account
from a commonly accepted theory of possible worlds, the intuition of
the essentiality of the original matter of artifacts, and the intuition of
tolerance in the original matter of artifacts. Salmon also defends his
position by some other arguments which are supposed to be
independent of his Intransitive Accessibility Solution but support his
8
rejection of S5 modal logic. We shall analyze Salmon’s arguments and
present our reason for thinking that the Intransitive Accessibility
Solution is not successfully defended. Our second focus will be on
solving the paradoxes and defending S5 modal logic. We shall
propose a solution to the paradoxes that is different from both
Salmon’s solution and Forbes’ solution. We shall argue that the
particular version of the tolerance principle employed in the
paradoxical inferences is false, which we believe to be responsible for
the arising of the paradoxes. Our defense of S5 modal logic as the
correct logic for metaphysical modality will be based on our views
about the nature of the paradoxes and the vagueness of the threshold,
and our discussion on the a posteriori necessities involved in the
problem. Forbes’ Counterpart Solution will be examined while we
consider the correct solution to the paradoxes.
In Chapter 1 we shall give the initial analysis on the modal
principles from which the Paradoxes are deduced. We shall present
the paradoxical modal inferences and Salmon’s argument of his
Intransitive Accessibility Solution.
In Chapter 2 we shall analyze Salmon’s reply to the so-called
“standard objection.” The “standard objection” challenges Salmon
on the nature of metaphysical modality that makes transitivity invalid,
from which one can be convinced of the correctness of the
Intransitive Accessibility Solution. In his reply, Salmon argues that
metaphysical modality is a restricted type of modality (there are
some worlds that are not metaphysically possible worlds). According
to Salmon, metaphysical modality’s being characterized by S5 is
9
commonly defended by the unrestrietiveness of metaphysieal
modality. He argues that sinee metaphysieal modality is neither
unrestricted nor least restrieted, metaphysical modality’s being
characterized by S5 is not being suecessfully defended. On the other
hand, if modal quantifiers quantify over all worlds ineluding
metaphysically possible ones and metaphysically impossible ones,
then the accessibility relation is intransitive. Our analysis of Salmon’s
reply will first clarify two different senses of “restrieted” that
philosophers may use for modality. We shall argue that only if
metaphysical modality is shown to be restricted in both senses, is
Salmon in the position to make the claim that metaphysical
modality’s being characterized by S5 is not being suecessfully
defended, and that the accessibility relation between metaphysically
possible worlds is intransitive. However, we shall show that Salmon
did not succeed in providing an argument which is independent of
his Intransitive Accessibility Solution and shows that metaphysieal
modality is restricted in both senses. The key premise of Salmon’s
argument for the restrictiveness of metaphysical modality relies on
the correctness of his Intransitive Accessibility Solution. This is a
circular reasoning because Salmon’s argument for the restrictiveness
is intended to back up his Intransitive Accessibility Solution.
In Chapter 3, we shall continue to examine Salmon’s defense of
his position. Forbes in rejecting Salmon’s Intransitive Aceessibility
Solution gives a defense of S5 as the logic of metaphysical modality.
Forbes argues that metaphysical necessities, a priori or a posteriori,
are fundamentally conceptual truths, and conceptual truths should be
held the same in every possible world because all possible worlds are
constructed in the same conceptual system. We shall show that this
defense of S5 is not sufficient. The logic of metaphysical modality
should be S5 if the conceptual system, in which possible worlds are
constructed, has the feature of being “absolute essentialist”—the
essential properties of an object possessed in a world w are essential
to the object simpliciter. On the other hand, a sufficient reason to
reject S5 consists in showing that an absolute essentialist conceptual
system is not acceptable, instead, the conceptual system should be a
“relative essentialist” one—the essential properties of an object
possessed in world w are essential to the object with respect to the
world w. Salmon in his argument of Intransitive Accessibility Solution
tries to provide a reason for the unacceptableness of absolute
essentialism. He tries to show that the intransitive accessibility
relation, or relative essentialism, is a consequence of his theory of
possible worlds and the truths of the modal principles (the
essentialist principles and the tolerance principle). We shall argue
that relative essentialism, or the intransitivity of metaphysical
necessity, is actually a presupposition of Salmon’s argument of the
Intransitive Accessibility Solution, and is by no means a non-trivial
consequence of the premises. We shall also examine another
argument of Salmon’s in attempt to show the falsity of some absolute
essentialist principle by means of Leibniz’s Law. Our analysis will
show that this attempt is also failed. We shall conclude that Salmon’s
Intransitive Accessibility Solution is a solution to the two paradoxes
from a relative essentialist point of view. The plausibility of the
Intransitive Accessibility Solution relies entirely on the plausibility of
the relative essentialism. However, no successful defense of relative
essentialist position can be found in Salmon’s account.
In Chapter 4, we shall begin by examining Forbes’ Counterpart
Solution. Our view is that Forbes’ Counterpart Solution is not a
successful solution to the two paradoxes. The Counterpart Solution
uses a trans-world similarity relation to represent the trans-world
identity relation and uses a range of intermediate truth values to
express the decrease of similarity between the actual matter of the
given artifact and the hunks of matter in the sequence derived from
the tolerance principle. A trans-world identity relation may be
indeterminate in some sense in some cases, but we do not think that
identity relations, intro-world or trans-world, can be viewed as true
in a certain degree or percentage. Thus, the identity relation is
either misrepresented or completely removed by the
counterparthood. This solution in fact solves the paradoxes and
defends S5 by avoiding trans-world identity. We shall provide a
different diagnosis to the two paradoxes. In disagreement with
Salmon and Forbes, we hold that the particular version of the
tolerance principle used in the modal inferences to infer an infinite
sequence of possibilities for the given artifact’s original construction
is an incorrect principle. We call this version the “strong tolerance
principle.” We shall provide counterexamples for demonstrating the
falsehood of the strong tolerance principle. We shall discuss some
philosophical views that support our rejection of the strong tolerance
principle. Finally, we shall defend the absolute essentialist intuition
about the original construction of artifacts, and in turn, the validity of
S5 as the logic of metaphysical modality.
1 3
CHAPTER 1
MODAL PRINCIPLES, PARADOXES AND SALMON’S
INTRANSITIVE ACCESSIBILITY SOLUTION
1.1 Two Essentialist Principles
Essentialism holds the doctrine that certain properties of an
object are properties that this object could not fail to have, except by
not existing. Thus, the essential properties of an object are
properties such that necessarily, if the object exists, it has them.
Among essential properties there are some trivial ones, for instance,
property of self-identity, property of existing and properties that are
de dicto truths. Trivial essential properties are essential properties
possessed of necessity by every existing thing. The interesting
essential properties are non-trivial ones. Non-trivial essential
properties are those possessed by a particular thing only or by a
particular kind of things only. An individual essence of object x can
be defined in terms of non-trivial essential properties of x as follows:
an individual essence of object x is a set of properties such that every
property in the set is a non-trivial essential property of x and for any
object y distinct from x it is impossible that y has every property in
the set. We ignore trivial essential properties as they are possessed
by everything. In other words, the individual essence of object x
composed of non-trivial essential properties of x is the smallest set
which necessarily distinguishes x from all other possible objects, and
hence it provides a necessary and sufficient condition for the
identilication ot x. There are many discussions about whether there
ever exist such individual essences and whether, in what sense,
essentialism is true. The paradoxes that concern us, Chisholm’s
Paradox and the Four Worlds Paradox, may be seen as a challenge to
the essentialist belief in individual essences. Specifically, these
paradoxes challenge the following two essentialist principles, the
Principle (N) and Principle (C).
(N) If a wooden table x is originally made from a hunk of
matter y, and z is any hunk of matter whose collection
of components is sufficiently different from the collec-
tion of y, then x could not have been originally made
from z.
(C) If a wooden table x is such that it might have been
made originally from a hunk of matter y according to a
certain plan P, then there could not be any table
distinct from x and made from hunk y according to
the same plan P.
Principles (N) and (C) are in accordance with the essentialist
principles stated in Salmon’s works when he discusses these
paradoxes. Principle (N) is in accordance with Principle (111) in
Salmon! 1986], and Principle (C) with Principle (1) in Salmon[1986]
as well as Principle (V') in Salmon! 1981]. ®
8 See Salmon (1981], 211, and Salmon [1986], 75 and 77. Principle (V') says: “If it is
possible for a given table x to be originally constructed from a certain hunk of
matter y according to a certain plan P, then necessarily any table
originally
constructed from hunk y according to precisely tlie same plan P is the very table x
and no other.” Principle (I) says: “If a wooden table x is such that it might have been
the only table originally formed from a hunk of matter z according to a certain plan
Principle (N) can be seen as a weakened version of Kripke’s
well-known thesis, “The Necessity of Origin”; “if a material objeet
has its origin from a certain hunk of matter, then it could not have its
origin in any other matter. ”9 Principle (N) is weaker than Kripkean
thesis because of a weaker condition that hunk z is not merely
different, but sufficiently different, from table x’s original matter
hunk y. However, Principle (N) is stronger than the weakest version
of Kripkean thesis that a material objeet eould not have its origin in
any other matter entirely different from the one from whieh it
actually originates. The adjustment in Principle (N) is made for
accommodating the intuition about tolerable variations in the original
matter of an artifact. This intuition has two aspects. One aspeet is
that some slight variations in the original matter of a given table are
considered as possible—these variations do not affect the identity of
the given table. This aspect is expressed by the “Tolerance
Principle” which we shall introduce in Section 1.2. The other aspect
is embodied in Principle (N) that it is metaphysically impossible for
the given table to be made from a hunk of matter which is
dramatically or completely different from the matter from which the
table actually originates.
Principle (C) is a strengthened version of another principle
called “the Principle of Cross-World Identification,” which says that
if a material object has its origin from a certain hunk of matter, then
P, then there could not be a table that is distinct from x and the only table formed
from hunk z according to plan P.” Principle (III) says: If a wooden table x is the only
table originally formed from a hunk of matter y, and z is any hunk of matter that
does not sufficiently substantially overlap y, then x is such that it could not have
been the only table originally formed from z instead of from y.
9 Kripke [1972], 1 14, footnote 56.
there could not be any other object originating from this hunk of
matter(assuming that other essential properties hold the same for
the material objects in question). Principle (C) is a stronger version
because it asserts not only that other tables could not be made
according to the same plan from table x’s actual original matter, but
also that they could not be so made from any of table x’s possible
matter. The adjustment in Principle (C) is made for the same reason
as in the case of Principle (N): if certain slight changes in the given
table’s original matter are possible, then it is sufficient that any table
being constructed from a possible matter of the given table according
to the same plan is the given table itself and no other.
Principle (N) and Principle (C) are deemed as metaphysically
necessary principles. If these principles are true, they are not only
true as a matter of fact, but bound to be true no matter how different
the world turns out to be. We may formulate Principle (N) and
Principle (C) as necessary principles in the following way.
(N*) UVxiJVyUVz(D(z,y)^U(M(x,y)^U-.M(x,z))).
Let M(a, (3) mean that wooden table a is originally made from
hunk of matter (3, where by “a is originally made from P” we mean
that p is a collection of components which forms a without any left-
over. Let D(6, P) mean that the collection of the components of 6 is
sufficiently different from the collection of the components of p.
Accordingly, let x be a wooden table, and y and z be hunks of forming
materials for wooden tables. Then (N*) says: For any possible wooden
table X, any possible hunk of matter y and any possible hunk of matter
z, if z is sufficiently different from y, then if it turns out to be the case
that X is made from y, then it eould not be the case that x is made
from z.
(C*) LIVxUVyUVj((jVx)i3G(0(M(x,y)&Px)3G-,(M(j,y)&Px))).
Let j be a table, and Pa means that a is made according to plan
P. Then (C*) says: For any possible wooden table x and any possible
hunk of matter y and any possible wooden table j, ifj is not x, then if
it turns out to be the case that x is possibly made from y according to
certain plan P, then it could not be the case that j is made from y
according to the same plan.
Principle (N) and Principle (C) are also deemed as a priori
propositions. They are principles from a priori philosophical analysis
(Kripke) or from reflections upon the (essentialist) concept of
thisness for individual artifacts(Salmon).io ^ important feature of
these principles is that from these principles and some empirical
information, certain necessary a posteriori truths are derivable. For
example, (N), together with the empirical fact that table a is made
from hunk of wood p and the assumption that 6 is a possible hunk of
wood sufficiently different from p, entails the proposition that table a
could not have been made from 6. Similarly, given the empirical
knowledge that table a and table (3 are distinct and the assumption
that hunk cr is a possible hunk of matter for table a, one can infer that
table P cannot be made from a according to the same plan. Though
Principles (N) and (C) are deemed a priori, the necessary
propositions derivable from them are not, because some empirical
information is needed for obtaining these propositions.
10 See Kripke [1971] in Schwartz [1977] on page 88 and Salmon [1981] on pages 263-
264.
Notice that Principle (C) assumes an unchanged “plan P" lor
the tables in question. We use the word “plan” in Principle (C) to
refer to all other non-trivial essential properties of those tables,
which include, for example, the design(form, size and configuration)
and the particular construction process for the table(the raw
material, the processing method, and maybe the maker). The
meaning of the word “plan” in (C) is in agreement with Salmon’s
usage of the word “plan” in his Principle (V') in Salmon [1981] and
Principle (1) in Salmon) 1986]. i ‘ In Principle (N) the condition of
being made from the original matter is a necessary condition for a
certain table to be itself. In other words, a table’s being made from
its original matter is a property in the individual essence of the table.
In Principle (C) that tables in question share the same “plan,”
namely, they share all other essential properties than the original
matter. Principle (C) indicates that a table distinct from table a
cannot share every non-trivial essential property in the individual
essence of a. In other words, possessing every essential property of
table a is sufficient for an object to be a.
1.2 The Tolerance Principle
“Tolerance Principle” refers to the principle that expresses
the intuition about possible variations in the original matter of
artifacts. As we briefly stated in the Introduction, the Tolerance
Principle employed in the paradoxical inferences has the feature that
we can infer from this principle an infinite sequence of possible
Salmon [1981], 210-211. Salmon [1986], 75.
constructive mutter for un urtiiaet sueh that each successive
occurrence in the sequence is sufficiently similar to its immediate
predecessor, but shares fewer components with the first occurrence
than its immediate predecessor does. Thus, whatever standard one
may give to the notion “sufficiently similar,” the occurrences in the
sequence after some point will not be sufficiently similar to the first
occurrence. There are, however, different versions of the Tolerance
Principle, and not every version possesses the above feature. We shall
in this section try to distinguish between different versions of the
Tolerance Principle, and make clear which version possesses the
above feature and which does not.
It is said that it is intuitively not plausible to insist that every
chip or molecule of a given table is essential to the table such that
none of them could have been replaced by any qualitatively identieal
chip or molecule. This is just to say that some replacements of the
components in the original matter of an artifact are possible. ^ 2 We
think that this intuition is acceptable. In addition, we seem to have
the intuition that the changes in artifacts’ original matter must be
small. Combining these two intuitions we may say that an artifaet
composed of components could be originated from some hunk of
^ 2 Note that we are talking about the fonning matter of a table in the way of talking
set-theoretically the collection of components of that matter. We thus ignore the
details about where each chip or molecule is put to make the table. When we say that
one chip is replaced by another qualitatively identical chip, our notion allows the
cases that the replacing chip may or may not be in the same spot of the table as the
replaced chip was. Also the intuition stated here is an over simplification. We are
not only have the intuition about the tolerable replacement of the chips, some
quantitative changes in the collection of components may also be tolerable. For
example, some chips may be sunply missing from the set or some chips m^p^ be
simply added to the set. This simplification does not alter the nature of the
tolerance and is preferred for the discussion.
20
matter whose eollection of components is slightly different from the
one from which it actually originates. (Here we confine the difference
only to the case that some components are replaced by numerically
diflerent but qualitatively identical components in order to simplify
the discussion.) This is the intuition captured in principle (T) below.
We use the phrase “collection of components” as a set-theoretical
notion. When we say that collection A is different from collection B,
we mean that A and B are different sets—some member of A is not in
B or vice versa.
(T) If a wooden table x is originally made from a hunk of
matter y according to a certain plan P, then x might
have been made according to the same plan P from
a(some) hunk of matter y' instead of from y, where y'
has the same quantity and quality as y but the
collection of components of y' is slightly different from
that of y.
(T) is the weak version of the Tolerance Principle. This version is
given in Salmon! 1986] as the first unnumbered principle. ^3 Also this
version is the only version literally given in Forbes! 1985]. The
Tolerance Principle is also deemed as a metaphysically necessary
principle. Forbes has argued that it is not some special properties of
actual artifacts or of the actual world that make it true. Had things
13 Salmon 11986], 75. Salmon’s first unnmnbered principle says: “If a wooden table x
is tlie only table originally formed from a hunk (portion, quantity, bit) of matter y
according to a certain plan (fonn, structure, design, configuration) P, then x is such
that it might have been the only table formed according to the same plan P from a
distinct but overlapping hunk of matter y' having exactly the same mass, volume,
and chemical composition as y.” Also this version of tolerance principle is the only
version Literally given in Forbes [1985] on page 161.
been dilterent, there would still have been this Tolerance Principle,
Salmon also views the Tolerance Principle as an a priori necessity
which has to do with our concept of artifact. The necessary principle
(T) may be formulated as:
(T*) UVxUVy03y'(Siy',y)&U(iM(x,y)SiPx)^0(Mix,y')&Px))).
Let y' be a hunk of matter of the same sort as y, and let S(6, (3)
mean that the collection of components of 6 is slightly different from
the collection of the components of P, but 6 is qualitatively and
quantitatively the same as p. (T*) says: for any possible wooden table x
and any possible hunk of matter y, there is a possible hunk of matter
y' such that the collection of components of y' is slightly different
from but qualitatively and quantitatively the same as that of y, and if it
turns out to be the case that x is made from y according to plan P,
then table x might have been made from y' according to the same
plan P.
Principle (T) only asserts that table x might have been made
from some sufficiently overlapping matter; therefore, “sutiiciently
overlapping” is not a sufficient condition for a hunk of matter to be a
possible matter of table x. For example, given an actual table a, its
original matter p, a standard for what counts as slightly difterent and
a hunk of matter P' satisfies the standard, one is unable to determine,
by (T) and the given premises, whether it is possible for a to be
made from P'. One needs some additional information or other
reasoning to determine whether P' is a possible matter of table a. The
property of being “slightly different from oc s original matter in (T)
Forbes [1985], 161.
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is not a sufficient condition, for a hunk of matter to be a possible
matter of table a. It is illegitimate to assert any specific possible
matter of table a from (T) and a’s actual matter. Principle (T) seems
to me intuitively correct, but this is not the version that was involved
in the paradoxical inferences.
The version of Tolerance Principle involved in the paradoxical
inferences is the following one. We call it (ST) standing for Strong
Tolerance Principle.
(ST) If a wooden table x is originally made from a hunk of
matter y according to a certain plan P, then x might
have been made according to the same plan P from
any hunk of matter y', instead of from y, where y' has
the same quantity and quality as y but the collection of
components of y' is slightly different from that of y.
We formulate (ST) accordingly as a necessary principle:
(ST*) UVxUVi/UVy'(S(y',i/)=)U((M(x,y)&Px)=)0(M(x,i/')&Px))).
(ST*) says: For any possible wooden table x, any possible hunk of
matter y and any possible hunk of matter y', if the collection of com-
ponents of y' is slightly different from that of y and y' is qualitatively
and quantitatively the same as y, then if it turns out to be the case
that X is made from y according to plan P, then it might have been
the case that x is made from y' according to the same plan P.
(ST) is a much stronger principle, since it asserts that table x
might have been made according to the same plan from any, instead
of from some, slightly different matter. Given an actual table a, its
matter p, and a hunk of matter P' sufficiently overlapping but
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qualitatively and quantitatively the same as p, one ean infer from
these premises and (ST) that table a might have been made
according to the same plan from P'. Furthermore, given a standard
lor what counts as “slightly different,” one can infer a sequence of
possibilities from (ST). In S4 or S5, all the possibilities inferred in
the sequence are real possibilities with respect to the actual table a.
The property of “slightly different from table a’s original matter” in
(ST) is a sufficient condition for the inference about table a’s possible
constructions.
(ST) is the same principle as Principle (11) in Salmon) 1986],
which is explicitly employed in his presentation of the paradoxical
inferences. It is not specified in Salmon) 1981] and Salmon) 1989)
which version of Tolerance Principle is employed, but his discussions
indicate that Salmon has (ST) in his mind.
Salmon claims that principle (11), namely, our principle (ST), is
intuitively and literally true.i® it is not clear to me that the intuition
embodied in (ST) is indeed true. We ask what exactly is the intuition
in (ST), especially, the intuition underlying the word “any” in (ST).
This is a question about the reason that permits the move from (T) to
(ST). In Salmon) 1986), we see another unnumbered principle. (The
first unnumbered principle in Salmon (1986) is the weak version ol
tolerance principle that we stated in (T).) Though 1 am not certain ol
•5 Salmon [1986], 77. Principle (II) says: “If a wooden table x is the only table
originally formed from a hunk of matter y according to a certain plan P. and Y is
any (possibly scattered) hunk of matter that sufficiendy substantially overlaps y
and lias exactly the same mass, volume, and chemical composition as y, then x is
such that it might have been the only table originally formed according to the same
plan P from Y instead of from y.”
Scdinon (1986], 80.
Salmon’s own intention for introducing this principle there, we may
see this principle as elucidating the intuition in (ST). Let us call this
principle (Mi), as being the first principle considered in permitting
the move from (T) to (ST).
(Ml) “If a wooden table x originally formed from a hunk
of matter y is such that it might have been originally
formed from a hunk of matter y' according to a certain
plan P, then for any hunk of matter y " having exactly
the same matter in common with y that y' has, and
having exactly the same mass, volume, and chemical
composition as y', x is also such that it might have
been originally formed from y" according to the same
plan
(Ml) expresses the following thought: if table a made from hunk (3 is
possible to be made from hunk P', then a is possible to be made from
any hunk of matter P" which shares exactly the same components
with P as P' does but differs from P' in the place where P' differs from
P with some component which is qualitatively identical with but
numerically distinct from the corresponding component of P'. This is
to propose that one can use a known possibility as a prototype to
infer other possibilities. Suppose that P is composed of {ci, ..., cio}
and that P' overlaps p except having cn as its component instead of
CIO. Suppose that there is a hunk of matter p" composed of {ci, ..., eg,
C12} in which C12 is qualitatively the same as, but numerically distinct
Salmon [1986], 75.
from, cii. By (Mi), one can infer that table a is also possible to be
made from (3".
Given the understanding of (ST) in the sense of (Mi), (ST) still
does not have the inferential power needed for the paradoxical
inferences. When the phrase “any slightly different matter” in (ST) is
given in the sense of (Mi), it means “any matter that differs slightly
from a’s original matter in the same way as the prototype does.” By
“the same way” we mean what we just explained about the content of
(Ml). The simple property of “slightly different from table a’s
original matter” is still not a sufficient condition for determining any
possible matter for table a. How can one decide whether a hunk of
matter is such a prototype is not shown in (Mi). One needs additional
information or other reasoning to determine whether a hunk of
matter, which is slightly different from a’s original matter, is a
prototypic possible matter of a. Principle (ST) in the sense of (Mi) is
just as weak as (T) when merely a standard for “slightly different” is
assumed, though it does strengthen (T) in the aspect that some
inferences can be done when a prototype is given. Notice that the
inference from a prototype does not automatically produce the kind
of sequence of possibilities in which each successor difters from the
artifact’s original matter more than its immediate predecessor does,
provided that the prototypes are not given as such a sequence.
However, if one does assume the prototypes as such a sequence, we
would say that he probably has in mind some even stronger principle,
namely, principle (M2). In principle (M2), the property of “slightly
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different from a’s original matter” is taken as a sufficient condition
for inferring possible matter for artifacts.
(M2) If a wooden table x originally formed from a hunk of
matter y is such that it might have been originally
formed from a hunk of matter y' according to a certain
plan P, then for any hunk of matter y " having exactly
the same number of components in common with y
that y' has, and having exactly the same mass, volume,
and chemical composition as y', x is also such that it
might have been originally formed from y
"
according
to the same plan P.
Principle (M2) proposes a pure quantitative condition, based on
how many components of a given matter differ from the table’s actual
matter regardless of which components are being replaced, as a
sufficient condition for inferring possible matter for the given table.
The difference between (Mi) and (M2) is the following. When
inferring possibilities from a prototype according to (Mi), one
considers not only how many components of the prototype are
changed from the original matter but also which component of the
original matter is changed in the prototype. The second required
consideration makes the pure quantitative condition not sutticient tor
inferring possibilities for the table. But principle (M2) allows us to
consider only how many components are changed. Let table a, its
actual matter P, {ci, ..., cioK the known possible matter (3 , {ci, ...,
C9 , cii}, be the same as described above. Suppose that there
is
another hunk of matter |3'" composed of {ci, ..., eg, C13, cio} and C13
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is qualitatively equivalent to cg. From (Mi), we don’t know whether
table a could possibly be made from (3"'. But according to (M2 ), this is
a possibility since P'" differs from p in as many components as p' does
and is qualitatively and quantitatively the same as P'. The intuition
embraced in (M2 ) is probably this; Other components of table a’s
original matter are no more essential to the identity of table a than
the components that are replaced in P', the given prototype of
possible matter of a—if these components are replaced in P' without
affecting the identity of table a, the replacement of other
components instead of the ones replaced in P' should be viewed the
same as long as the amount of the changes remains the same. This
intuition views the quantitative condition as sufficient for inferring
possible forming matter for artifacts. In principle (M2), the protot3T>e
y' merely serves as a quantitative standard for the tolerable changes
in table x’s original matter. It is an easy step to drop the prototjrpe
and maintain only the quantitative standard. In the case of table a,
when a pure quantitative standard is taken as sufticient condition tor
inferring possible matter for a, a sequence of possible matter of a, in
which each successor shares less components with a’s original
matter P than its immediate predecessor does, can be interred in S4
or S5 modal logic. We shall see that Chisholm’s Paradox and the Four
Worlds Paradox are derived in S4 and S5 from (N), (C) and (ST) in
the sense of (M2 ).
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1.3 Two Paradoxes
The argument for Chisholm’s Paradox proceeds in the
following way. The modal logic employed in the inference is S5.
Suppose that we have a wooden table a, in the real world w@, made
from a hunk of matter ho composed of {ci, cioo} according to plan
P. Assume that a hunk of matter differing from ho by only one
component definitely counts as slightly different from ho- By the
Strong Tolerance Principle (ST) there is a world wi, possible relative
to the real world w@, in which a is made according to the same plan
P from hunk of matter hi composed of {ci, C99, cioi}, where cioi
is qualitatively identical to but numerically distinct from cioo- Since
(ST) is a necessary principle, there is a world 1V2 possible relative to
wi in which a is made according to plan P from a hunk of matter h2
composed of {ci, 093, C102, cioi} where C102 is qualitatively
identical to but numerically distinct from C99. Suppose that ho, hi, ...,
hm, •••, are hunks of matter such that each hunk is different from its
immediate predecessor in only one component and, as the subscript
increases, the hunk of matter shares fewer components with ho, the
original matter of a in w@. Let lui, ..., t«m, •••, be a sequence ot
worlds such that wi is possible relative to w@ and, for each i>l, Wj is
possible relative to Wi - 1 and table a is made trom hi in Wi. By applying
(ST) repeatedly for the worlds in the sequence, we eventually reach a
world Wn, possible relative to Wn-i, in which a is made according to
plan P from hunk hn which differs from hn-i by one component but
shares no component with ho- By transitivity in S5 modal logic, Wn is
also possible relative to w@. Thus we arrive at the conclusion that
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from the standpoint ot w@ table a eould have been made from hunk
hn aeeording to plan P. But, sinee hn shares no eomponent with Hq.
the two hunks are definitely sufficiently different. By principle (N),
we come to the conclusion that from the standpoint of w@ table a
could not have been made from hunk hn according to plan P. Hence,
we derived a contradiction from principles (N) and (ST).
The argument for the Four Worlds Paradox assumes a boundary
between possible matter and impossible matter of table a. Suppose
that h, the original matter of a in the real world, has one hundred
components represented by the set {ci, C2, ..., cioo}- Assume that any
hunk of matter with the same quantity and quality as h but having
more than two components different from h counts as sufficiently
different from h. Let the real world be a-worldl, and let P-worldl be
a world, possible relative to a-worldl, in which a distinct wooden
table p is made from the hunk of matter h' composed of {ci, ..., cge,
ciOL cio2, cio3, C104} according to the same plan P according to
which table a is made in a-worldl. In virtue of principle (ST) and
above assumption of the tolerable variations, there is a world, a-
world2, possible relative to a-worldl, in which a is made according
to plan P from a hunk of matter h" composed of {ci egg, cio3.
C104}. Also, there is another world, p-world2, possible relative to (3-
worldl, in which p is made according to plan P from {ci C98, cio3,
C104}, the very same hunk of matter as a’s matter in a-world2. Since
P-worldl is possible relative to a-worldl and P-world2 is possible
relative to p-worldl, by the transitivity of S5 modal logic, p-world2 is
also possible relative to a-worldl. This is to say that irom the stand-
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point of the a-worldl, table p, distinet from table a, eould have been
made aeeording to the same plan P from the hunk {ci, cgs, C103,
C104}, a possible matter of table a. But by prineiple (C), we have that
from the standpoint of a-worldl, table (3 eould not be made
according to the same plan P from the hunk {ci, egg, C103, C104}.
Thus, we have derived a contradiction from principle (C) and the
Strong Tolerance Principle (ST).
Salmon has argued that even if principle (C) is eliminated from
the above argument, an equally paradoxical argument can be
constructed by the following consideration. In the above argument of
the Four Worlds Paradox there is nothing that requires a-world2 and
(3-world2 to differ in anyway except the identity of two tables a and p.
The notion of materially complete proposition is given as: “A
proposition is materially complete if it is a complete enumeration of
every particle of matter in the cosmos throughout all of a potential
history of the world, as well as a complete specification of all the
physical interactions and configurations of all the matter in the
cosmos in exact chronological sequence throughout that potential
history.” 18 por each possible world there corresponds a materially
complete proposition. (All materially complete propositions
corresponding to the same possible world should be equivalent).
Assume that a-worldl and p-worldl are exactly the same except that
two tables a and P differ by four qualitatively identical components.
Assume also that the other two worlds, a-world2 and P-world2,
resemble a-worldl and P-worldl respectively with the only
^8 Salmon [1986], 79.
difterence of two components in the tables’ original matter. Let p be
the materially complete proposition corresponding to a-world2. By
(ST), it is possible from the standpoint of a-worldl that p is true and
table a is made from h ". (0(p&M(a,h"))) But, by the same prineiple
(ST) through transitivity, it is also possible from the standpoint of a-
world 1 that p is true and it is not the ease that table a is made from
h". (0(p&^M(a,h"))) This means that the identity of a table eannot be
decided by a complete description of material facts. Tliis conclusion
contradicts the supervenience principle: a material object is nothing
over and above its matter and form. Salmon holds that the
supervenience principle is true for the material objeets like tables.
He says that the faet that h " constructs table a, “if it does, is
supervenient on a complete possible history of all the matter in the
cosmos.” ^9 According to the supervenience thesis, either p
necessarily entails that table a is made from h ", or p necessarily
entails that it is not the case that table a is made from h ". (U(p ^
M(a,h"))VU(p=>-iM(a,h"))) Thus the second version of the Four
Worlds Paradox.
The Supervenience Principle is a more general principle than
principle (N) and principle (C). Principles (N) and (C) are
supervenience principles on a particular object—they follow from the
general supervenience principle. In the second version ot the Four
Worlds Paradox, principle (C) is replaced by the general
supervenience principle.
'9 Salmon [1986], 80.
1.4 Salmon’s Account of Possible Worlds
In order to have a clear understanding of Salmon’s Intransitive
Accessibility Solution to the paradoxes, it is important to explain
some crucial concepts and viewpoints of the theory of possible
worlds that Salmon endorses, which constitute the theoretical basis
for his solution and his defense for his solution.
Salmon holds the following concept of possible worlds; In our
pre-philosophical views we think that there are alternative ways
things might have gone, or other situations in which things could
have been. “Possible worlds” is just a philosopher’s name for the
different ways things might have been. TTiere are various approaches
in construing the ontological nature of possible worlds, namely, what
kind of entity the possible worlds are. Salmon holds that possible
worlds are actually existing maximal abstract entities that can be
instantiated or realized. First, possible worlds are entities
constructed in our real world—they are not entities existing spatially
and temporally in some place disconnected from the real world.
Hence possible worlds are actually existing entities. Secondly, a
possible world is not a “world” in the usual sense, that is, it is not a
concrete object of the same sort as our real world. A possible world is
an abstract entity that exists in the real world. Philosophers who
view possible worlds as abstract entities construe possible worlds
either as maximal propositions, or as maximal sets of propositions, or
as maximal states of affairs, or as a maximal property. For Salmon, a
possible world is called a “maximal scenario.” Thirdly, possible
worlds are maximal entities. In Salmon’s words, a possible world [is]
a set of (potential) facts or statements that does not leave any of a
very comprehensive range of questions of fact undecided . ”20 Lastly,
possible worlds are a special sort of abstract maximal entity such that
in a certain sense they are possibly to be instantiated or realized.
Based on his modal notion of possible world, Salmon
emphasizes on the following three viewpoints.
(1) One must distinguish between the generic notion of a world
(a way for things to be) and the modal notion of a possible world (a
way things might have been). Salmon points out that not all actual
existing maximal abstract entities of the sort (propositions,
properties or states of affairs) are possible worlds. As a maximal
abstract entity it can be any arbitrary maximal combination of the
answers to the questions of fact—it needs not be compossible in any
sense and even needs not be logically consistent. “Worlds” is a name
for all maximal abstract entities, which is defined by him as “total
way-for-things-to-be-even-if-things-could-not-have-been-that-way.” A
possible world represents “a way for things to be such that things
might have been that way.”2i The notion of possibility is crucial to
the understanding of the notion of a possible world; one must know
20 Salmon [1989], 6. Here by proposition Salmon means propositions as Russell
conceived. He means to exclude tlie modal logician’s conception of a proposition as a
set of possible worlds, wliicli would create a circle in explaining the notions. In
saying “any of a very comprehensive range of questions of fact” instead of “any
question of fact”, Salmon is considering the following two cases: (i) given a certain
decision on some statement, some other statements are neither tme nor false under
tliis condition, and hence neither these latter statements nor their negations can be
inchided in the set of statements of the world which contains the fonner statement;
(ii) certain meta -facts or facts about possible worlds and sets of facts cannot be
included in the set of statement of a world for the reasons concerning cardinality
problems. (Note tliat in holding (i), Salmon adopts the Fregean view: Given that the
statement “there is no present King of France is tn.ie, the statement the present
King of France is bald” is neither true nor false.)
21 Salmon [1989], 12.
what the possibilities are in order to know whether a way for things
to be is a way that things might have been.
(2) The possibilities and neeessities of a given world
determines which world is possible relative to the given world.
According to Salmon, possible worlds should always be viewed in a
relative sense with respect to a certain world. Whether a world is
possible relative to a given world is decided by the possibilities the
given world has. Salmon defines the notion of relative possibility or
accessibility of worlds as this; a world w' is metaphysically possible
relative to a world w if and only if every fact of w' is a metaphysical
possibility in w (that is, every proposition that is true according to w'
is possible according to w). This is the standard definition of relative
possibility between worlds given in Kripke’s pioneer work on the
semantics of modal logic. 22 Salmon gives another definition of
accessibility which he claims is equivalent to the first one: w' is
metaphysically possible relative to w if and only if every
metaphysically necessary fact of w obtains in w' (that is, every
proposition that is necessary according to w is true according to
u)').23 These two definitions of relative possibility relation describe
how possible worlds of a given world are determined by the
necessities and possibilities of the given world.
We have some comments on the equivalence of the two
definitions of accessibility. As we see it, these two definitions are
22Kripke [1963], 70.
23 Salmon] 1989], 18.
equivalent only il the worlds in question are all consistent. 24 Suppose
that world w' is possible relative to a consistent world w by the
second definition that every necessary fact of w obtains in w'. If w' is
inconsistent, it may still contain some fact that is not a possibility in
IV. Thus according to the first definition that w' is possible relative to
w il' and only if every fact of w' is a possibility in w, w' is not possible
relative to world w. For example, assume that it is a necessity of w{
that table a cannot be made from hunk of matter h. World luk, a
world possible relative to wi according to the second definition, must
contain the fact that table a is not made from hunk h. Assume that
tuk is inconsistent and contains the fact that table a is made from
hunk h. Since the fact that table a is made from hunk h is not a
possibility of Wj, luk is not a possible world of wi according to the
first definition. A similar reasoning can be given when we assume
that w is inconsistent but w' is consistent.
(3) There exist impossible worlds. In Salmon’s theory of
possible worlds, the set of possible worlds with respect to world w
represent the ways things might have been according to world w.
The other worlds that are not qualified to be in the set of possible
worlds of IV are ways things cannot be according to iv, namely, they
are impossible worlds relative to world w. Salmon insists on the
actual existence of impossible worlds. The impossible worlds of w
possess different modal properties from those possible worlds of w.
But the impossible worlds of iv and the possible worlds of iv are not
24 Wlien the worlds in question are all inconsistent, the two definitions are also
equivalent. But these cases are philosopliically uninteresting and logically trivial
because an inconsistent world contains everything.
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different ontologically—they all maximal abstract entities existing in
the real world.
Salmon distinguishes the metaphysically impossible worlds that
are only contingently impossible from those that are essentially
impossible with respect to a certain world u>.25 The contingently
impossible worlds of w are those that are not possible relative to w,
but possibly possible, or possibly possibly possible, or possibly ...
possibly possible relative to w. That is, a contingently impossible
world according to world lu is a world which is not possible relative
to w but bears an ancestral relative possible relation to w. On the
other hand, an essentially impossible world relative to world ir is a
world which is not even possibly possibly
... possible to any degree of
nested accessibility relation to w. Salmon gives two examples for
essentially impossible worlds: “A world according to which Nathan
Salmon is Henry Kissinger is such a world, for example, as is a world
according to which Nathan Salmon is a Visa credit card account with
the Bank of America. Since they are wa3rs-for-things-to-be of a certain
sort (viz., such that things necessarily cannot be that way, and
necessarily necessarily cannot be that way, and so on), Given
that the name “Nathan Salmon” rigidly denotes the person Nathan
Salmon and the name “Henry Kissinger” rigidly denotes the person
Henry Kissinger, the essentially impossible world in which Nathan
Salmon is Henry Kissinger is a logically inconsistent world, since it
contains both the statement that Nathan Salmon is Henry Kissinger
and the statement that it is not the case that Nathan Salmon is Henry
25 Salmon [1989], 7-8. 24-25.
26 Salmon [1989], 7-8.
Kissinger.27 The other essentially impossible world deseribed in
Salmon’s example involves a sortal confusion (that is, the person
Nathan Salmon is said to be a Visa credit card account). This world is
essentially metaphysically impossible because it violates a certain
metaphysical principle.
1.5 The Intransitive Accessibility Solution
Salmon’s Intransitive Accessibility Solution holds that (i) the
principles (N), (C) and (ST), and their multiple necessitations
(namely, the necessity of the necessity of ... of the principles), are
intuitively and literally true; (ii) the conventionally accepted axiom of
S4 modal propositional logic, UP^UUP, or equivalently, the
presumption that metaphysical modal accessibility between worlds is
transitive, is illegitimate and must be rejected in its unrestricted
form. 28 Salmon has expressed the thought that necessity iteration,
namely transitivity, is legitimate for the a priori principles like (N),
(C), (T) and (ST), but fallacious with respect to the kind of necessary
a posteriori propositions derivable from these a priori principles.
Since necessity iteration is fallacious with respect to at least some
necessary a posteriori propositions, an unrestricted version of S4
axiom schema is therefore illegitimate.
In the following we present Salmon’s Intransitive Accessibility
Solution to the Paradoxes.
27 We shall deHne logicaUy consistent world in Chapter 2 as a world wliich does not
contain any inconsistent fhiite part. An inconsistent finite part of a world is a
statement the form of which is the negation of a thesis of the logical system in
question.
28 Salmon [1986], 80.
29 Sahnon [1989], Section X.
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Salmon argues that in the case of Chisholm’s Paradox,
according to Principle (N), there is a threshold somewhere in the
sequence of Hq, hn which marks the tolerable variations in table
a s original matter with respect to the real world u)@.30 xhe hunks
that precede the threshold are regarded as sufficiently similar to
table a’s actual original matter ho, and the hunks that succeed the
threshold as sufficiently different from ho. Suppose that hunk hm is
the last one in the sequence regarded as sufficiently similar to ho.
Any hunk of matter in the sequence after hm is an impossible matter
for a from the standpoint of w@. Given Salmon’s view that the
necessities and possibilities contained in w@ determine whether a
world is possible relative to w@, any world in which table a is
originated from hi(i>m) is an impossible world relative to w@, because
w@ contains the necessity that necessarily table a cannot made from
any hunk hi(i>m). World lUm+i, which contains table a made from
^m+l» is the first impossible world in the sequence. Since Principle
(ST) is an a priori necessary principle, according to Salmon’s view,
(ST) holds in every world possible relative to the real world and
hence in world Wm- By the possibility derivable from (ST) in Wm,
World t«m+l is a possible world relative to world Wm which is possible
relative to w@. So, Wm+\ is possibly possible relative to w@. But by the
a posteriori necessity derivable from principle (N) in w@, u^m+l is not
a genuinely possible world. So lUm+l is a possibly possible but
genuinely impossible world. Using Salmon’s terminology, u^m+l is a
Salmon points out tliat whether the tlireshold of tlie possible matter of an artifact
consists in a sliarp cutoff point, or in an indeterminate interval, will not affect the
way of presenting the paradoxes and liis way of solving the problem. I tliink that he
is right at this point.
contingently impossible world relative to w@. Since iv^ is possible
relative to w@ and tUni+i is possible relative to Wm but tUni+i is not
possible relative to w@, the relative possibility relation is not
transitive. The same reasoning can be given to any world w^+i (i<i <m),
where table a is made from hunk hm+i- (Worlds iVm+i are
contingently impossible worlds of the same degree as u>m+i is relative
to w@.) However, Salmon continues to argue, in the paradoxical
inference, the transitivity of S4 and S5 modal logic permits the
modal inference from w@Rwm and WmRWxn+i to tu@RiUm+i. By this
inference, all worlds Wm+u which are impossible relative to w@
according to the a posteriori necessity derivable from (N) in w@, be-
come possible relative to w@ and eonsequently, table a's being made
from hunk hm+i becomes possible from the standpoint of w@. The
inferences allowed by transitivity are illegitimate. The relative
possibility relation determined by the a posteriori neeessities and
possibilities asserted in (N) and (ST) in the relevant worlds is non-
transitive. Therefore, modal inferences involving Principles (N) and
(ST) must be carried out in a modal logic which is consistent with
the intransitive nature of the relative possibility relation. The paradox
arises because the alleged possible worlds of w@ inferred by the
transitivity of S4 and S5 modal logic are not genuinely possible
according to Principle (N) in w@. Therefore, S4 and S5 modal logie
should be rejected as correct logic for metaphysical modal reasoning
concerning artifacts.
In the case of the first version of Four Worlds Paradox, it is
assumed that any hunk of matter having more than two components
40
diltercnt irom table a s ori^nal matter h are ret^arcled as siiirieieiilly
dilferent I'rom table a’s ori0nal matter h. It is also assiiiiu'd that \\-
worldl, in whieh table (3 is made Irom h' dilTerin^ irom h by lour
eornponents. is possible relative to (x-worldl, Aeeordin^ to FrineipU'
(ST) in a-worldl, a-world2, in whieh table (x is made Irom h" that
has two eornponents dilTerent I'rom a’s matter h in a-worldl, is
possible relative to a-worldl. Likewise, aeeordin^r (ST) in (1-worldl,
(Lworld2, in which table (3 is made Irom hunk h" that has two
components dift'erent from (3’s matter h' in (3-world 1, is possible
relative to (3-worldl. Salmon argues that though (3-world2 is a
possible world relative to (3-worldl and (3-worldl is a possible world
relative to a-worldl, (3-world2 is an impossible world relative to a-
worldl according to Principle (C) in a-worldl. Hence, from the
standpoint of a-worldl, (3-world2 is a possibly possible but not
genuinely possible world. The paradoxical inferenee takes an
illegitimate step in inferring that (3-world2 is possible relative to a-
worldl from (3-world I’s being possible relative to a-worldl and (3-
world2’s being possible relative to (3-worldl. This step is validated by
the transitivity of S4 and S5 modal logic. To solve the Four Worlds
Paradox, one should reject S4 and S5 as correct logic for modal
reasonings coneerning artifacts.
In the case of the second version of the Four Worlds Paradox,
Salmon argues that the supervenienec thesis held in a-worldl
prevents (3-world2 from being accessible from a-worldl. This shows
that the accessibility relations determined by the possibilities ol
these worlds is intransitive. The paradoxical eonehision is drawn
from a step allowed by the transitivity of S4 and S5 modal logic. By
denying the transitivity, one can only infer that (i) it is possible that p
is true and table a is made from h", and (ii) it is possibly possible that
p is true and it is not the case that table a is made from h".
We may summarize Salmon’s argument in his Intransitive
Accessibility Solution as follows.
(1) The metaphysical necessities and possibilities contained in
a given world determine which world is metaphysically possible
relative to the given world.
(2) The Principles (N), (C) and (ST) express certain
metaphysical necessities of the real world. These principles and
their multiple necessitations are true in the real world. The
stipulation about the possibility of P-worldl is also a correct one.
(3) The necessities and possibilities inferred from Principles
(N), (C) and (ST) in those involved worlds determine that the
metaph}^ical accessibility relation between the worlds is intransitive.
(4) The correct modal logic employed in the modal inferences
involving the three principles must be consistent with the
intransitive nature of the accessibility relation between the worlds
determined by the three principles.
(5) The axiom of S4 modal logic, UP=)UUP, characterizes a
transitive accessibility relation between possible worlds.
(6) Therefore, to avoid the paradoxes is to reject S4 and S5
modal logic and accept system T as the correct logic for
metaphysical modal reasoning.
We shall discuss the soundness of this argument in Chapter 3.
CHAPTER 2
ON SALMON’S REPLY TO THE “STANDARD OBJECTION”
2*1 The “Standard Objection” and the Restrictiveness
of Metaphysical Modality
In his paper, “Logic of What Might Have Been,” Salmon has
summed up a “standard objection” to his intransitivity account. The
objection, as Salmon presents it, has two parts. In the first part,
Salmon says, the objection holds the view that the intransitive
accessibility relations are introduced into modal semantics for the
purpose of interpreting various restricted types of modalities such as
nomological modality. A world w' is nomologically possible relative to
a world in if and only if every natural law of w is true in in', and a
proposition is nomologically necessary in an arbitrary possible world
in if and only if it is true in every world nomologically possible
relative to in. However, the distinguishing characteristic of
metaphysical necessity and possibility is that it is completely
unrestricted or the least restricted. Such an unrestrictiveness of
metaphysical modality honors S5 modal logic. The second part of the
objection, as Salmon puts it, asks for an explanation of the restriction
in metaphysical modality to explain why transitivity fails. For
example, the failure of transitivity in nomological modality can be
clearly understood from the definitions of nomological modality and
nomologically possible worlds. If the intransitive accessibility account
rejects S4 and S5 in favor of system T as the logic of metaphysical
modality, it must provide a clear account of the restriction that
indicates the failure of transitivity in metaphysical modality.
According to this description of the “standard objection,” the
defensive argument for S5 in the first part of the objection can be
written as below:
(I) If metaphysical modality is unrestricted, then it is
characterized by S5 modal logic.
(II) Metaphysical modality is unrestricted.
(III) Therefore, metaphysical modality is characterized by
S5 modal logic.
The key word in this argument is the word “restricted”. Because the
“standard objection” is presented by Salmon in his own words, we
must be clear about what Salmon means by the word “restricted” in
order to understand what the objection is as Salmon presents it.
Salmon explains the notion of “restriction” as follows.
(Passage (1)]
... a proposition is said to be necessary, in the restricted
sense in question, with respect to an arbitrary possible
world w if and only if it is true in every possible world of
such-and-such a restricted sort—the restriction in
question depending on some appropriate relation to w.3i
According to this passage, a certain type of necessity and
possibility is a restricted type if and only if it is qualitatively defined
so that only a special sort of worlds can be the possible worlds ol the
t3Tpe relative to an arbitrarily given world w. In other words, if we talk
set-theoretically, we may explain Salmon’s notion of “restricted” like
Salmon [1989], 9.
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this: a type ot modality is restricted if and only if not every world is a
member of the set of possible worlds of the type with respect to an
arbitrarily given world w; a type of modality is not the least restricted
if and only if the set of possible worlds of the type with respect to w
is a proper subset ot the set of possible worlds of some other type
with respect to the same world w. We may see this from the
following passage in which Salmon argues that metaphysical modality
is a restricted but not the least restricted type.
[Passage (2)|
Another type of modality less restrictive than
metaphysical modality is provided by what is sometimes
called “logical necessity” and “logical possibility,” ... A
proposition is logically necessary if its truth is required
on logical grounds alone, logically possible if its truth is
not ruled out by logic alone ... Thus whereas it is logically
necessary that Nathan Salmon is not somebody other
than Nathan Salmon, and it is also logically necessary that
either Nathan Salmon is a Visa credit card account with
the Bank of America or he is not, it is not logically
necessary that Nathan Salmon is not a credit card
account. Although there is a way things logically could be
according to which I am a credit card account, there is
no way things metaphysically might have been according
to which 1 am a credit card account. This illustrates the
restricted nature of metaphysical modality. Some logically
possible worlds must be “ignored.” Metaphysical
necessity is truth in every logically possible world of a
certain restricted sort. ... Just as nomological possibility
is a special kind of metaphysical possibility, so
metaphysical possibility is a special kind of logical
possibility.32
Considering necessity of any types which have been discussed
by philosophers, we see that they are all qualified as a restricted type
in the sense given in Passage (1), that a necessary proposition of a
32 Salmon [1989], 13-14.
certain type in an arbitrary world iv is a. proposition true in every
possible world of the special sort relative to iv. For instance, a
nomological necessity of w is true in every nomologically possible
world relative to w, a metaphysical necessity of w is true in every
metaphysically possible world relative to u^, a logical necessity of w is
true in every logically possible world relative to w, and so on. Salmon
himself admits that in this sense there is no (interesting notion oh
completely unrestricted modality.33
Immediately after Passage (1), Salmon says the following:
[Passage (3)]
Such restrictions yield failures of the characteristic S4
principle that any “necessary” truth is necessarily
necessary, and even of the characteristic B principle that
any truth is necessarily possible.34
The impression of Passage (3) is that any of such restrictions
yields a failure of the S4 principle and perhaps even the B principle.
We notice that Passages (1) and (3) are given when Salmon presents
the “standard objection.” If the impression is right, Salmon might
mean that his opponents hold not only (1) but also (IV) and (V) below:
(IV) If a modality is restricted, then it cannot be
characterized by S5 modal logic.
(V) If metaphysical modality is restricted, then it cannot
be characterized by S5 modal logic.
We can see in Passage (2) that Salmon himself uses the word
“restricted” in the same sense as it is defined in Passage (1). This
33 Salmon [1989], 15.
34 Salmon [1989], 9.
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means that in Passage (1) Salmon is aiming to elarify the notion of
“restrieted” and then use it rather than to present a view and then
reject it. Because of this, we have reason to believe that he himself
agrees with the views stated in (IV) and (V).
The notion of “restricted” given in Passage (1) is better
understood with respect to a model. That is, the phrase “all worlds”
means all worlds defined in a model, and the phrase “the type of
modality is restricted” means that for any world iv in the model, not
every world in the model is a possible world relative to w with
respect to the type of modality in question. A model containing all
worlds is just a special case. When models are considered in general,
it is easy to see that (IV) is false. It can be the case that the modality
is restricted in the given sense and yet characterized by S5. This is
illustrated in the following (LPC+S5) model <W, D, R, V), where W is a
set of worlds, D is a set of individuals, R is accessibility relation for
the type of modality in question, and V is a value assignment which
(i) assigns to any atomic n-place predicate a set of ordered n-tuples
of member of D for each world in W, denoted by V((j),iri), and (ii)
assigns 1 or 0 to any atomic formula 4)Xi ..., Xn in world Wi€W
according as <xi ..., Xn>e V((j),iUi) or not, and (iii) assigns 1 or 0 to any
other wtTs of LPC+S5 according to the standard rules. 35 The model is
the following:
W = {w I , W2 , ws\ and D = {a}.
For any atomic n-place predicate (j),
V((j),u^i) = {a, ..., a},
35 See [Hughes & Cresswell] page 147 for rules about —i, v, and 0, and page 192 for
rules about =.
V((j),u)2) = {a a],
and V((}),u)3) = 0.
By this definition of V, (j) is true of everything, namely, true of a,
at w\ and at IV2, but of nothing at UJ3.
Let L be the type of necessity for which the accessibility
relation for the worlds in W is:
R = {(Wi,W2), {W2,W\), (W2,W2), <11)3, U?3>}.
The accessibility relation R splits W into two equivalence
classes, iDi and iV2 versus 1D3. In this model, V(LVx(|)x,
..., x, idi)= 1 .
The type of necessity L is restricted in the very sense defined in
Passage ( 1 )—the necessary proposition LVx(j)Jc, ..., x in world id 1 is a
proposition true in every world of a restricted sort in W, that is, in
iDi and ID2- In other words, not every world of W is a L-possible world
with respect to iDi. The same is true for 1D2 and 1D3. Yet the model
satisfies S5 for L: Given V(LVA:(t)x x, iDi)=l, V(MVa: 4)X, ..., x, iDi)=l
where M refers to the possibility of the same type as that of L. Also,
we have V(MVx(f)x. ..., x, 0)2)= 1 and therefore V(MVx(j)x, ..., x^ LMVx
(J)x, ..., X, iDi)=l. The same holds for 1D2 that V(MVx(j)X, ..., x=^ LMVx
4)X, ..., X, iD2)=l. Since there is no world accessible from 1D3 in which
the proposition Vx (j)X, ..., x is true, V(MVx(j)x, ..., x, id3)=0 and hence,
V(MVx(j)X, ..., x^ LMVx(f)X, ..., x, iD3)=l.^®
It seems to me, however, by “all worlds” Salmon does not
mean all worlds in an arbitrary model but rather all the abstract
maximal entities defined as “total way for things to be even if things
36 Professor Max Cresswell suggested to me a inetliod of using a mini-model to show
that there can be two kinds of modality such that one is more restricted tlian the
other and yet each obeying S5. His method is used in the argument presented here in
which we show that there can be a restricted type of modality obeying S5.
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could not have been that way. ”37 Thus, speaking in term of model,
the question is: if W in the model is specified as a set of all the “total
ways for things to be even if things could not have been that way,”
then whether it is true that any restricted t3T>e of modality in the
given sense cannot be characterized by S5 modal logic. We shall
consider this question later in Section 2.4.
We consider another sense of restriction. We have said that
according to Passages (1) and (3), being restricted in the sense given
in Passage (1) causes the failure of transitivity and even the failure of
symmetry. According to the statement in Passages (1) and (3), being
intransitive or being asymmetric is not part of definition of
restriction, but an inevitable consequence brought about by being
restricted. We have shown, by the model above, that this alleged
causal relation is wrong in general, but we postponed the discussion
of a special case to Section 2.4. There is another sense of restriction
for modality in which being intransitive (or being asymmetrie) is part
of definition of restriction. In this sense, a type of modality is
restricted if and only if the nature of the type of modality determines
that (i) not every world is a possible world of the type with respect to
an arbitrary world w, and (ii) the accessibility relation of the type is
not an equivalence relation. In fact, (ii) entails (i). We put the
definition in this way for an easy comparison between two senses of
restriction.
The second sense of restriction is probably mostly meant by
philosophers. Those philosophers who hold the “standard objection”
37 This is Salmon’s definition of a world given in Salmon [1989], on page 12.
to Salmon’s account may actually raise the objection using the seeond
sense ol restriction. Salmon did not explicitly distinguish the seeond
sense ol restriction, but he is certainly aware of it and also tries to
argue lor his position in term of it. In his presentation of the
“standard objection,” when explaining how the restrietion in
nomological modality fails S5 modal logic, Salmon says the following:
[Passage (4)]
A proposition is nomologically necessary in an arbitrary
possible world w if and only if it is true in every possible
world in which all of the laws of nature in w are true. ... a
world w' is ... nomologically possible relative to ... a world
w if every natural law of w is true in w'. ... Suppose, for
example, that w and w' are worlds so different in their
natural constitution that although every natural law of w is
true in w' ( so that w' is nomologically possible relative to
w), some of these natural laws of w are not natural laws in
w' but merely accidental generalizations, while certain
other generalizations not even true in w are additional
natural laws in w'. Then a natural law of w (which is
automatically nomologically necessary in w) that is not
also a natural law of w' will not be true in every world
nomologically possible relative to w, and hence will not
be nomologically necessarily nomologically necessary in
w. Similarly, a proposition that is true in w but violates
one of the additional natural laws of w' will not be
nomologically necessarily nomologically possible in w. In
this restricted scheme, accessibility between worlds is
neither transitive nor symmetric. 3®
According to Passage (4), the definition of nomological necessity and
the definition of nomological accessibility relation indicate that the
set of nomological necessities and possibilities in a world w may be
different from the set of nomological necessities and possibilities of
some world nomologically possible relative to w. It allows the case
that there is a nomological necessity p of world w which, though true
38 Salinon [1989], 8-9.
in a nomologically possible world w' relative to w, is not a
nomological necessity in world w'. Thus, p is not nomologically
necessarily nomologically necessary in w, and some nomologically
possible world of w' is not nomologically possible according to uj. We
call the nature of a modality of this sort the varying nature. Clearly, it
is the varying nature of nomological modality that yields the failure of
transitivity and symmetry between nomologically possible worlds.
The example of nomological modality in Passage (4) tells us that it is
not the question of whether the type of modality is simply restricted
in the sense given in Passage (1), but rather the question of how the
type of modality is specified, which is relevant to the failure of S4
principle or B principle. In other words, the failure of the S4
principle or the B principle is not a consequence of being restricted
in the sense given in Passage (1), but a consequence of being
restricted in a particular way that makes the type of modality to bear
the var3dng nature. Let us call the restrictions defined in Passage (1)
“restriction -sensei,” and the restrictions bringing the varying nature
to a type of modality “restriction-sense2.”
According to Salmon, the characteristic S5 principle is
defended by the unrestrictiveness of metaphysical modality. If we
understand the word “unrestricted” in restriction -sense2, then “a
type of modality is unrestricted” should mean either that the t}qDe ol
modality is simply unrestricted in restriction-sensei, or that there is
no varying nature consisted in the type of modality. But since
unrestricted in restriction-sensei is just a special case of not bearing
the varying nature, we may simply say that “a t3T>e ol modality is
unrestricted in restrietioii-sense2" means that there is no varying
nature in the tv'pe of modality.
We know that it the set of necessities and possihilitit's ol a (ype
in an arbitraiy world w does not vary from w to worlds aec('ssihl(‘
troin w. then the accessibility relation is an eqnivaleiu't' rc'lation. A
model tor this type of modality will contain one or mon' (HiuivaUMiei'
classes and in each equivalence class eveiw world is a possible' world
ot the type with respect to any world in the equivaleiu'e' ('lass. (Ih'iujLi
unrestricted in restrietion-sense2 entails beiiii» unr('slri('l('d in
restriction-sensei with respect to the equivalence class.) W(' also
know that such a model fits S5. Thus, the an>umenl whic'h de'lcMids
S5 in term of unrestrietiveness of metaphysical modalily in
restriction-sense2 can be written as follows:
(VI) If metaphysical modality is unrest riel ed in
restrietion-sense2. then it is characterized by S5 modal
loi^ie.
(VII) Metaphysical modality is unrestrieted in n'strietion-
sense2.
(VIll) Therefore, metaphysical modality is eharaeterizc'd
by S5 modal louiie.
Notice that (VI) as well as (IX) and (X) below are trivially true:
(IX) If a modalily is restrietc'd in restrict ion-s('ns('2. tln'ii
it cannot be characterized by S5 modal lo)>ic.
(X) If metaphysical modalily is restricted in n'striction-
scnsc2. (hen it cannot be characterized by Sv5 modal
.5 2
lo^ic.
I believe that being eharaeterized by S5 modal logie is usually
defended by the unvarying nature of metaphysieal modality.
Specifieally, in the diseussions related to the two Paradoxes, Graeme
Forbes has argued for the unvarying nature of metaphysieal modality
as his reason for favoring S5 to be the logie of metaphysieal modality.
He defines metaphysieal neeessities as neeessities of eoneeptual
truths, and argues that sinee eoneeptual truths do not vary from a
given world to the worlds metaphysieally aeeessible from the given
world, the aeeessibility relation between metaphysieally possible
worlds is an equivalenee relation. His argument may be seen as an
agreement with the general line of argument (Vl)-(Vlll).
2.2 Salmon’s Reply to the “Standard Objection”
We said earlier that the “standard objeetion,” as Salmon
presents it, has two parts. The first part of the objeetion gives a
defensive argument for S5 in term of unrestrietiveness of
metaphysical modality, whereas the second part of the objection
requires the intransitive accessibility account to provide a definition
of metaphysical modality from which the failure of transitivity can be
explained.
In rejecting the “standard objection,” Salmon tries to establish
the point that metaphysical modality is a restricted type. By arguing
for this point, he intends to defeat the defensive argument in the
first part of the objection, namely, to reject the second premise ol
the argument, “metaphysical modality is unrestricted,” and
therefore, to demonstrate that S5 has “never been satisfactorily
justified to be the logic of what must be and what might have been.”39
We have investigated two senses of restriction relevant to the defense
of S5. In order to defeat the defensive argument of S5 in the first
part of the “standard objection,” Salmon must at least show that
there is no successful defense for metaphysical modality’s being
unrestricted in restriction-sense2. Merely showing that metaphysical
modality is restricted in restriction-sensei is not enough for him to
make his desired claim.
The following passage may be thought as Salmon’s answer to
the second part of the objection:
[Passage (5)]
What is the restriction? To worlds that are
metaphysically possible. (What else!) When we identify
necessity with truth in every possible world, the word
“possible” means something there, and what it means
place a restriction on the sort of worlds under
consideration
Passage (5) indicates that what metaphysical modality is is
itself an answer to the question of why transitivity fails for
metaphysical modality. This passage itself is uninformative, but from
the context, we may understand Salmon as saying that the
intransitiveness results from the restriction of being metaphysically
possible. Thus, for either part of the “standard objection,” whether
Salmon is successful in rejecting the objection depends on whether
he can argue for the restrictiveness of metaphysical modality in both
39 Salmon [1989], 29.
40 Salmon [1989], 13-14.
senses. In the following, we shall see in details how the
restrietiveness of metaphysical modality is argued.
In explaining his opponents’ defense of S5 in term of
unrestrictiveness of metaphysical modality in restriction-sensei,
Salmon says that his opponents confuse the two notions; the notion
of a world and the notion of a possible world. (The two notions are
explained in Section 1.4. The generic notion of a world is a way for
things to be whether or not things might have been that way,
whereas the modal notion of a possible world is a way that things
might have been.) He says that this confusion comes from the
equivocation of the two senses of the Leibnizian terminology of
“possible world.” In one sense, “possible world” is used to
distinguish the notion of a world in the metaphysics of modality from
layman’s notion of a world: the former is a maximal abstract entity
whereas the latter is a physical universe of atoms, molecules and etc..
Thus “possible world” in this sense means the same as Salmon’s
notion of a world. In the other sense, “possible world” is used to
refer to the ways for things to be that conforms to certain constraints
concerning what might have been. In this sense, a type of possible
worlds is a special kind of world. Thus “possible world” in this sense
means the same as Salmon’s notion of a possible world. Salmon says
that this ambiguity in the phrase of “possible world” is “... the
primary source of the idea that metaphysical modality is the limiting
case of restricted modalities, that metaphysical necessity and
possibility is the unrestricted, and hence the least restricted, type of
necessity and possibility. ”4 1 what Salmon means here is that his
opponents mistakenly take all worlds, namely, all abstract maximal
entities of the sort called by him a “total way-for-things-to-be-even-if-
things-could-not-have-been-that-way,” to be metaphysically possible
worlds and, therefore, metaphysical modality appears to be an
unrestricted type of modality in restriction-sensei.
Salmon says that this confusion “has led to the widely accepted
myths that the concepts of metaphysical necessity and possibility are
defined in terms of, or constructed from, the concept of a possible
world. ”42 According to Salmon, his opponents give the following
definition of metaphysical necessity and metaphysical possibility: “a
proposition is [metaphysically] necessary in this unrestricted sense
with respect to a possible world w if and only if it is true in absolutely
every possible world whatsoever, no restrictions, ”43 and accordingly,
a proposition is (metaphysically) possible in this unrestricted sense
with respect to a possible world w if and only if it is true in at least
one possible world. Remember that “possible world” here is
supposed to be confused with Salmon’s notion of a world. Given this
definition of metaphysical necessity and possibility, Salmon says, the
characteristic S5 principle that any possible truth is necessarily
possible may be easily proved in the so-called “oft-used defense” of
S5 modal logic quoted below.
41 Salmon [1989], 13.
42 Salmon [1989], 29.
43 Salmon [1989], 9.
[Passage (6)]
suppose p is a possible truth, that is, a proposition true in
at least one possible world w. Then relative to any
possible world w', without exeeption, there is at least one
possible world in which p is true-namely, w. It follows
(given our assumption that p is possible) that it is
necessary that p is possible. For in the unrestricted sense
of “possible,” one possible world in which p is true is all
that is required for p to be “possible” relative to any
given world w', with no further restriction as to what sort
of world p is true in or how that world is related to w'.44
According to Passage (6), the validity of S5 modal logic for
metaphysical modality is proved by Salmon’s opponents using the
following 3-tuple model <W, D, V), in which W is the set of all worlds
(the ways for things to be whether or not things could have been that
way), D is the set of all possible individuals, and V is the value
assignment such that it assigns “true” to the proposition Op (read as
“it is metaphysically possible that p”) in an arbitrary world lUieW if
and only if there is a world iWk^W such that V assigns “true” to p in
u?k, and accordingly, V assigns “true” to the proposition Up (read as
“it is metaphysically necessary that p”) in an arbitrary world u?i€W if
and only if for all world lUk^W, V assigns “true” to p in tUk- No
specific metaphysical accessibility relation between the worlds in W
is involved. The deletion of metaphysical accessibility relation
according to Salmon’s explanation results from taking all worlds to
be metaphysically possible worlds.
44 Salmon [1989], 10.
45 Salmon’s definition of accessibility relation is presented and explained in Section
1.4, which is in fact a standard definition given in Kripke’s work and accepted by
majority of philosophers: a world w' is metaphysically possible relative to a world
w if and only if every fact of w' is a metaphysical possibihty in w, or, w' is
metaphysiccilly possible relative to UJ if and only if every metaphysically necessary
fact ofw obtains m in'.
Since every world is treated as a metaphysically possible world,
the “oft-used defense” is one which defends S5 by the
unrestrictiveness of metaphysical modality in restriction-sensei.
Salmon calls another defense of S5 in term of unrestrictiveness
of metaphysical modality “the ostrich approach to metaphysical
modality”:
[Passage (7)]
One may choose to ignore ways things could not have
been, confining one’s sights always and without exception
to ways things actually might have been. One may
stipulate that a proposition is necessary with respect to
an arbitrary possible world w if and only if it is true in
every world accessible to the actual world-never mind
worlds accessible to w—and likewise that a proposition is
possible with respect to an arbitrary possible world w if
and only if it is true in at least one world accessible to the
actual world. ... One may then ignore accessibility
altogether. ... If one confines one’s sights to genuinely
possible worlds, disavowing the impossible worlds, then
metaphysical modality emerges as the limiting case-the
“unrestricted” modality that takes account of “every”
world--and S5 emerges as its proper logic.
According to passage (7), the validity of S5 modal logic for
metaphysical modality is proved by Salmon’s opponents using the 4-
tuple model, <W, r, D, V), where r is the real world and W is a set
which contains only the worlds metaphysically possible relative to
the real world r. The truth value assignment V assigns “true” to the
proposition Op in an arbitrary world tUicW if and only if there is a
world lUkeW such that V assigns “true” to p in u?k; accordingly, V
assigns “true” to the proposition Up in an arbitrarily world iTiCW if
and only if for all world w\^e^, V assigns “true” to p in uJk- We see
46 Salmon [1989], 20-22.
that when the worlds in W are all eonsistent worlds, the truth value
assignment V thus defined is equivalent to the truth value assignment
given in Passage (7), where the metaphysieal aeeessibility relation is
involved and other elements of the model remain the same. That is,
V is equivalent to the truth value assignment whieh assigns “true” to
the proposition Op in an arbitrary world u)i€W if and only if there is a
metaphysically possible world t^k of reW such that V assigns “true”
to p in u)k; accordingly, V assigns “true” to the proposition Up in an
arbitrary world i«i€W if and only if for all metaphysically possible
world iDk of r e W, V assigns “true” to the proposition p in u>k. Given
Salmon’s description of how metaphysical necessity and possibility
are defined in the “ostrich approach”, it is easy to see that a possible
world of r is possible relative to any possible world of r, on the other
hand, if a world is not possible relative to r, it is not possible relative
to any possible world of r, because the V assigns the same set of
necessities and possibilities to all the possible worlds of r. Thus, the
possible worlds of r bear an equivalent accessibility relation. The
same thing is true for any world that r may stand for. This gives the
reason for the “ostrich approach” to remove metaphysical
accessibility relation from the model.
From Salmon’s description, we see that the “ostrich approach”
views metaphysical modality as a type that does not have the varying
nature and can be correctly represented by a model containing only
the equivalence class of all worlds metaphysically possible relative to
the real world. Therefore the “ostrich approach” actually defends S5
in term of the unrestrictiveness of metaphysical modality in
restriction
-sense2.
Our immediate question is who has ever confused the two
notions and taken the notion ot a possible world to mean the same as
the notion of a world, and who has ever defined metaphysical
necessity and possibility either in the way described in the “oft-used
defense” of S5 or in the way described in the “ostrich approach.”
Salmon seems to have in mind David Lewis as one who holds the
“oft-used defense” of S5 modal logic. For Lewis, the name “worlds”
and the name “possible worlds” do refer to the same sort of things,
but these things are not the same as Salmon’s worlds, nor are they
the same as Salmon’s possible worlds. It is not fair to say that Lewis
confuses the two notions as Salmon defines them. Furthermore,
given Lewis’ worlds (or possible worlds), the entities of the same sort
as the real physical world but spatially and temporally disconnected
from the real world, it may be seen as the case that metaphysical
necessity is identified with truth in every world and metaphysical
possibility with truth in at least one world, and the validity of S5 is
proved on a 3-tuple model as described above. But, in doing so, Lewis
is not confusing the notion of a possible world with the notion of a
world. Whatever the justification is, it can only be found in Lewis’
theory of possible worlds. I did not see any respectable philosopher
who holds the so-called “oft-used defense” of S5. Nor did I see any
respectable philosopher who explicitly or tacitly defines
metaph5^ical necessity and possibility in the way as described in the
“ostrich approach.” But let us consider this: one can imagine
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objections to one’s own account and reject them for the purpose of
emphasizing some important points ot one’s own account. In any
case, we want to see how Salmon rejects the “oft-used defense” of
S5 and the “ostrich approach.”
Salmon’s argument against the “oft-used defense” of S5 modal
logic and the “ostrich approach” is based on his three points of view
which we explained in Section 1.4: (1) the distinction between the
generic notion of a world and the modal notion of a possible world,
(2) determining the possible worlds of a world according to the
possibilities contained in the world, and (3) the existence of
metaphysically impossible worlds.
To reject the “oft-used defense” of S5 modal logic, Salmon
argues as follows. When talking about metaphysical modality in
possible world discourse, the modal operators, and 0, are
considered as quantifiers quantifying over all worlds. Namely, the
modal operators quantify over not only metaphysically possible
worlds relative to an arbitrary world w, and not only metaphysically
impossible yet consistent worlds relative to w, but also all worlds
including inconsistent worlds which are impossible in any sense. Why
should it be the case? Salmon’s answer is this: Possible worlds are
ways for things to be such that things might have been that way, and
impossible worlds (whether consistent or inconsistent) are ways lor
things to be such that things could not have been that way; though
they differ modally, they “both are ways for things to be, and in that
sense, ontologically on a par.”'^^ Salmon’s point is that the modal
Salmon [1989], 17.
operators, considered in semantics as quantifiers, must quantify over
all entities of a certain ontological kind, and “worlds” is the name for
this ontological kind—maximal abstract entities.
Given the distinction between the notion of a world and the
notion of a possible world, and given modal quantifiers’ quantifying
all worlds, it is obvious that for any world w in the set W of a model M
containing all worlds, it is not the case that every world in W is a
metaphysically possible world relative to Therefore,
metaphysical modality is a restricted type in restriction-sensei.
Salmon concludes: “If worlds include ways things metaphysically
cannot be in addition to ways things metaphysically might have been,
then the idea that metaphysical necessity corresponds to truth in
every world whatsoever is flatly mistaken. ”^9 According to Salmon’s
view, in the alleged “proof” of the “oft-used defense” of S5, W is a
set of all worlds, namely all the “ways-for-things-to-be-even-if-things-
could-not-have-been-that-way”. Certainly, there are metaphysically
impossible worlds relative to an arbitrary consistent world w in
W—some world in W (any metaphysically impossible world of w) is
such that not every necessity in world lu is a truth of it. By removing
the metaphysical accessibility relation, the “oft-used defense” of S5
mistakenly makes all worlds metaphysically possible relative to world
w, and hence mistakenly makes metaphysical modality unrestricted
in restriction-sensei and suitable for S5 modal logic.
48 We shall discuss the problem of metaphysical accessibihty relation from an
inconsistent world in Section 2.4. The words said here will be correct accordmg to
the discussion.
49 Salmon [1989], 15.
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For the “ostrich approach,” Salmon argues that it “flies in the
face of the very meanings ot the words ‘necessary’ and ‘possible’. ”50
the ostrich approach misconstrues the simple modal term
necessary” to mean the modally complex concept of actual
necessity, or necessity according to [world r], where [r] is the actual
world. Likewise, the ostrich approach misconstrues “possible” to
mean actual possibility, or possibility according to [world r].”5i What
Salmon says here is that the “ostrich approach” views metaphysical
modality as unrestricted in restriction-sense2 for a wrong reason.
Premise (VII) that metaphysical modality is unrestricted in
restriction- sense2 in argument (VI) -(VIII) is thus not legitimately
established, which means that the metaphysically impossible worlds
are illegitimately ignored. Therefore, the conclusion that
metaphysical modality is characterized by S5 modal logic can not
soundly follow.
We think that Salmon’s three viewpoints explained in Section
1.4 are correct. We also agree that if the set W of a given model
contains all worlds as its members, it is indeed wrong to identify
metaphysical necessity with truth in every world of W and
metaphysical possibility with truth in at least one world of W.
Moreover, it is wrong to simply take “necessary” to mean “actually
necessary” and “possible” to mean “actually possible,” where
“actually necessary” and “actually possible” are as defined in Passage
(6). However, as we said earlier, in order to answer either part of the
“standard objection,” one needs to show that in neither of the two
50 Salmon [1989], 21.
51 Salmon [1989|, 23.
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senses is metaphysical modality unrestricted. It seems to me that, by
his rejection to the “oft-used defense” of S5 and the “ostrich
approach, Salmon cannot succeed in demonstrating this point.
Later, we shall argue in Section 2.4 for the following three points, by
which we explain why Salmon is not successful.
First, in his rejection of the “oft- used defense” of S5, Salmon
holds that modal operators should quantify over all worlds including
inconsistent worlds. There may be a consideration that if
inconsistent worlds are quantified over, being restricted in
restriction-sensei will give rise to being restricted in restriction-
sense2. We shall explain this consideration, and argue that the idea
that modal operators quantify over inconsistent worlds is
theoretically incoherent with the equivalence of two definitions of
accessibility relation(which are discussed earlier in Section 1.4), is
dubious in its meaning, and is completely not needed in semantics.
Furthermore, we shall argue that Salmon’s ontological argument does
not work.
Secondly, if modal operators quantify only over consistent
worlds, we can show that metaphysical modality’s being restricted in
restriction-sensei does not entail its being restricted also in
restriction-sense2.
Thirdly, though it is incorrect to change the meanings of
metaphysical necessity and possibility as what happens in the
“ostrich approach,” it does not follow that metaphysical modality is
therefore restricted in restriction-sense2. We shall point out that
Salmon’s argument for metaphysical modality’s being restricted in
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restriction-sense2 relies ultimately on his belief in the truth of the
following statement: Some metaphysically impossible worlds of a
world w are possible relative to some of the metaphysically possible
worlds of w. His examples are the cases that world w^+i in
Chisholm’s Paradox and p-world2 in the Four Worlds Paradox are
metaphysically impossible relative to the real world but possible
relative to some metaphysically possible worlds of the real world.
However, the truth of the statement and the examples just beg the
question. To demonstrate the truth or falsehood of this statement
and these examples are what the discussion of the two paradoxes is
all about. It is clearly not correct to use them as premises of other
argument.
We shall lay some ground work in the next section for the
discussion in Section 2.4 and Chapter 3.
2.3 r-construction and Henkin Completeness Theorem
The most important feature of Salmon’s account of possible
worlds is that the necessities and possibilities contained in a world w
determine which worlds are possible relative to w. Furthermore,
from the two equivalent definitions of relative possibility relation, ^2
we can see in Salmon’s account a description of what he regards as
the possible worlds relative to a given world w, or how the possible
worlds of world w are determined by the possibilities and necessities
contained in w. We think that these views are correct. Hughes and
Cresswell in their book. An Introduction to Modal Logic, present a
52 See Section 1.4 for the two definitions of relative possibility relation and our
discussion about the equivcdence between them.
Henkin proof for the completeness of modal lower (first-order)
predicate calculus(LPC) systems LPC-hT+BF, LPC-hS4-hBF and
LPC-FS5.53 The proof shows that we can form a tree-construction r
which is composed of maximal consistent sets Ti Ti, ... relative to
a system S of modal LPC. A r-construction starts by constructing a
maximal consistent set, and then expands from the maximal
consistent set a set of maximal consistent sets according to certain
rules. This expansion applies to any maximal consistent set that has
been generated in the F-construction. The proof shows that we can
then define a model <W, D, R, V) of system S based on T such that W
of the model can be interpreted as a set of worlds corresponding to
the maximal consistent sets in F and R as the accessibility relation
which fits S. What interests us is that the rules of F-expansion are in
accordance with Salmon’s idea that possible worlds of a world is
determined by the necessities and possibilities contained in the
given world, and the relation R based on the expansion is in
accordance with the definitions of relative possibility relation. In the
following we shall explain the F-construction of Henkin proof. The
modal logical reasoning exhibited in the model based on F-
construction will help us argue with clarity about the restrictiveness
of modality.
The LPC system introduced in the book of Hughes and
Cresswell contains as primitive symbols a set of individual variables
{x, y, z, ...}, a set of predicate variables {((), ip, •••} and a set of logical
Tlie proof is given in Hughes & Cresswell [1968], 149-169. BF stands for Barcan
formula, (a)U«:=>LJ(a)a. Barcan fomixila is not a diesis of system T, nor is it a thesis
of S4, but it is a thesis of S5. Barcan Fonnula is employed m the proof.
constants v, V, (, )}. The formation rules and inference rules are
standard.54 The notion of the consistency of a formula with respect to
axiomatic system S is as follows: A formula a of a system S is said to
be consistent with respect to S iff -lU is not a thesis of S. That is, the
negation of a thesis counts as inconsistent, but every other formula
counts as consistent. Moreover, a finite set {ai, an} of formulae of
S is consistent iff
-i(ai& &an) is not a thesis of S. Finally, il' A is an
infinite set of formulae, A is consistent iff it contains no inconsistent
finite subset of formulae. Since there is no difference in principle in
constructing F with respect to any one of the three modal LPC
systems, we shall not pick a particular modal system for the T-
construction, as long as the F-construction is consistently formed
with respect to exactly one system.
To construct the initial maximal consistent set Fi in the F-
construction, we begin with a consistent wff a relative to the modal
LPC system of the F-construction. We add to a the set of all selected
EM-formulae as shown in the proof, which guarantees that the set
has the E-property—^for every wff of the form (3a)(3 in A there is also
in A some wff P[b/a], which differs from (3 only in that wherever (3 has
54 For fonnation rules see Hughes & CressweU [1968], 133-134.
55 It is required that every maximal consistent set Fi m tlie system F lias E-property.
Any wff of the form (3a)p^(3[b/a] is called an Ejvi-formula with respect to b (b is
referred as the replacement variable): and if y is an EM-fonnula with respect to b
and 6 is any wff not containing free b, then the formula. 06=30(6&y), is an Em-
formula with respect to b. All Em
-
formulae wliich differ only in their replacement
variables are said to have the same EM'form. To ensmre that every Fi in F has the E-
property, the proof shows a systematic way of adding to every set Fi some Em-
fonnula of each Em
-
form, and the resulting set is proven to be consistent. By
including these EM-formulae, whenever there is a fonnula (3a)P in Fj, the formula
P|b/a] is derivable from (3a)P and the relevant EM-formula. The proof is given on
pages 165-168.
free a, P[b/a] has some b, whieh is free in 3(b/a] but not free in (3.
Intuitively, this requirement is that whenever the set Fj eontains an
existential statement for some individual or other to be such-and-
such, it must also contain a statement that a particular individual is
such-and-such. Finally we extend the set to a maximal consistent one.
A maximal consistent set is one that there is no formula which is not
already in but can be consistently added to the set. In other words, a
set of formulae of the modal system is maximal consistent iff it is
consistent and every formula of the modal system not in the set is
inconsistent with the set. To extend the set we do the following. We
assume that the formulae are arranged in a fixed order ai, U2 an,
.... Let Fi 0 be the set {a, 6i, ..., 5n, •••}’ where a is a formula consistent
with the modal LPC system of the F-construction and each 6 is an
EM-formula of a distinct EM-form. In each of the subsequent steps we
shall form a set Fi i(i>0 ). If ai is consistent with Fi o U-e. il -i(a & 6i
& ... & ai) is not a thesis of the modal LPC system), let Fij be (a &
6i & ... & ai); otherwise, let Fi i be Fi o- We form Fi 2 analogously by
considering a2- In general, given Fi n, if ri,n U {un+i} is consistent,
let F 1 ^n-f" 1 be the union F i^n b ^an+i}, otherwise, let Fj^n+i be F 1 n-
The rules of expansion in F-construction is the following: For
every wff of the form Op in Fi we construct a maximal consistent set
Fk beginning with {p}. We next add the EM-formulae b\ 6n, ••• to
{p} as indicated in the proof, which ensures that Fk has the E-
property. Then we add to the set {p, 61, ..., 6n, every wff, y, such
that UY^Pi. The resulting set, {p, 61, ..., 6n, •••, YL •••» Yn, •••} is an
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infinite consistent set.56 Let the set !(i, 6i, .... 5n, .... vi. Ym. be
fk.O' the initial set oi r^, and then extend to a maximal consistent
set in the standard way described earlier.
From the above rules of expansion for V, we see the following
important features of r-construction: (i) for every fi in f and for every
wff of the form 0(3 in Pi there is a subordinate set Pk of Pi such that
(3ePk, and (ii) for any subordinate set Pk of Pi and for every wff of the
form Uy Fi, y^Fk. A subordinate set Fk of Fi is a set expanded from
Fi according to the rules of P-expansion. The construction of a
subordinate set of set Pi is based on one formula p such that Op is in
Pi and all formulae y such that Uy is in Pi.
The quadruple <W, R, D, V) is defined to be a LPC+T+BF (or
LPC+S4+BF, or LPC+S5) model. With each Pi in P we associate an
entity Wi and let W be the set of all such entities. Let R be the
relation such that u^iRiWk iff Fk is either a subordinate of Pi or is Pi
itself for LPC+T+BF model (for LPC+S4+BF model, WiRw\^ iff Pk is a
subordinate* of Pi, where a subordinate* of Pi is either Pi itself or a
subordinate of Pi or a subordinate of a subordinate of Pi or ...; for
LPC+S5 model, whenever Pk is a subordinate* of Pi, uJiRi^k and
56 The consistency of tliis set is given by: (i) the leinina tliat where p, yi, .... Yn are any
wffs, if {Op, Uyi UYn} is consistent, then {P, yi Yn) is consistent: and (ii) the
proved fact that 0(p & 6i & ... & 6n) e fi for any n > 0, wliich is given when
introducing the specific way of adding to {P} the Em
-
formulae; and (iii) The
definition of consistency of an infinite set: an infinite set is consistent iff every
finite subset of it is consistent. Con.sider any finite subset {p, 6i 5n, Yl, .•, Ym) of
the set {P, 6i, ..., 6n Yl Ym. •••}. where n > 0, m > 0. We have by (ii) 0(p & 6i & ... &
5n) e Fi, and it is given that for each y, UyeGi; hence {0(P & 6i & ... & 6n), ^Yl. •••>
Ym} is a finite subset of Fi. Since Fi is by hypothesis consistent, by (iii). this subset
of Fi is also consistent. By (i) and the consistency of {0(p & 6i & ... & 6n), LIyI
Yn}. we have that every finite subset {p, 6i 6n. Yl. •••. Ym} of the mfinite set (P,
6l, .... 6n, .... Yl. •••. Ym. •••}is consistent; tlierefore
tiie infinite set itself is consistent.
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w\^RWi). Let D be the set of individual variables eonsidered as objeets.
For the value assignment V, we have; for every individual variable a,
V(a)=a, for any n-place predicate variable (}), V((j)) is the set of ordered
(n+l)-tuples {<Xi, Xn, Wi>, ...} such that(f)(xi, XnlcFi (for every
Tier), and for any other wfl, V assigns a value to it according to the
standard rules for v, V, and Ll.^7
The completeness theorem proves: Given W, R, D and V as
defined above, for any wff, (3, of LPC+T+BF (or of LPC+S4+BF, or of
LPC+S5), and for any WfeW, V(P,u;i)=l or 0 according as pePi or not.
We interpret the entities in W as consistent worlds, where the
notion of a world is used in the sense according to Salmon’s
delinition of a world—a maximal abstract entity, and the notion of
being consistent is as defined above. Since a world is an infinite
abstract entity, a world is consistent if and only if it does not contain
any inconsistent finite part. We interpret the relation R of the model
as the accessibility or relative possibility relation according to
definitions of accessibility that Salmon holds; a world w' is accessible
from a world w if and only if every fact of w' is a possibility in w; or
equivalently, w' is accessible from w if and only if every necessity of w
obtains in w'.
The justification for us to interpret R as such is given by the
completeness theorem. We can see from the completeness theorem
that the syntactical features of P-construction have a perfect match in
the given notion of accessibility. The second leature, (ii), says that for
any subordinate set Pk of Pi and for every wh of the form Uy in G,
57 Hughes & Cresswell [1968], 147.
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yeTk. In a T model, uJiRu^k. According to Henkin completeness
theorem, the value assignment V assigns true to y in world wy, when
it assigns true to Uy in world Wi. The relation between u), and is
exactly in accordance with the second definition of accessibility
relation—every necessity in Wi is true in iTk- Furthermore, since both
Pi and Fk are maximal consistent sets, taking the set {(3, 6i, ..., 6n, ...,
Yl» •••» ym» •••} as the initial set ot Fk precludes any formula 0 being
included in Fk such that -iO0 is in Fi. If ^00 is in Fi, then U-n0 is in Fi.
Hence -.0 is one of the y’s in the set {(3, 6i, ..., 6n, yi ym, •••}•
Formula 0 can not be consistently added to Fk because -i(0&-i0) is a
thesis of any of the three modal axiomatic systems. So F has another
feature, equivalent to feature (ii), that for every subordinate set Fk of
Fi in F, and for every wff peFk, there is a wff of the form OpeFi.
According to Henkin completeness theorem, the value assignment V
assigns true to p in world u^k only if it assigns true to Op in world Wi.
This is in accordance with Salmon’s first definition of accessibility
—every proposition that is true in u>k is possible in Wi.
In an S4 model, if lOiRu^k and w^RWn then WiRWn^ In the F-
construction with respect to modal logical system LPC+S4+BF, we
have that for any subordinate* set Fk of Fi and for every wl't ol the
form Uy in Fi, yeFk. According to the completeness theorem, the
value assignment V assigns true to y for every subordinate* world ivy^
of Wi when it assigns true to Uy in world Hence the relation
between world Wi and any subordinate* world of Wi is in accordance
with the second definition of accessibility. Like what we did lor T
model, we can show analogously that the relation between world W{
and any subordinate* world of Wi is in accordance with the first
definition of accessibility as well.
In an S5 model, lor any subordinate* world of world Wi,
iDiRiDk and W]^Rwi. The accessibility relation between worlds in a S5
model is not only transitive but also symmetrical. What is needed to
be checked further is that, when is accessible from Wi, whether
Wi is also accessible from lUk in the same sense of accessibility. We
know that S5 can be obtained by adding to S4 an additional axiom
P^JOP. In a r-construction with respect to modal system LPC+S5, by
the axiom P^ JOP, for every wff 06^, JOecTi, and by the rule of
expansion and the axiom UP^UlJP, OOeFk for any subordinate* set
Fk of Fi. By Henkin completeness theorem, the value assignment V
assigns true to 00 for every subordinate* world w\^ of W{ when it
assigns true to 0 in W{. This is to say that every fact 0 of W{ is a
possibility of wy^, which is exactly Salmon’s first definition of
accessibility from lUk to wi. Equivalently, for any subordinate* world
t«k of Wi and every Uy in u>k, Y is true in Wi. Assume that Uy is true in
twk but Y is false in Wi, that is, -iY is true in uJi. By axiom P=>U0P,
LIO—lY is true in Wi. Since i^k is accessible from Wi according to the
first definition of accessibility, 0—«y is true in u?k and hence -iJy is
true in wy^. But we have assumed that Uy is true in ii^k* This
contradicts the consistency of u^k- Thus the accessibility relation
from any subordinate* world u^k of Wi to the world Wi is in
accordance with the second definition of accessibility as well.
The construction of F forms a tree-structure. Consequently, by
Henkin completeness theorem, the worlds in the model defined
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based on r are related in a tree-strueture. (A tree-strueture is a
eonnected structure with a starting point as its root, and latter
occurrences in the structure are expanded or generated from some
earlier occurrence according to a certain rule.) The tree of a F-
construction is infinite, so is any subtree in the F-construction. An
inlinite model defined on the F-construction represents the modal
space of the type of modality concerned in the F-construction. In the
model, each subtree rooted in world Wj draws a picture of how modal
reasoning of the relevant type goes for world Wi. Let us call the
subtree rooted at wi “the scope of modal reasoning (of the relevant
type) for world idi.”
It is not always the case that every world in the scope of modal
reasoning of Wj is a genuine possible world of iVi. This is true in the
cases when the type of modality in question is characterized by S4 or
S5 modal logic, but certainly not true when the logic is T. Flowever if
we use the name “a potentially possible world relative to world Wj” to
mean a world which bears an ancestral accessibility relation to Wi
whether or not it is directly accessible from i^i, then every world in
the scope is a potentially possible world of i^i. In other words, a
potentially possible world of Wj is a world which can be reached by a
continuing modal reasoning started from the necessities and
possibilities in world Wi.
In talking about the scope of modal reasoning for a world, there
is a consideration arising from the maximality of a world. A world as a
maximal abstract entity contains various difterent t}pes of modality. A
F-construction is formed with respect to the modal logic which
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characterizes the type of modality that the T-construction coneerns.
Whichever is the logic of the F-construetion, the maximality of a
world requires that different types of modality be stated correetly in
the language of the modal logic of the F-eonstruction. This can be
done by considering the following two aspects.
First, philosophers often talk about different systems of modal
logic that characterize different types of modality. This is a issue
about whether necessities and possibilities of a type will vary from a
given world to worlds accessible from the given world, and if the
necessities and possibilities vary, how they vary. This aspect of a
modality is called the mode of the modality. In constructing maximal
consistent sets in a F-construction, every type of modality must be
formulated according to its mode using the language of the logie of
the F-construction.
The second aspect concerns the strictness of necessities.
Among different types of necessity, some type of necessity is stricter,
and some is less strict. The strictness is a question about what is
taken to be a necessity, or say, by what standard a necessity is
qualified. The standard for a stricter type of necessity allows fewer
propositions to be necessary while the standard for a less strict type
allows more to be necessary. The strictness of a type of necessity is
an issue separate from the issue about the mode of a type of
necessity. Two types of necessity with distinct strictness may be or
may not be characterized by the same modal logical system,
depending upon whether they share the same mode. In a F-
construction, how many subordinate sets that set Fi will yield
depends upon how many possibilities Fj eontains. Suppose that
modality type A is stricter than modality type B. A possibility of type A
may not be a possibility according to type B. It is easy to imagine that,
a F-expansion from set Fi based on possibilities of type A generates
more subordinate sets than those generated by a F-expansion based
on possibilities of type B in set Fi, simply because modality type A has
more possibilities. Therefore, in constructing F, in addition to
formulating different types of modality in their correct modes in the
language of the logic of F, we must also correctly present their
strictness within the scope of the modality which is the concern of
the F-construction.58
With respect to metaphysical necessity, the most coimnonly mentioned stricter
type of necessity is logical necessity, and the most commonly mentioned less strict
t}pe of necessity is nomological necessity. Salmon has pointed out in Passage (2) a
relation between the three types of necessity: with respect to world UJi, the set of
necessities of a stricter type are extensionaUy included as a proper subset in the set
of necessities of a less strict type. This is probably true, and we may add to it that the
converse holds between the corresponding types of possibihty.
We have mentioned three alternative modal LPC systems for r-construction,
LPC+T+BF, LPC+S4+BF and LPC+S5. Suppose that tlie concern of a T-construction is
metaphysical modahty. We consider the three types of modality mentioned in the
previous paragraph. TTiere will be no worry about necessities of a type stricter than
metaphysical necessity and possibilities of a type less strict than metaphysical
necessity, since they are also metaphysical necessities and metaphysical
possibilities respectively. For the necessities of a less strict type, since many of
them are not metaphysical necessities, we must use a distinct symbol for them. Let
us say that the symbol is “^J”. Thus, ^JP and 0-,P are not contradictorJ^ Similarly,
since some of the possibilities corresponding to a stricter type of necessity are
impossibilities according to metaphysical necessity, we must use a distinct symbol
for them as well. Let the symbol be “*0”. Thus, UP and *0-.P can be both added to a
set consistently. Combining the concern about the strictness with the concern about
the modes, we shall do the following. (Since the contention about the logic of
metaphysical modahty is between T and S5, we shah consider both cases. Likewise
we shall not claim any modal system as the logic of the other two types of modality.
As long as they can be characterized by one of the three systems, the following
general description is appHcable):
In the case that the logic for metaphysical modahty is system LPC+T+BF, for a
type of modahty of mode T other than metaphysical modality, if the type is less
strict than metaphysical modahty is, then for every necessity, necessary y, of the
type in ri(i>i), let ^^Lly be the expression of it where is a specification of the
strictness; for any less strict type of modahty in mode S4 or S5 and for every
necessity, necessaiy y, of the type in f'i, let it be expressed by ^Uy or and let
The considerations about proper representations of the modes
and the scopes of distinct types of modality are required by the
unconditional maximality of the sets in T-construction. But, if
discussions concern only one or two types of modality, we can
condition the maximality of the modal aspect of worlds on these
types of modality. For example, if a discussion is about metaphysical
necessity and possibility, we condition the maximality of a world for
double iiecessitatioiis of y with the restricted scope, ^U^Uy or
included m Ti in addition to or ^^Uy. PossibihUes of tlie corresponding types
in T or S4 can be taken care of by consistently increasing the set to a inaxinial one
according to the rule of maximization. That is, they are confined by the necessities
of corresponding type included in each maxunal set. For every possibility of the
corresponding type of S5, possible (3, let ^g included in the set, and since this
necessity is in mode S5, we also include in Ti.
For any t5rpe of modality of mode T other than metaphysical modality, if it is
stricter than metaphysical modality is, then for every possibility, possible p, of the
type in fj, let *^0p be its expression in Fp For any stricter type of modality of S4 or
S5, cmd for every necessity, necessary y, of the type in Fi, let double necessitadon of
y, LlUy, be included in Fi in addition to Uy. PossibUities of the corresponding type
in mode S4 can be consistently added to Fi with the specification of the strictness of
the type, *^0p, similar to the case in which the mode is T. For possibilities, possible
P, of the corresponding type in mode S5, let *^0p and GQ^^Op be included in Fj.
In the case that the logic of metaphysical modality is system LPC+S5, for any
type of modality in mode S5 other than metaphysical modahty, if it is less strict
than metaphysical modality, then for every necessity, necessary y, of the type in Fi,
let ^^Gy be its expression in F^, where is the specification of the strictness, and
let G(^^GP =5 ^Ig^^GP) be mcluded m Fi. For every possibility, possible p, of the
corresponduig type of S5 in Fi, let ^^GOp be its expression m Fi. For any less strict
type of modality in mode T, and every necessity, necessary y, of the type in Fi, let it
be expressed as ^G(y in every subordinate set of Fi which is in the scope .specified by
in Fi. For any less strict type of modality in mode S4, and every necessity,
necessary y, of tlie type hi Fi, let ^^G(y m every subordhiate* set of Fi wliich is in the
scope specified by be its expression m Fi. The possibifities of the corresponduig
type in T or S4 can be taken care of by consistently maxunizing Fi.
For any stricter type of modahty in mode S5, and for every possibility,
possible p, of the type in Fi, let G*4p be its expression in Fi. For any stricter type of
modality in mode T, and every necessity, necessary y, of the type in Fi, let it be
expressed as G(y in every subordinate set of set Fi) in Fp For any t}^e of modality in
mode S4 with a larger scope, and every necessity, necessary y, of the type in Fi, let
G(y in every subordinate* set of set Fi) be its expression hi Fi. The possibifities of the
corresponding type in T or S4 can be consistently added to Fi with the specification
of tlie scope of the type.
modal tacts on metaphysical modality alone. The T-construction
composed of conditioned maximal sets as such should be equally
appropriate for representing metaphysical modal reasoning.
2.4 Our Views about Sabnon’s Reply
It may be thought that if modal operators quantify over not only
consistent worlds but, as Salmon suggested, inconsistent worlds as
well, and if the metaphysical accessibility relation between worlds is
fixed according to Salmon’s definition of accessibility relation, then it
is true that S5 is not valid for metaphysical modality. This can be
illustrated by the following picture.
Let us explain the picture above. An inconsistent world is a
world containing contradictions. Since a contradiction entails
everything, everything is true in an inconsistent world in the sense
that every proposition can be included in the inconsistent world.
Hence everything is metaphysically possible according to an
inconsistent world. Given the first definition of accessibility relation
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(the first of the two definitions given in Section 1.4) that a world w'
is metaphysically possible relative to a world w if and only if every
fact of uj is a metaphysical possibility in uj, if uj is an inconsistent
world, then every world is a possible world of w according to the first
definition of accessibility relation. However, an inconsistent world
itself can only be a possible world of some other inconsistent worlds
according to the tirst definition. The picture represents a model in
which W is a set of all worlds including both consistent worlds and
inconsistent worlds, and R is metaphysical accessibility relation
according to the first definition. In the picture, a small box
represents an inconsistent world, the small circle represents a
consistent world, and each triangle represents consistent worlds
related by metaphysical accessibility relation (We may think of a
triangle as a F-construction concerning metaphysical modality that
begins from the consistent set represented by the small circle at the
top of the triangle). The directed edge from world A to world B
represents the relation that B is possible relative to A. In this model,
metaphysical modality is a restricted t}rpe in restriction-sensei with
respect to any consistent world in the model. That is, not every
world in the model is a metaphysically possible world of a consistent
world. Whatever is the metaphysical accessibility relation inside each
triangle, the picture as a whole does not fit S5 because the
metaphysical accessibility relation holds in the direction from
inconsistent worlds to consistent worlds but not the other way
around—the metaphysical accessibility relation is not symmetric.
This might not be what Salmon means when he rejects S5 by arguing
that metaphysical modality is restricted in restriction-sensei.
Nevertheless, this is how S5 fails to characterize metaphysical
modality under the following conditions: (i) modal operators quantify
over all worlds including inconsistent worlds, (ii) the accessibility
relation is determined according to the first definition of
accessibility, and (iii) metaphysical modality is a restricted type in
restriction-sensei. According to the above picture, it does seem that
if a modality is restricted in restriction-sensei, then it is also
restricted in restriction
-sense2 because the worlds in the model are
not related as equivalence classes—the metaphysical necessities and
possibilities vary from a consistent world to an inconsistent world.
The question is whether we should agree with the view that
modal operators quantify over inconsistent worlds. We consider the
following points.
First, there is a theoretical incoherence. We said in Section 1.4
that Salmon gives two equivalent definitions for the notion of relative
possibility. The first definition is: a world w' is metaphysically
possible relative to a world w if and only if every fact of w' is a
metaphysical possibility in w. This is the definition used above in
describing the accessibility relation from an inconsistent world to a
consistent world. The second definition is: w' is metaphysically
possible relative to w if and only if every metaphysically necessary
fact of w obtains in w'. We showed in Section 1.4 that the two
definitions are equivalent only if the worlds involved are all
consistent. This can be easily reviewed in the above picture. The
accessibility relation from an inconsistent world to a consistent
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world is drawn according to the first definition of accessibility: every
fact of a consistent world is a metaphysical possibility of an
inconsistent world. Hence every consistent world is metaphysically
possible relative to any inconsistent world. But an inconsistent world
w contains both Up and 0—ip. When -ip is true in a consistent world
IV', p cannot be true in w'. Thus, according to the second definition of
accessibility, the consistent world w' is not possible relative to the
inconsistent world iv. In a similar way, we can show that an
inconsistent world is not possible relative to a consistent world
according to the first definition, but is possible relative to a
consistent world according to the second definition. The two
definitions of accessibility and their equivalence in determining
possible worlds are regarded as standard in the semantics of modal
logic. To avoid incoherence one must choose between rejecting the
equivalence of the two definitions and rejecting the accessibility
relation from an inconsistent world to a consistent world. The
former approach involves fundamental changes in the semantics of
modal logic, whereas the latter approach will give a reason for not
quantifying over inconsistent worlds. In fact, since the two
definitions of accessibility are not equivalent with regard to the
accessibility relation between consistent worlds and inconsistent
worlds, the accessibility relation drawn according to one of the
definitions between a consistent world and an inconsistent world is
by no means the same relation drawn between two consistent worlds
according to both definitions, and hence, it is a convincing reason to
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reject the accessibility relation between consistent worlds and
inconsistent worlds.
Secondly, 1 cannot imagine any philosophical or modal logical
interest in pursuing possibilities in an inconsistent world. Pursuing
possibilities in an inconsistent world is logically trivial, and
philosophically doesn’t make sense. In philosophy, “something is
possible” means that the thing in question is in a certain sense
instantiable or realizable. What do we mean by saying that something
is realizable according to an inconsistent world which is in any sense
not realizable?^9
Thirdly, given that there is no accessibility relation between
consistent worlds and inconsistent worlds, one may say that when we
consider necessities and possibilities of a certain consistent world,
quantifying over inconsistent worlds is harmless because the modal
reasoning starting from a consistent world will never reach an
inconsistent world. But then quantifying over inconsistent worlds is
redundant in semantics.
Fourthly, Salmon’s ontological argument doesn’t work. Salmon
has argued that modal operators should quantify over all worlds,
possible worlds and impossible worlds, since they are ontologically
the same kind.^o According to Salmon’s definition of a world, worlds
as an ontological kind are defined by the property of being abstract
and the property of being maximal. We agree to the view that it is
59 In my view, the indexical sense of “realizable” or “realized” should not apply to
inconsistent worlds, since that soinetliing is realizable or realized means that
something could be true or is true as a whole. A contradiction is something wliich is
always false. If we say an inconsistent world is realizable or realized according to
itself, we abandon our logic, and then we are completely out of ground of reasoning.
69 Salmon [ 1989 ], 17 and footnote 1
1
on page 17 .
incorrect to divide worlds into ontological sub-kind by whether they
are a possible world of a certain world w. The intuition here is
somewhat like the intuition about why we don’t divide the ontological
kind “cats” into ontological sub-kind by whether a cat is born from a
certain mama-cat c. The property of being possible relative to some
world and the property of being born from some cat are more
general properties. But every (consistent) world is possible relative to
some worlds and impossible relative to some other worlds.
Therefore, being possible or impossible relative to some world is not
a property by which we can determine sub-kind of worlds.
Nevertheless we can reasonably divide worlds into ontological sub-
kinds by the property of being consistent. Every world is either
consistent or inconsistent and cannot be both consistent and
inconsistent. An ontological sub-kind of worlds is also an ontological
kind. I don’t think that being a more general ontological kind than
the kind of consistent worlds is a reason for holding the view that
modal operator must quantify over all worlds including inconsistent
worlds rather than quantifying over consistent worlds. Besides, it is
more proper to say that the objects of modal thinking are consistent
worlds. Inconsistent worlds possess only trivial modal properties,
non- trivial modal reasoning need not take them into account?
The above considerations demonstrate our refutation of
Salmon’s view that modal operators should quantify over inconsistent
worlds. We want to show next that it modal operators quantify over all
consistent worlds only, metaphysical modality’s being restricted in
restriction-sensei does not imply that it is also restricted in
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restriction-sense2. In other words, given a model <W, R, D, V) in
which W is a set of all consistent worlds, a modality can be a
restricted type in restriction-sensei, that is, not every world in W is
a possible world of an arbitrary world w in W, but at the same time an
unrestricted type in restriction-sense2, that is, the worlds in W are
related by relation R into equivalence classes. In the following we
shall show that when W of the given model is a set of all consistent
worlds, being restricted in restriction
-sensei and being unrestricted
in restriction-sense2 are compossible. The same thing should be true
when W contains less consistent worlds.
To say that a world is consistent is to say that the world does
not contain any statement the form of which is a contradiction. Let Q
be an LPC system. A consistent world is also consistent with Q in the
sense that it does not contain any statement the form of which
contradicts some thesis of Q, since the negation of a thesis is a
contradiction. A proposition is Q-logically necessary if and only il' it is
provable by Q, and a proposition is Q-logically possible if and only if it
is consistent with Q (it is not a negation of a thesis of Q). Salmon has
pointed out in Passage (2) a relation between the logical modality and
metaphysical modality: “metaphysical possibility is a special kind of
logical possibility”. We may add to it that, conversely, logical
necessity is a special kind of metaphysical necessity.
In the following, we will form a P-construction, F*, based on Q-
logical necessities and possibilities with a set-up so that the
restricted scope of metaphysical modal reasoning is recognizably
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included as subtrees in r*.6i We use the S3Tnbols “lI” and “0” to
denote 0-logieal necessity and Q-possibility respectively, and the
S3mibols and “m<>” denote metaphysieal neeessity and
possibility respeetively, where speeifies the seope of
metaphysical modal reasoning. We assume that the logie for T* is S5
because whether a proposition is provable by, or eonsistent with, the
logic Q does not seem to vary from one 0-logieally possible world to
another. 62 We also assume that the mode of metaphysical necessities
6^ Professor Max Cresswell commented on an earlier version of my argmnent related
to the r*-construction. His suggestion simplified my argmnent.
62 Salmon has expressed his doubt on S5’s being the logic of strict logical modality.
He says that “the interpretation of the diamond, 0, as logical possibility instead of
metaphysical possibihty could turn 0<P into a logical truth for every logically
consistent formula d>.” See Sahnon [1989], 15. In the footnote foUowing this
passage, he seems to hold affirmatively that if it is the propositions but not the
sentences that are considered to be possible, tlien tlie logical possibility, O^b, is itseli
a truth of pure logic. But he goes on to say tliat “Even under this construal, however,
S5 may not be the appropriate (first-order) propositional logic of logical necessity.
The rule of necessitation (...) is inapphcable to such logiCcd validities as ‘If Saul
Kripke is an antln-opologist, then Saul Kripke is actually an anthropologist.’” See
Sahnon [1989], 14-15, footnotes 7 and 9.
The latter worry, as Salmon indicates, has to do with the logic of indexicals.
David Kaplan has shown that some sentence containing demonstratives expresses a
true proposition whenever the sentence is uttered, so it is a truth of the logic of
indexicals; but the same sentence uttered in most contexts expresses a contingent
proposition (that is, the sentence uttered in different context expresses a different
contingent proposition), so it is not a metaphysical necessity. See Kaplan [1978], in
Sahnon & Soaines [1988], 66-68. So, the rule of necessitation must treated
differently in the logic of indexicals. It seems to me, if this worry was sometlfing
that we must deal with for om present purpose, then, it would not just be a problem
particularly for S5 but a problem for other modal systems as well. But, in my
opinion, the worry can be easily avoided by using a demonstrative -firee language so
that each sentence constantly expresses only one proposition. Then, the rule of
necessitation is valid. What we need in the present discussion is a language
sufficient for forming maximal consistent sets, and a demonstrative-free language
will properly serve this purpose.
Furthennore, the concern about divergence between some sentences and their
infonnational contents
—
propositions expressed by tliose sentences—in the states
of beheving is also separable from the present problem of which modal system is tlie
correct logic for strict logical modafity. It is a reasonable assumpUon that, in
forming maxhnal consistent sets, every sentence used expresses a proposition
according to the standard usage of the language, and every equivocation can be
ehminated by replacing a non-equivocal plirase for it. So, it seems to me, Sahnon s
doubts are not real obstacles to the project of constructing a model representing H-
logical modal space with respect to S5 modal logic.
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and possibilities fits S5. We are not elaiming that S5 is the correet
logic for metaphysical modality; our assumptions are made for
showing the compossibility of metaphysical modality’s being
restricted in restriction-sensei and being unrestricted in
restriction
-sense2. We shall limit the maximality of the modal aspect
of maximal consistent sets in r* to Q-logical modality and
metaphysical modality.
To begin with, we construct a maximal set, F*i, in a way similar
to the construction of Ti as stated in the previous section. We then
construct the rest of T* according to the following two steps. In the
first step, for each 0(3 in r*i, we form a subordinate set, rP^i,
beginning with the set {(3, 6i, ... ,6m Yl Yn, where each 6 is
an EM-formula and for each y, UycF*!. We then take each rPh as the
starting maximal consistent set and expand a rPii -construction from
it based on metaphysical necessities and possibilities in
according to the rules of F-expansion. In the second step, we take
the original maximal consistent set F*i as starting set and form F*i-
construction based on metaphysical necessities and possibilities in
F*i according to the rules of F-expansion. We get a picture in Figure
2. (See next page.)
The construction of F* does not look exactly like the F-
construction in the previous section. We shall explain that F* is
actually constructed according to the rules of F-expansion based on
fl-logical necessities and possibilities. Remember, we refer to the
whole tree-construction as “F*-construction,” and call the subtrees
constructed according to metaphysical modality of ‘T*i
construction, and ot rPh»
-construction.”
(Figure 2)
Let us examine the first level F*-expansion from the set F*i, In
the first step of expansion, for each H-logical possibility 0(3 € F*i, we
constructed a maximal consistent set based on the truths of (3 and Q.-
logical necessities in F*i. In the second step (that is, in the
expansion from F*i for metaphysical modality), we have constructed
a maximal consistent set for each ^^^Op € F*i based on the truths of p
and metaphysical necessities in F*i. Since every Fi-logical
necessity is true in the maximal consistent sets expanded in the
second step. Since ^^Op^Op, the metaphysical possibility p is also a
Q-logical possibility. Therefore, we constructed for every Op in F*i
(at least) one maximal consistent set beginning with the set {P, 6i, ... ,
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y\, ... , Yn» ...} where each 6 is a Ejyi-formula and for each y, Uy
€ r*i.
In the rest of the r*-construction, for any maximal consistent
set r*ni in r*i -construction, and for every Q-logical possibility
such that we have constructed a maximal
consistent set F*n based on the truths of p and every metaphysical
necessity (which include every O-logical necessity) in 1 within
r*i -construction. We know that since the logic of T*i -construction is
S5, the set of metaphysical necessities and possibilities in r*i
remains the same in every maximal consistent set of F*i-
construction, and hence in F*rn. Since every Q-logical necessity is a
metaphysical necessity, the set of H-logical necessities in F*i
remains the same in every maximal consistent set of F*i-
construction, and hence in F*m. This in turn determines that the set
of Q-logical possibilities remains the same in every maximal
consistent set of F*i -construction, and hence in F*m. In the first
level F*-expansion from the set F*i we have constructed for every Op
in F*i a maximal consistent set beginning with the set {p, 6i, ... , 6m.
...
, Yl. ... . Yn. ...} Therefore, for every Q-logical possibility OpeF*m
such that n^0p^tF*m, we know that there is maximal consistent set
FP^I already constructed in F*-construction based on the truths of P
and every Q- logical necessity in F*m. Let it be a subordinate set of
F*m. Thus, we have constructed for every Op in F*m a maximal
consistent set beginning with the set (P, 6i, ... , 6m. •.. . Yl. ... . Yn. ...}.
where each 6 is a E]vi-formula and for each y. F*m. Since every set
FP^I is expanded from F*i based on H-logical modality of F*i
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according to S5, rPij contains the same set of Q-logieal necessities
and possibilities as the set in r*i. A similar reasoning ean be given to
any maximal consistent set rPim in rPii-construetion.
The above also shows that r*-construetion as a whole is
constructed according to S5 based on Q-logical modality. This is
given by the argument that the same set of H-logical necessities and
possibilities holds in every maximal consistent set in r*-eonstruetion.
Thus, r* is a legitimate F-construction—it possesses all the
important features of a F-construction.
We now define a model <W, M R, rM, d, V> based on F*-
construction. W is a set of worlds corresponding to the maximal
consistent sets in F*-construetion. M is a set of sets of consistent
worlds Mb, Ml ... such that Mb is a set of worlds corresponding to the
maximal consistent sets in F*i -construction, and for each i >0, M^ is
a set of worlds corresponding to the maximal consistent sets in FP^i-
construction. R is the Q-logical accessibility relation sueh that for any
world iVi and any world tUk^W, WiRiv\^, that is, R is a total relation
which relates all worlds in the model. R^ is the metaphysieal
accessibility relation such that for any world Wi and any world
i^k^MF iDiR^iyk. that is, R^ is a total relation with respect to the
worlds in MF D and V are as stated in Section 2.3.
The model <W, M D, R, R^, V) shows the following three
points. First, since F*-construction is an infinite construction based
on logical necessities and possibilities, we can claim that every and
all maximal consistent sets with respect to Q are constructed
somewhere in F*-construction. Hence, W is a set ol all consistent
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worlds with respect to a. Secondly, the scope of metaphysical modal
reasoning for any arbitrary world Wi in W is restricted in the sense
that not every world in W is a metaphysically possible world relative
to Wi. Third, the metaphysical accessibility relation is an equivalence
relation every world in W is in an equivalence class related by the
metaphysical accessibility relation. These three points demonstrate
that when modal operators quantify over all and only consistent
worlds, it is compossible that metaphysical modality is restricted in
restriction-sensei and unrestricted in restriction-sense2.
Given what we have shown above, Salmon’s rejection of S5
relies totally on whether he can convincingly argue that metaphysical
modality is restricted in restriction-sense2. We said in Section 2.2
that Salmon’s rejection of the “ostrich approach” is not sufficient for
this purpose: the rejection of the “ostrich approach” criticizes a
particular way of viewing metaphysical modality as unrestricted in
restriction-sense2, it does not follow from this rejection that
metaphysical modality is therefore restricted in restriction-sense2.
However, Salmon holds that in a broad sense, the philosophical
practice of the majority of philosophers concerning metaphysical
modality all commit the fallacy of the “ostrich approach.” Namely, in
talking about metaphysical modality, those philosophers all ignored
metaphysically impossible worlds of the real world and let modal
operators quantify over only metaphysically possible worlds ot the
real world. He says the following:
[Passage (8)]
Surprisingly, the ostrich approach has nevertheless
ascended to the status of orthodoxy. It is precisely the
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approach followed by my critics. The most obvious sign of
the ostrich approach is the explicit denial of impossible
worlds, ... Metaphysical modality appears unrestricted
because the restriction to metaphysically possible worlds
is already built into one’s practice concerning which
worlds to pay attention to and to quantify over. ... But
ignoring impossible worlds does not make them go away,
... by what right do we ignore worlds that are
inaccessible? Accessible or not, they’re still worlds. Why
don’t they count?63
Salmon’s claim in Passage (8) is this: Whatever reason those
philosophers may give, ignoring impossible worlds in metaphysical
modal reasoning is always fallacious. We know that when possible
worlds of a consistent world iv bear equivalent accessibility relation
between each of them, there is a legitimate technical reason to
ignore impossible worlds of w, since there are no accessibility
relation between any possible world of w and any impossible world of
w. Only if metaphysical accessibility is not an equivalence relation,
does it make sense to say that ignoring impossible worlds in
metaphysical modal reasoning is always fallacious. Clearly there is a
gap between the claim made in Passage (8) and what can be
demonstrated by Salmon’s rejection of “ostrich approach.” Then,
there must be something crucial to link the reasoning. The answer is
not difficult to see. Here is a passage where Salmon explains why
impossible worlds must not be ignored.
[Passage (9)]
... as long as there is a possible scenario according to
which it is possible for Woody [a wooden table) to have
originated from m [an impossible hunk of matter of
Woody according to the real world], it is true (in English)
to say “It is possible that it is possible that Woody
Salmon [1989], 21-24.
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originates from m,” and one cannot correctly say (in
English) “It is necessary that it is necessary that Woody
does not originate from m.“ ... If the possible scenario ...
that verify a possibility claim or falsify a necessity claim
draw our attention to inaccessible worlds, then we are
obliged to pay attention to those inaccessible worlds. 64
Passage (9) is a repetition of Salmon’s Intransitive Accessibility
Solution to the Paradoxes. Salmon says that his intransitivity account
stems from the following intuition: a particular material artifact, say.
Woody, could have originated from a hunk of matter slightly different
from its actual original matter. “... by stretching things to the limit,
we may select some ... matter m such that, although Woody could not
have originated from m, m is close enough to being a possibility for
Woody that if Woody had originated from certain matter m' that is in
fact possible for Woody ... then it would have been possible for Woody
to have originated from m, even though it is not actually possible. ”66
This is to say that Salmon’s intransitivity account is given on the
ground of his belief that it is true that some metaphysically
impossible worlds of the real world, like world u^m+i in Chisholm’s
Paradox and |3-world2 in Four Worlds Paradox, are possible relative to
some metaphysically possible worlds of the real world. In general,
Salmon believes that some metaphysically impossible worlds relative
to a world w are accessible from some metaphysically possible worlds
of tv. This can be evidently seen in Passage (9). In order for him to
say that a possible world of w (a possible scenario relative to w) that
verifies a possible claim or falsifies a necessary claim draws our
attention to an inaccessible world of w, Salmon must in the tirst
64 Salmon [1989], 21.
66 Salmon [1989], 5.
place believe that there truly are possible worlds of w whieh eontain
some metaphysical possibilities that are metaphysieally impossible in
w.
Our analysis shows that Salmon’s reply to the “standard
objection” ultimately relies on the correctness of his Intransitive
Accessibility Solution, or the truth of his belief in metaphysically
impossible but possibly possible worlds. But, it is to the truth of this
belief the “standard objection” is raised. We conelude that Salmon’s
reply to the “standard objection” did not meet the ehallenge raised
by the objection. He tails to offer a convincing account independent
of his Intransitive Aceessibility Solution that shows the restrieted
nature of metaphysical modality in restriction-sense2. Hence he
provides no real solid answer to the second part of the objeetion. For
the same reason, he cannot successfully defeat argument (Vl)-(VIll),
the defensive argument for S5 given in terms of being restrieted in
restriction-sense2. He then cannot effectively reject the first part of
the objection. Salmon’s reply to the “standard objection” per se
sounds circular; what remains for us to see is whether the
Intransitive Accessibility Solution itself is a convincing account for
showing the intransitive nature of metaphysical modality, and this is
the task of next chapter.
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CHAPTER 3
THE PHILOSOPHICAL POSITION OF SALMON’S
INTRANSITIVE ACCESSIBILITY SOLUTION
3,1 Forbes’ Defense of S5
In last chapter, we distinguished two senses of the notion of
restriction on modality. We defined a restrietion on a type of modality
in restriction-sensei with respect to a model of the type of modality
as follows: not every world in the model is a possible world of the
type relative to an arbitrary world w of the model. We defined a
restriction on a type of modality in restriction-sense2 with respect to
a model of the type of modality as follows: the worlds in the model
are not related as equivalence classes. The property of being
restricted in sensei and the property of being restricted in sense2
thus stated are formal properties of a modality. These formal
properties must be explained by the metaphysical property of what
the type of modality in question is. Hence a genuine defense for the
restrictiveness or the unrestrictiveness of metaphysical modality can
only be given by a metaphysical explanation of what metaphysical
modality is.
Graeme Forbes has given a metaphysical defense for the view
that S5 is the logic of metaphysical modality (Forbes use the word
“broad logical necessity” for metaphysical necessity):
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[Passage (10)]
If we consider substantial philosophical theses whose
formulations employ broadly logical possibility and
necessity, such as the theses that the members of a set
are essential to it or that if it exists, an organism belongs
of necessity to the biological kind to which it actually
belongs, we see that there is a conceptual character to
such claims: establishing them involves investigating the
notions of set and set membership, and of kind and
subsumption under a kind, and the interconnections of
these concepts with the idea of what it is to be an
individual thing of the given sort. What the broadly logical
necessities are is therefore fundamentally an a priori
matter, to do with the content of our concepts, even
though with the addition of a posteriori information,
necessary a posteriori truths can be inferred.®®
In Passage (10), metaphysical necessity is explained as
fundamentally necessity of conceptual truth. There are de dicto
metaphysical necessities as well as de re metaphysical necessities.®'^
Forbes says that “de dicto necessities are straightforwardly explicable
in terms of the content of concepts, for they are simply definitions,
or principles constitutive of some concept’s content, or logical
consequences of some concept’s content, or logical consequences of
such principles.”®® De dicto necessities are knowable a priori.
According to Forbes, a priori de re necessities (like principles (N)
and (C)) are essentialist principles, while a posteriori de re
necessities (like those necessities derivable from (N) or (C)) are
essentialist claims about particular individuals. Forbes’ argument
6® Forbes [1983], 185.
6'7 Forbes defines de dicto and de re formulae as follows: A formula with modal or
tense operators is de re iff it contains a modal or tense operator R which has witliin
its scope either (1) an in individual constant, or (2) a free variable, or (3) a variable
bound by a quantifier not witliin R’s scope. All other formulae with modal or tense
operators are de dicto. See Forbes [1985], 48-49.
®® Forbes [1985], 231.
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about a posteriori necessities’ being conceptual is mainly made in
terms of their being derivable from certain a priori necessity: most
direct method of establishing a necessary a posteriori truth is by
inference from a singular a posteriori truth and a general a priori
one, then the source of the necessity in an a posteriori truth is still
an a priori truth. Forbes’ conjecture is that no necessary a posteriori
truth departs from this pattern,
Given this explanation of what metaphysical necessity is, Forbes
claims that metaphysical necessities, as fundamentally conceptual
truths, must hold in every possible world. Forbes demonstrates his
claim by the view that all possible worlds of the real world, as
maximal abstract entities, are constructed in the same “conceptual
scheme” as the one by which we describe the real world, but he
did not provide any more detailed explanation about what this view
exactly is. We may have the following intuitive understanding of
Forbes’ view. First, it is the case of philosophical practice that all
possible worlds are constructed in the same interpreted language as
the one used in describing the real world. Thus, if w@ is the real
world and u? i is a possible world of w@ and sentence P is true in both
w@ and wi, then sentence P in uJi expresses the same proposition as
the one expressed by P in w@. Secondly, assume that we know the
facts of the real world and when describing the real world in the
interpreted language we are able to tell whether a sentence
expresses a truth. This means that we have the grasp of the boundary
for the use of the expressions in the sentence. The boundary for the
69 Forbes [1985], 231.
70 Forbes [19851, 237, footnote 26.
use of an expression is a eoneeptual truth of the interpreted language
that belongs to the very interpretation of the language. Thirdly, since
the real world is consistent, the language used to describe the real
world should be interpreted consistently. Thus, the conceptual
truths of the interpreted language must be systematically related to
the establishment of the consistency—this may be called “the
conceptual system” of the interpreted language. Fourthly, given what
a conceptual system is, we may say that the real world is described in
the conceptual system of the interpreted language. Since the possible
worlds are constructed in the same interpreted language as the one
used to describe the real world, we may say that the possible worlds
are constructed in the same conceptual system as the one in which
the real world is described. This understanding of Forbes’ view, that
all possible worlds of the real world are constructed in the same
“conceptual scheme” as the one by which we describe the real
world, is consistent with the rest of his argument.
According to Forbes, all a priori metaphysical necessities (de
dicto necessities and a priori de re necessities) of w@ must hold the
same in every possible world of w@. Since a priori metaphysical
necessities are simply definitions or principles about the content of
concept (conveyed by a certain expression of the language), they are
part of the conceptual system of the interpreted language and,
hence, must hold whenever the interpreted language is used. Thus,
every a prion metaphysical necessity of w@ is metaphysically
necessary in every possible world of w@.
96
Forbes continues to argue that no a posteriori metaphysical
necessity of iv@ can fail in any possible world of w@:
[Passage (11)]
Could some a posteriori necessary truth, necessary at
w*[the actual world], fail at w[a possible world of w*]?
Evidently not: the same a priori conceptual truths hold at
every world, and any a posteriori truth T necessary at the
actual world is so by being true at the actual world and by
some conceptual truth’s entailing that Ts truth makes it
necessary. Thus T holds at any world accessible to the
actual world, so the same conceptual truth will make it
necessary at such a world over again; hence we never
reach a world where some actual impossibility is true.
Since a world is accessible to the actual world provided
everything true at it is actually possible, failure of
transitivity of accessibility therefore never arises. Similar
reasoning settles the question of symmetry, which means
that S5 emerges as the correct system.'^i
We may summarize our understanding of Forbes’ argument as follows:
(1) a priori metaphysical necessities are straightforwardly
conceptual truths.
(2) Given that all possible worlds of the real world are
constructed in the same interpreted language as the
one by which we describe the real world, a priori
metaphysical necessities, as conceptual truths of the
interpreted language, must hold in every possible
world.
(3) The general patten of obtaining an a posteriori
metaphysical necessity JT is by inference trom a
singular a posteriori truth and a general a priori
necessity. So the source of the necessity in an a
Forbes [1985], 237, footnote 26.
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posteriori metaphysical necessity is an a priori
conceptual truth.
(4) a posteriori truth T hold in every possible world iv of
the real world. The same a priori necessity which
makes Ts truth necessary in the real world will make
Ts truth necessary in w over again.
(5) Therefore, S5 is the correct logic for metaphysical
modality.
Let us now examine Salmon’s response to Forbes’ defense of
S5. Salmon agrees with Forbes on the first two premises. ^2 ^0
raises an objection to premise (3) of Forbes’ argument by proposing a
counterexample as quoted in the following passage.
[Passage (12)]
In fact, not even the conditional “If table a is not
originally formed from hunk hm» then it is necessary that
a is not originally formed from hm” is a priori. ... The
necessary a posteriori truth that table a is not formed
from hunk hm is thus a counterexample to Forbes’ claim
concerning the source of necessary a posteriori truths.
Since the conditional proposition that if a is not formed
from hm then a is necessarily not thus formed is not a
priori, it cannot be entailed by any conceptual a priori
truth. ^3
Salmon holds that the epistemological status of the proposiUons such
as “If table a is not originally formed from hunk hm, then it is
necessary that a is not originally formed from hm” is neither
knowable a priori nor knowable a posteriori. The hunk of matter hm
is supposed to be the threshold of possible matter for table a. Salmon
Salmon [1986], 108-109.
^3 Salmon [1986], 109.
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sayB that since it is “dit'ficult to imagine establishing, by philosophical
argument or otherwise, exactly what number m is, i.e., precisely how
many molecules of difference from the actual original matter of table
a would first result in a new and different table. It seems likely that it
is unknowable that table a is necessarily not originally formed from
hunk of matter
1 do not deny that there may be some unknowable truths, but 1
do not think this helps provide a counterexample to Forbes’
argument at all. As 1 understand it, Salmon’s point is this: though the
truths of the necessary a posteriori proposition and the given
conditional are not knowable either a priori or a posteriori, they
nevertheless must be either true or false; if it happens to be the case
that they are in fact true, the truth of the necessary a posteriori
proposition does not involve any a priori factor, or is not entailed by
any conceptual principle. We notice that in Salmon’s example what is
unknowable is the threshold of the tolerance. Even if Salmon is right
that the threshold of the tolerance is unknowable whatsoever, the
principle stated in (A) below is nevertheless knowable a priori:
(A) “If table a is not originally formed from hunk hm, and
hm is, or is beyond, the threshold of table a’s possible
forming matter, then it is necessary that a is not
originally formed from hm-”
(A) expresses an essentialist concept about table a. The universal
generalization of (A) is an a priori essentialist principle. Every
instance of the universal generalization of (A) is true because when
Salmon [1986], 113.
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the antecedent is true, the consequent is true as well, no matter
what value hm takes.
On the other hand, the universal generalization of the
conditional given in Salmon’s example:
(B) “If table a is not originally formed from hunk hm,
then it is necessary that a is not originally formed
from hin-”
is not true because some of its instances are false. Salmon is right in
saying that (B) is not knowable a priori and does not express any
conceptual truth. But for each case that (B) comes out true by hm’s
taking a certain value, there is always a corresponding instance of (A)
such that the same necessary a posteriori proposition, “necessarily
table a is not originally formed from hm,” which is derivable from (B),
is also derivable from (A), together with the same empirical
information. Any instance of (A) is knowable a priori, and it is clear
that we can understand the necessity of the a posteriori proposition
better from (A) rather than from (B). It is inacurate to claim that the
necessary a posteriori proposition in question is not entailed by any a
priori principle, or involves no a priori factor just because the same
proposition is also derivable from some non-a-priori and not-well-
informed proposition such as (B). Thus, Salmon’s objection to
premise (3) does not succeed in refuting Forbes’ argument.
The following is another passage of Salmon’s, which may be
understood as rejecting Forbes’ defense of S5 by a different
reason—Forbes’ argument is inapplicable to the a posteriori
necessities (derivable from principles (N) and (C)).
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[Passage (13)]
... there are examples ... of propositions that are
metaphysically necessary yet conceptually a posteriori.
With respect to these examples, the argument that a
priori necessity iterates—the argument that if it is
necessary, because a priori, that p, then it is also
necessary that it is necessary that p, and so on-is
inapplicable. The argument is inapplicable precisely
because the examples in question, though necessary, are
not a priori, and hence not necessary-by-virtue- of-being-
a-priori. ”^5
We see that in Forbes’ defensive argument for S5, premise (2) is a
rationale for a priori metaphysical necessities of the real world to be
held in every possible world of the real world, and premise (4) is a
rationale for a posteriori metaphysical necessities to be held in every
possible world of the real world. It is not clear from Passage (13)
which of premise (2) and premise (4) is referred to by “the
argument” mentioned in the passage. If by “the argument” Salmon
means premise (2), Passage (13) is no objection at all to Forbes’
defense of S5, since premise (2) is originally not intended to be
applied to the cases of a posteriori necessity. To make Salmon’s
rejection more plausible, we may assume that by “the argument”
Salmon means premise (4).
Recall that premise (3) states that the a posteriori necessity
T is obtained by inference from an a priori necessity and a singular
a posteriori truth. Premise (4) states that the a posteriori truth T
hold in every possible world w of the real world, and the same a
priori necessity which makes Ts truth necessary in the real world
will make Ts truth necessary in w over again. Premise (3) and
Salmon [1986], 109.
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premise (4) together seem to suggest that a posteriori neeessities’
being held in every possible world is defended by the derivableness
of the a posteriori neeessities in every world. The following are two
possible understandings of premise (4) in terms of the derivableness.
We found that premise (4) under these understandings is indeed
inapplicable to the a posteriori necessities derivable from principles
(N) and (C):
(i) One may understand premise (4) as saying that UT is
derivable in world w from the same a priori necessity and the same a
posteriori truth T. Then the a priori necessity has to be of the form
(7^ JT). But principles (N) and (C) are not in that form. Therefore,
(4) is inapplicable to the a posteriori necessities derivable from
principles (N) and (C).
(ii) One may understand premise (4) as sa3dng that UT is
derivable from the same a priori necessity in world w in the same
way as it is derived in the real world. Let T be the proposition “table
a is not made from hunk hn,” and Q be the proposition “table a is
made from hunk hi and hn is sufficiently different from hi.” UT is
derived in the real world from (N) and the a posteriori truth Q. But
there is no guarantee that the a posteriori truth Q holds in every
possible world of the real world. Therefore, (4) is inapplicable to the
a posteriori necessities derivable from principles (N) and (C).
1 do not know which, if any, of the above understandings of
premise (4) is the one that Salmon has in mind when he says that
Forbes’ argument is inapplicable to certain a posteriori necessities.
But, from (i) and (ii) above, it seems to me that if it should be the
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case that a posteriori necessities hold in every possible world, the
rationale for it must be different from the one given by Passage (12)
summarized as premise (4) of Forbes’ argument.
3.2 Absolute Essentialism and Relative Essentialism
With the conelusion of the last seetion, we may ask what eould
be a defense for the view that a posteriori neeessities hold in every
possible world. Recall that Forbes defines metaphysieal neeessity as
fundamentally conceptual truths. It is not eontroversial, as Forbes
argues in premises (1) and (2), that a priori metaphysical necessities
(de dicto or de re), as straightforward eoneeptual truths, hold in
every possible world. The a posteriori neeessities in question are
deemed as a posteriori de re metaphysieal neeessities. An a
posteriori de re metaphysical necessity differs from any a priori
necessity because it requires empirieal knowledge; in addition, an a
posteriori de re metaphysical necessity differs from any de dicto
necessity because it is about an individual, not about a proposition.
But, a posteriori de re metaphysical necessities are also metaphysical
necessities—these necessities are of the same modal type as de dicto
metaphysical necessity and a priori de re metaphysical necessity. One
may suggest that if we construe an a posteriori de re metaphysical
necessity itself' as a conceptual truth concerning a certain individual
in the real world, then premise (2) of Forbes’ argument is applicable
to a posteriori metaphysical necessities, and hence S5 can be
defended. Forbes himself seems to hold this view. Forbes rejeets
Salmon’s accessibility account by saying the following:
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[Passage (14)]
... the idea of contingent possibility or necessity to which
the accessibility theorist is committed hardly makes
sense: surely no-one will want to say that a merely
possibly possible world would have been possible if our
concepts had been different, or if we had had the
concepts required to understand the propositions true at
that world, which as a matter of contingent fact we do
not.76
Passage (14) says that the idea of contingent possible world comes
from changing concepts from a given world to possible worlds of the
given world. We explained in Section 1.5 that in Salmon’s account,
necessity iteration is valid for a priori essentialist principles like (N)
and (C), but invalid for a posteriori necessities derivable from a priori
essentialist principles. The objection in Passage (14) makes sense
only if those a posteriori necessities are taken to be conceptual
truths in Forbes’ account. In a context related to Passage (14), Forbes
argues that the necessity of an essentialist claim about an individual x
comes from certain category concepts (concepts of property or
relation) which describe the category to which x belongs and the
concept of the individual x’s thisness (the concept of x’s thisness,
according to Forbes, can be articulated as some necessary conditions
which may not be jointly sufficient).
In my view, if the a posteriori necessities that are derivable
from an a priori necessity are, as Kripke suggested, ol the same type
of necessity as those cl priori ones, and if a. priori metaphysical
necessities are construed as conceptual truths, the suggestion that a
76 Forbes [1983], 185.
77 Forbes [1985], 234.
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posteriori metaphysical necessities are also conceptual truths is
reasonable. But, we shall see that even it a posteriori metaphysical
necessities are viewed as conceptual truths, it is still not enough to
sufficiently defend S5. We shall show that given that all metaphysical
necessities, a priori or a posteriori, are conceptual truths, and given
that the possible worlds of the real world w@ are constructed in the
same interpreted language as the one in which w@ is constructed,
there is still a consideration according to which some possible world
of world w is impossible relative to w@ but w is possible relative to
w@—the transitivity of the relative possibility relation between worlds
fails.
We want to first make the following point clear. Salmon
emphasizes that the propositions that the intransitive-accessibility
account holds to be necessary but not doubly necessary are certain a
posteriori propositions whose necessity is derived by means of a
priori modal principles like (N) together with certain further
information, some of which is not a priori—a priori principle (N)
might be used to establish the necessity of table a’s not originating
from hunk hm, but the fact that a does not thus originate is itself
unquestionably empirical and not a prioriJ^ This may be taken as
suggesting that the intransitiveness has to do with the way of how a
posteriori necessities are established, that is, being a posteriori is
the reason for those necessities’ being intransitive—the need ot an
empirical information in the inference of an a posteriori necessity is
78 Salmon [1986], 109.
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responsible for the intransitiveness. We show that this view is
incorrect.
Let us recall how an a posteriori necessity is derived in the
example of Chisholm's Paradox:
(I) UVxUVi/UVzJ(lf a wooden table x is made from a
hunk of matter y, and z is any hunk of matter
sufficiently different from y, then U(table x is not
made from z)).
(II) If wooden table a is made from hunk p at the starting
world and 6 is a hunk of matter sufficiently different
from p, then U(table a is not made from 6).
(III) Wooden table a is made from hunk P at the starting
world.
(IV) 6 is a hunk of matter sufficiently different from p.
(V) U(table a is not made from 6).
(1) is an a priori modal principle and, according to Salmon, multiple
necessitation is true for (1). (11) is an instance of (1), where whatever
the mode of the necessity embodied in the consequent of the
conditional may be, it is preserved from (1). (Ill) is the empirical
information which makes the antecedent of (11) true. The truth of
(IV) is according to the assumption on the threshold of tolerable
variations. Nothing in the pattern of the derivation suggests that the
empirical discovery, (111), will affect the mode ot the necessity in the
consequent of (II) and hence give rise to the intransitiveness for the
necessity of the necessary a posteriori proposition in (V).
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We can see from the above that whatever mode of the a
posteriori necessity stated in (V) is, it is already so in (II) and
(I) ^whatever mode a particular a posteriori necessity has, it comes
from the relevant a priori conceptual principle. In other words, the
mode of the derived a posteriori necessity is originally included in
the conceptually a priori principle as part of the content of the
principle. The empirical discovery only helps derive whatever is
entailed in the principle. It is not difficult to see that if some a priori
metaphysical necessity of the form, “if ..., then necessarily
contains as part of its informational content an intransitive mode for
its inner a posteriori metaphysical necessity, and if the a priori
necessity is reckoned to be true and the inner a posteriori necessity
can be soundly inferred, the accessibility relation between possible
worlds will be intransitive. In the following, we assume that the
modal operator “J” is defined by the axioms of S5, and compare the
two different statements:
(Nl) D(if a wooden table a is originally made from a hunk
of matter (3, and 6 is any hunk of matter whose
collection of components is sufficiently different from
the collection of |3, then (« can not be originally
made from 6)).
(N2) U(if a wooden table a is originally made from a hunk
of matter (3, and 6 is any hunk of matter whose
collection of components is sufficiently different from
the collection of |3, then U(relative to the situation in
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which a is in fact made from (3, a can not be originally
made from 6)).
The difference between (Nl) and (N2) is that they contain
different content for the inner a posteriori conceptual truth. (Nl)
can be formulated as:
(Nl*) U((M(a,(3)&D(6,P))=^U-nM(a,6)).
The partial formulation of (N2) is:
(N2*) U((M(a,P)&D(6,P))=>U(Relative to the situation in
which a is in fact made from p, -iM(a, 5))).
We now show that if the conceptual system of the interpreted
language that we use to describe the real world contains a priori
conceptual truths such as (N2), then it can be the case that the
metaphysical accessibility relation between worlds is intransitive, and
premise (11) of Forbes’ argument is not applicable to the a posteriori
necessities derivable from these a priori necessities.
We may reformulate (N2) as follows:
(N2**) U((M(a,P)&D(6,P))^^(«’P)i-nM(a,6)).
According to (Nl*), the a posteriori necessity in (Nl*),
U-TM(a,6), holds in every possible world by necessity iteration, but
according to (N2*), it is the necessity J(relative to the situation in
which a is in fact made from p, -.M(a,8)), not the necessity
U^M(a,6), that holds in every possible world by necessity iteration.
However, saying that “it is necessary (relative to the situation in
which a is in fact made from p, -iM(a,6))” is equivalent to sa3dng that
“it is necessary relative to the situation in which <x is made from P
(-,M(a,6)).” The modal operator “Mla.PlU” stands for “it is necessary
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relative to the situation in which a is made from (3.” Since the
necessity referred by “M(a,p)ij” is ^ relative one, it carries an
intransitive mode—the axiom of S4, UF^LiUP, is invalid for “M(a.p)^ ”
We now form a T'-construction starting with a maximal
consistent set, f'l, containing (N2**), (ST*) and M(a,(5), but not
(Nl*). The logic of F'-construction is S5, because our hypothesis is
that S5 is valid for all a priori metaphysical necessities formulated as
“Ll( ).” In doing so, all formulations of a priori conceptual truths
will hold at every maximal consistent set in F'. The axiom, UF^UUP,
is invalid for “M(a,p)^ ” Notice that we are using both and
to refer to metaphysical necessities. In the expansion of a
subordinate set F'k of F'l, the initial set of F'k, F'k.i, must include all
y’s such that either Lly or M(a,p)^Y jg p'i. The difference is that
every Liy of F'i is also included in F'k.i whereas of F'j are
not. This is because when Uy is in F'l, UUy is also in F'l by the
characteristic axiom of S4, which is not valid for ^(«’P)Uy’s. The
expansion can otherwise proceed normally.
We define a model M, composed of W, R, D and V, based on F'-
construction in the way similar to defining a model based on the F-
construction explained in Section 2.3. We must, however, postpone
adding the accessibility relations by transitivity because the
complication caused by the modal operator “M(a,[3)^
”
'po examine
whether the transitive accessibilities do hold, we look at the outcome
of the expansion whether a subordinate* world F'k of world F'l in F'
has the property that every fact contained in F'k is a metaphysical
possibility of F'l, or that every metaphysical necessity of F'i is true in
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r'k. If it does have this property, we add the aceessibility relation
from r'i to r'k; otherwise, we do not add the relation between them.
Let the world that corresponds to the starting maximal
consistent set of F'-construction F'l be the real world w'@. The
necessary principles (N2**) and (ST) hold in the real world and, by
the axiom of S4, hold in every world in M. The a posteriori necessity
can be established in the real world by an inference
from (N2**) and M(a,(3). But the axiom of S4 is invalid for this
necessity. If in some subordinate world of w'@, M(a,(3) is still true,
the a posteriori necessity can be derived in that world
again. But since M(a,(3) is contingent, there must be some
subordinate world iv'i of w'@ in which M(a,P) is not true, and so
M(«’PlU^M(a,6) is not derivable in w'i. Then, -^(«’P)0M(a,6) can be
consistently added to the initial set of w'i. In the expansion at the
next level, according to the rule of T-expansion, there is at least one
subordinate world w\ of w'i which contains M(a,6)—the construction
of the maximal consistent set corresponding to tu'k starts from the
initial set which contains M(a,6). Since tu'k is consistent, ^M(a,6) is
not in tr'k. The rule of T-expansion guarantees that w'i is possible
relative to w'@ and ly'k is possible relative to w'i. But, according to the
definition of relative possibility relation, u?'k is not possible relative to
w'@ since the necessity 5) holds in w'@ but —>M{a,b) is not
true in ty'k—the relative possibility relation is intransitive.
In our view, the intransitiveness of the relative possibility
relation between the consistent worlds in model M is an inherent
nature from the conceptual system of the interpreted language in
which M is given. Namely, the relative possibility relation is
intransitive because the worlds in M are constructed in an
interpreted language the conceptual system of which contains
relative conceptual truths such as (N2**). Notice that, corresponding
to (N2**), the general principle (N) can be re-formulated as:
(N**) UVxUVi/'JVz(D(z,y)=)iJ{M(x,i/)^A^(^.y)U^M(x,z))).
With different empirical fact, different a posteriori relative
conceptual truth can be inferred from a relevant instance of (N**),
Given the assumption of Chisholm’s Paradox that a sequence of
worlds, w@, w\, Wn, is such that in w@ table a is made of ho, and
for each i>l, table a is made from hi in Wi, where ho and hfs are
distinct hunks of matter, by (N**) and the assumption, in each
different world in the sequence there holds a different a posteriori
relative conceptual truth. This may be what Forbes means in Passage
(13) that Salmon’s account committed the fallacy of adopting
different conceptual scheme in each of the worlds. But it seems to
me that it is more plausible and more illuminating to construe the
cause of the intransitiveness by the relative nature of the conceptual
system of the interpreted language in which the worlds are
constructed.
In our above argument, all metaphysical necessities, a priori or
a posteriori, are viewed as conceptual truths, and the model M is
given in the same interpreted language. The argument shows that
even if all metaphysical necessities, a priori or a posteriori, are
conceptual truths, and even if the metaphysically possible worlds of
an arbitrary world w are constructed in the same interpreted
language as the one in whieh w is eonstrueted, the relative
metaphysical possibility relation between worlds can still be
intransitive if the conceptual system of the interpreted language
contains a priori principles like (N**).
It is not difficult to see that if an interpreted language has a
priori necessities like (Nl), instead of those like (N2), as its
conceptual truths, then the relative possibility relation between the
worlds in a model constructed in this interpreted language will be an
equivalence relation. Recall that we let “LI” be defined by the axioms
of S5. Principle (Nl) (formulated as (Nl*)) asserts its inner a
posteriori necessity in the same mode, i.e., the mode of S5. Once the
a posteriori necessity J-iM(a,6) is established in a certain world w by
an inference from (Nl*) and M(a,|3), it holds in every possible world
of w.
Let us use and “0” consistently in the mode of S5, and use
and “^0” in an intransitive mode, where “R” refers to the
situation to which the relative necessities and possibilities apply. We
then call the a priori conceptual truth (N2) (formulated as (N2**)) a
relative essentialist conceptual truth, and call a conceptual system of
an interpreted language containing conceptual truths like (N2) a
relative essentialist conceptual system. Accordingly, we call the a
priori conceptual truth (Nl) (formulated as (Nl*)) an absolute
essentialist conceptual truth, and call a conceptual system of an
interpreted language containing conceptual truths like (Nl) instead
of (N2) an absolute essentialist conceptual system. If a model of
metaphysical modality given in an interpreted language with a
relative essentialist conceptual system, the relative possibility
relation of the model will be intransitive. One the other hand, if a
model of metaphysical modality given in an interpreted language with
an absolute essentialist conceptual system, the relative possibility
relation of the model will be an equivalence relation.
Despite the difference between the two kinds of conceptual
systems, a relative essentialist conceptual system and an absolute
essentialist conceptual system are all conceptual systems. Forbes’
views, that metaphysical necessities are fundamentally conceptual,
and that necessity iteration is true for necessary a priori
propositions, can be held with respect to either conceptual system.
But only with respect to an absolute essentialist conceptual system
should the logic of metaphysical modality be S5 unrestrictedly. That
is, premise (2) of Forbes’ argument can apply to a posteriori
metaphysical necessity only if the relevant conceptual system is an
absolute essentialist one. In arguing that S5 is the correct logic for
metaphysical modality as a whole, Forbes actually implicitly
presupposes an absolute essentialist conceptual system in addition to
his premises (1), (2) and (3) of his argument that we summarized in
Section 3.1.
We showed that it is not true that if metaphysical necessities
are fundamentally conceptual, only an S5-style system is appropriate
for representing the logic of metaphysical necessity, but it is true
that if metaphysical necessities are fundamentally conceptual and the
conceptual system in question is an absolute essentialist one, only an
S5-style system is appropriate for representing the logic of
metaphysical necessity. Thus the proponents of S5 must argue for
their position to favor an absolute essentialist conceptual system over
a relative one. On the other hand, a similar reason can apply to
Salmon’s Intransitive Accessibility Solution. The above analysis
reveals that the question about which logical system is correct for
metaphysical modality can only be answered from the nature of the
conceptual system of the interpreted language that we use to
describe worlds. From this point of view, I would say that the nature
of the Intransitive Accessibility Solution is such that it solves the
Chisholm’s Paradoxes and the Four Worlds Paradox by rejecting the
absolute essentialist conceptual system and adopting a relative
essentialist conceptual system for the language that we use to
describe the worlds in question, and therefore taking modal logical
system T to be the logic of metaphysical modality. Or, we can simply
say that the Intransitive Accessibility Solution is a solution to the two
Paradoxes from a relative essentialist point of view. Thus, the
plausibility of the solution lies on the plausibility of the relative
essentialist conceptual system. We shall analyze, in Section 3.3 and
Section 3.4, how successful Salmon is in defending the relative
essentialist conceptual system.
3.3 The Argument of Intransitive Accessibility Solution Again
We have the impression that in his Intransitive Accessibility
Solution as well as in his paper of 1989, “The logic of what might
have been,” Salmon intends to have us believe that a relative
essentialist conceptual system is not presupposed in his account.
instead, the relative essentialist eonceptual system is a eonsequenee
of his theory of possible world (the one that we presented in section
1.4) and the truths of the three principles (N), (C) and (ST). Recall
that the theory of possible worlds that Salmon embraces holds the
view that which world is metaphysically possible relative to world w
is determined by the metaphysical necessities and possibilities
contained in w—the view is clearly expressed in the two equivalent
definitions of relative possibility relation; (i) a world w' is
metaphysically possible relative to a world w if and only if every fact
of w' is a possibility in w, and (ii) w' is metaphysically possible
relative to w if and only if every necessary fact of w obtains in w'.
More precisely, Salmon’s view is this: The three necessary principles
(N), (C) and (ST) are true and, because they are a priori necessities,
they are contained in each of the worlds involved in the modal
inferences of Chisholm’s Paradox and of the Four Worlds Paradox.
Given the theory about how the possible worlds of a world are
determined, the modal inferences from the three principles in each
of those worlds determine that the accessibility relation is
intransitive. Therefore we should adopt a relative essentialist
conceptual system and let modal logical system T be the logic of
metaphysical modality. This view is explicitly stated in Salmon’s
argument of the Intransitive Accessibility Solution summarized at the
end of Chapter 1.
We explained in the previous section that intransitive relative
possibility relation between worlds is a consequence ot taking
relative essentialist conceptual truths to be metaphysical necessities
ot the worlds. In our view the intransitive relative possibility relation
is explained in terms of adopting a relative essentialist conceptual
system. But in Salmon’s view the relation is reversed: adopting a
relative essentialist conceptual system is explained in terms of the
intransitive relative possibility relation. In other words, we hold that
the relative possibility relation between the worlds is intransitive
because S4 axiom is predetermined as invalid for the a posteriori
necessities in question; but Salmon holds that S4 axiom should be
invalidated for the a posteriori necessities in question because the
relative possibility relation between the worlds is intransitive. We
believe that there are flaws in Salmon’s argument. In the following
we shall examine the argument of the Intransitive Accessibility
Solution summarized at the end of Chapter 1.
The argument is repeated here:
(1) The metaphysical necessities and possibilities
contained in a given world determine which world is
metaphysically possible relative to the given world.
(2) The principles (N), (C) and (ST) and their multiple
necessitations are true in the real world. The
stipulation about the possibility of P-worldl is also a
correct one.
(3) The necessities and possibilities inferred from
Principles (N), (C) and (ST) in those involved worlds
determine that the metaphysical accessibility relation
between the worlds is intransitive.
(4) The correct modal logic employed in the modal
inferences involving the three principles must be
decided consistently with the intransitive nature of
the accessibility relation between the worlds
determined by the three principles.
(5) The axiom of S4 modal logic, JP^UUP, characterizes
a transitive accessibility relation between possible
worlds.
(6) Therefore, we should reject S4 and S5 modal logic
and accept system T as the correct logic for
metaphysical modal reasoning.
To consider whether a relative essentialist conceptual system
could be a consequence of Salmon’s theory of possible world and the
truths of the three principles (N), (C) and (ST), we let the conclusion
(7)
follow (l)-(5):
(7) Therefore, we should reject the absolute essentialist
conceptual system and adopt a relative essentialist
conceptual system.
As one can see, premise (5) expresses a truth independent of
other premises. Premise (4) says that the logic of metaphysical
modality must be decided consistently with the accessibility relation
determined by the three principles. The question is whether the
inference from the (N), (C) and (ST) can determine the accessibility
relation without presupposing the logic which is supposedly to be
decided aiter looking at the accessibility relation. In fact, (4) makes
sense if the first three premises are all true. Thus whether this
argument is a sound one depends on whether the first three
premises can be true all together.
The two paradoxes show that the absolute essentialist version
of (N) and (C) cannot be true together with (ST). Suppose that when
asserting the truths of all three principles, Salmon actually asserts
that the three principles are all true in their relative essentialist
version. Given this understanding, premise (2) should be restated
that principle (ST) and the relative essentialist version of principles
(N) and (C) and their multiple necessitations are true in the real
world. Given (2) as such, (1), (2) and (3) can be true together, but
Premise (4) is redundant and the conclusion is trivial, as they just
reiterate something already given in premise (2).
We notice that, however, in (2) Salmon only asserts that the
three necessary principles and their multiple necessitations are true.
According to Salmon, the “true multiple necessitations” can
definitely apply to a priori necessities. But he did not explicitly
indicate in premise (2) the mode of the inner a posteriori necessities
in (N) and (C). There are four possibilities to explain premise (2): (i)
premise (2) means that the three principles and their multiple
necessitations are true and the mode of the inner a posteriori
necessities is not determined; (ii) premise (2) means that the three
principles and their multiple necessitations are true and the mode of
the inner necessities may be determined in either way, a mode of S4
or S5, or a mode of T; (hi) premise (2) means that the three
principles and their multiple necessitations are true and the mode of
the inner necessities is determined in a mode of S4 or S5; (iv)
premise (2) means that the three principles and their multiple
necessitations are true and the mode ol the inner necessities is
determined in a mode of T.
We have already dealt with the fourth possibility in previous
paragraph. Under the fourth explanation of (2), the argument is
sound but trivial. In my opinion, one cannot consistently assert the
truths of all three principles in standard semantics without
presupposing relative essentialism, therefore, the argument under
any of the other three explanations of (2) will not be a sound one. But
we want our conclusion that “the argument of the Intransitive
Accessibility Solution either presupposes a relative conceptual
system or is unsound” to follow from an argument, but not just a
simple assertion. We find that, without commenting on the truth of
(2) directly, we can still argue that the argument consisting of (1),
(2) and (3) is unsound under any of the first three explanations of (2).
By doing so we may have an opportunity to reveal some confusions
hidden in the argument.
Under the first explanation of premise (2), the argument is
either sell-contradictory or containing a false premise depending on
how premise (1) is understood. Premise (1) expresses the view that
possible worlds of world w are determined by possibilities contained
in w. There are two aspects concerning such a determination: in one
aspect, it needs to consider what are the metaphysical necessities
and possibilities in w, and in the other aspect, it needs to consider
what is the mode of the metaphysical necessities and possibilities.
Suppose that we have the maximal set of propositions describing a
given world and we are to determine which world is possible relative
to the given world using the method of the F-construction. We
determine a minimum set of propositions such that any consistent
world that contains this set and a fact which is a possibility of the
given world is a possible world relative to the given world. From the
rule of r-expansion, we know that this minimum set is composed of
every y such that Lly belongs to the given world. But does this
minimum set contain those necessities, Uy’s, themselves? Whichever
way one answers this question, he must have a prior understanding
about the mode in which the word “necessary” is being used. Hence,
the mode of metaphysical necessities must be decided in the given
world before the possible worlds of the given world can be
determined. Without a definite mode, there is no minimum set that
can be definitely given and no possible world of the given world that
can be expanded. In other words, philosopher’s necessity and
possibility are formally defined by a set of axioms of modal logic, and
without specifying the set of axioms we don’t know exactly what the
words “necessary” and “possible” mean, and hence we are not in the
position to talk about determining possible worlds by necessities and
possibilities. Besides, the maximality of possible worlds requires
answers to the questions like whether the necessary proposition,
UP, is itself a necessity of the world. In short, if the viewpoint
“possible worlds are determined by necessities and possibilities”
makes sense at all, the necessities and possibilities must be fully
defined, as explained by the rules of the F-expansion: the
subordinates are expanded according to the necessities and
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possibilities of the given world with respect to a set of axioms of a
system of modal logic which characterizes the kind of modality.
Suppose that premise (1) means the same as we just explained,
and that premise (2) is given the first explanation that the three
necessary principles and their multiple necessitations are true but
the mode of the inner a posteriori necessities is undetermined.
Premise (3) says that “the necessities and possibilities inferred from
principles (N), (C) and (ST) in those involved worlds determine that
the metaphysical accessibility relation between the worlds is
intransitive.” In this case, (2) and (3) together say the opposite of
(1). Premises (2) and (3) are suggesting that possible worlds of a
given world can be determined even though the mode of some
necessity or possibility is not determined in the given world. If in
addition one thinks that a relative essentialist conceptual system can
follow from the intransitive accessibility relation, one actually means
that sometimes the order of determination is reversed: it is not from
the necessities and possibilities to the possible worlds, but is from
the possible worlds to the necessities and possibilities.
Let us review Salmon’s solution to Chisholm’s Paradox. Salmon
assumes that hunk hm is the last one in the sequence regarded as
sufficiently similar to ho- Any hunk of matter in the sequence after
hm is an impossible matter for a from the standpoint of w@, thus any
world in which table a is originated from hi(i>m) is an impossible
world relative to w@, because w@ contains the necessity that table a
cannot made from any hunk hi(i>m)- World iUm+l» which contains table
a made from hm+L is the first impossible world in the sequence.
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Since principle (ST) is an a priori necessary principle, according to
Salmon’s view, (ST) holds in every world possible relative to the real
world and hence in world Wjn- By the possibility derivable from (ST)
in Will, world is a possible world relative to world 11)^ which is
possible relative to w@. So lUm+l is possibly possible relative to w@.
But by the a posteriori necessity derivable from principle (N) in w@,
iDin+i is not a genuinely possible world. So u)m+l is a possibly possible
but genuinely impossible world. Since Wm is possible relative to w@
and u?m+i is possible relative to Wm but lym+i is not possible relative
to w@, the relative possibility relation determined by the a posteriori
necessities and possibilities asserted in (N) and (ST) in the worlds is
intransitive.
In Salmon’s solution it is not specified whether the a posteriori
necessity derivable from (N) in w@ also holds in Wm, namely, whether
this a posteriori necessity is itself a necessity in w@—this is
consistent with our supposition of (2) that the mode of inner a
posteriori necessity of (N) is undetermined. But, by saying that ti)m+i
is possible relative to ti>m but not genuinely possible relative to w@,
Salmon actually attributes to the real world some modal properties,
namely, the properties that the a posteriori necessary proposition,
U-iM(a,hm+l)* which is derivable from the relevant instance of (N) in
w@, is not itself a necessity of w@. Given the supposition about
premise (2), this practice is in fact to determine some necessity of
the real world by the possible worlds of the real world. Therefore,
given the assumed meanings of (1) and (2), premises (1), (2) and (3)
in Salmon’s solution are self-contradictory.
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Now let us assume that in Salmon’s solution premise (1) means
that the possible worlds of a given world can be determined by the
necessities and possibilities of the given world without fixing a mode
lor every (or every kind oil necessity or possibility. In this case, the
argument is not sell-contradictory but unsound. We have argued that
this cannot be done. Premise (1) is false under this interpretation.
Thus, under the first explanation ol (2). Salmon’s argument is either
self-contradictory or unsound.
We consider the second possibility: premise (2) means that the
three principles and their multiple necessitations are all true, and
the mode of the inner necessities may be determined in either way, a
mode of S4 or S5, or a mode of T. In this case, premises (1), (2) and
(3) together imply that no matter how the mode of the a posteriori
necessities in (N) and (C) is determined, the accessibility relation
between the worlds is intransitive. This amounts to saying, for
example, either that (Nl)-(ST) and (N2)-(ST) will determine the
same set of possible worlds and the accessibility relation between the
worlds is intransitive, or that (Nl)-(ST) and (N2)-(ST) will
determine different sets of possible worlds but the accessibility
relation in either case is intransitive. By knowing how the content ot
an a priori essentialist principle will affect the accessibility relation
between possible worlds (which is discussed in the previous section),
we conclude that the two alternatives must be both false. Let us see
this with an example.
According to the first alternative, (Nl)-(ST) will determine the
same set of possible worlds as the set of possible worlds determined
by (N2)-(ST) But this cannot be the case. Suppose that the
determination of possible world in Wi involves (Nl)-(ST). Any
possible world thus determined will contain the a posteriori
necessity, J^M(a,6). On the other hand, if the determination of
possible world in wi involves (N2)-(ST) instead of (Nl)-(ST), there
will be some possible worlds of Wi which do not contain this
necessity. Therefore, the set of possible worlds determined
according to (Nl)-(ST) is not the same set as the one determined
according to (N2)-(ST).
According to the second alternative, (Nl)-(ST) and (N2)-(ST)
will determine different sets of possible worlds, but the accessibility
relations in both cases are intransitive. But that cannot be the case
either. A world containing (Nl)-(ST) is inconsistent, and if we use
the method of F-expansion, the subordinate worlds of the given
inconsistent world are also inconsistent. ^9 por example, in the case
described in Chisholm’s Paradox, if (Nl) is involved, the a posteriori
necessity J^M(a,hm+l) established in w@ holds in a subordinate
world wi by S4 axiom. On the other hand, 0M(a,hm+i) can be
inferred from (ST) and the fact M(a,hi) in uji. Therefore w\ is an
inconsistent world. If one agrees that the relative possibility relation
is defined only on consistent worlds, it is then illegitimate to talk
about the relative possibility relation between inconsistent worlds. If
one thinks that it makes sense to talk about the relative possibility
'79 We discussed in sections 1.4 and 2.4 about tlie relative possibility relation between
a consistent world and an inconsistent world. We reach the conclusion tliat the two
definitions of relative possibility relation wiU give two incoherent answers to the
question of whether a consistent world is a possible world of an inconsistent world.
So, we are not going to consider situations like that.
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relation between inconsistent worlds (by the same definitions of
relative possibility relation), then we cannot see any reason to
suppose that some necessity of an inconsistent world w may fail in
any subordinate worlds of w—these worlds are also inconsistent and
an inconsistent world contains every proposition.
Thus, under the second possible explanation of premise (2),
premises (2) and (3) cannot be true together: if (3) is true (2) must
be false, and if (2) is true (3) must be false. That is, if the relative
possibility relation is intransitive, then it cannot be the case that the
mode of the a posteriori necessity in (N) may be determined either
in the mode of S4 or S5, or in the mode of T. On the other hand, if
the mode of the inner a posteriori necessity in (N) may be
determined either in the mode of S4 or S5, or in the mode of T,
then there is no guarantee that the relative possibility relation is
intransitive. Since at least one premise is false, the argument is
unsound under the second explanation of (2).
Our discussion has already taken care of the next possibility. In
the third explanation, premise (2) says that the three principles and
their multiple necessitations are true in their absolute essentialist
version. Thus, if (2) is true, (3) must be false, and vise versa.
In summary, under the first three explanations of (2), in no
case the three premises, (1), (2) and (3), can be all true—in each
case at least one of them is false. So the premises failed to support
the conclusions (6) and (7). Under the last explanation of (2), (6) and
(7) trivially follow from the premises. But, the relative essentialist
conceptual system is already given in the premises of the argument
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rather than being shown by the argument. Salmon’s attempt of
deriving relative essentialism in his Intransitive Accessibility Solution
has failed. No justification for the relative essentialist version of
principles (N) and (C) can be found in the argument of the
Intransitive Accessibility Solution, and hence no non-trivial proof for
rejecting S4 and S5 modal logic as the correct logic for metaphysical
modal reasoning is exhibited in the Intransitive Accessibility
Solution.
In the above, we have taken a detour to show that the
Intransitive Accessibility Solution cannot work in whatever possible
interpretations of its key premises. Now we point out in a direct way
the reason for why this argument cannot work. There is a
fundamental confusion in the attempt of deriving relative
essentialism from the view that the possible worlds of a given world
is determined by the possibilities contained in the given world.
The concept of possible worlds is introduced into philosophy
as a semantic tool for representing the meaning of modal
expressions. It is unquestionably true that metaphysically possible
worlds are determined by metaphysical necessities and possibilities.
As we showed earlier, whenever the metaphysically possible worlds
of a given world can be determined, it must be the case that the
metaphysical necessities and possibilities of the given world and the
mode of metaphysical modality are already pre-determined in the
given world. In practice, to speak about which world is a
metaphysically possible world of the given world, we are always
assuming that the metaphysical necessities and possibilities oi the
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given world and mode of the metaphysical modality are already
correctly determined. The determination of the possible worlds of
the real world w@ according to principles (N), (C), and (ST) and the
a posteriori necessities and possibilities derivable from the three
principles can be carried out only if the mode of these necessities
and possibilities is already determined. The Intransitive Accessibility
Solution attempts to show the mode of the involved a posteriori
necessities and possibilities by the outcome of such a determination
drawn from these necessities and possibilities. Thus, what is showed
by the Intransitive Accessibility Solution cannot but be trivial—this is
argued in the discussion about the last explanation of premise (2).
Our discussion about other three explanations of premise (2) shows
that the proof of intransitive mode for metaphysical modality cannot
be otherwise done by the intransitive accessibility account. Such an
account cannot by any means explain why the mode of metaphysical
modality should be intransitive, or why a relative essentialist
conceptual system should be adopted.
3.4 The Supervenience Principle
In the second version of the Four World Paradox, Salmon
showed that the conclusion of the modal inference drawn from (ST)
contradicts the Supervenience Principle: a material object is
supervenient on its matter and form. We said earlier in Section 1.3
that the Supervenience Principle is a more general principle than
principles (N) and (C). Salmon holds an affirmative view towards the
Supervenience Principle as stated in the following passage.
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[Passage (15)]
... physical objects are “nothing over and above” their
matter and structure, in the sense that a complete
accounting of what matter there is in a genuinely possible
world, with its causal interconnections and exact
configuration through time, atom for atom, quark for
quark, must completely and uniquely determine whatever
physical facts there are about each of the physical objects
such as tables and ships present in the world This
principle would require that any two genuinely possible
worlds exactly alike at the level of matter and structure
must also be exactly alike at least in all their physical-
object facts. 80
William Carter has expressed his puzzlement on Salmon’s
acceptance of the Supervenience Principle. He argues that the
Supervenience Principle and the Strong Tolerance Principle (ST),
are not reconcilable. If (ST) is reckoned to be true in Salmon’s
accessibility account, how can the Supervenience Principle be true in
the same account. To him, it is incoherent to hold the view that “the
essence ... is contingent” while accepting the Supervenience
Principle. 81
Given that metaphysical necessities are conceptual truths, as
we said in section 3.2, philosophers may hold opposite views about
whether the conceptual system should be an absolute essentialist one
or a relative essentialist one. The Strong Tolerance Principle (ST) is
surely not reconcilable with the absolute essentialist version of the
Supervenience Principle, but (ST) is reconcilable with the relative
essentialist version of the Supervenience Principle. The phrase,
“genuinely possible,” used in passage (15) suggests that Salmons
80 Salmon [1981],
81 Carter [1983], 227.
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attirmation of the Supervenience Principle is made for the relative
essentialist version.
Graeme Forbes comes up a similar objection: “[The Intransitive
Accessibility Solution] is internally incoherent, in that it implies the
rejection of a principle which is needed to motivate the search for
any solution to the Paradox. ... The problem is that it is hard to see
why someone comfortable with the distinction between u and v
should regard the conclusion of Chisholm’s Paradox as false in the
first place, since the argument for the falsity of the conclusion relies
on a certain principle about the concept of identity which the
distinction between u and v would appear to flout. ”^2 Here u
corresponds to our a-world2 and v to our P-world2, which are
materially indistinguishable from one another. The principle that
Forbes mentioned in this passage is the principle that “numerical
distinctions between entities must be grounded in differences
between them in intrinsic respects. ”^3 This is a reductionist
principle more general than the Supervenience Principle in our
discussion.
Considering the distinction between the absolute essentialist
version and the relative essentialist version of the Supervenience
Principle, we see that it is in fact coherent for Salmon to be
comfortable with the numerical distinction between a-world2 and (3-
world2, and to accept the relative version of the reductionist
principle, and to view the conclusion of the Four Worlds Paradox as
false (that is, the accessibility account holds that in no genuinely
82 Forbes [1983], 182-183.
83 Forbes [1983], 183.
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possible world of the real world a table made from a possible matter
of table a according to the same plan is some table other than a ).
In my opinion, the question is not whether one can coherently
accept the relative essentialist version of the Supervenience
Principle (at least with respect to the discussion of the two modal
paradoxes). Rather, the question is the plausibility of relative
essentialism. According to relative essentialists, the Supervenience
Principle can only be asserted relative to a certain modal
situation—in different modal situations the specific content of the
Supervenience Principle will be different. Therefore, relative
essentialists must give up the Supervenience Principle simpliciter.
To demonstrate the plausibility of the relative essentialist points of
view, one must show that the Supervenience Principle simpliciter
should be repudiated. In the following, we shall examine first how
the Supervenience Principle simpliciter is repudiated in Salmon’s
account, and then Salmon’s defense for his repudiation of the
Supervenience Principle simpliciter.
W. Carter challenges the distinction between a-world2 and P-
world2. He says, “Since the material configuration and material
make-up of world [p-world2] can be stipulated to be precisely the
same as that of [a-world2]—since [p-world2] and [a-world2] are
indiscernible atom for atom, quark for quark—there is a reason to
believe that [P-world2] is [a-world2]. ... given the immensely plausible
thesis that ‘worlds’ that are physically indiscernible are identical.
Forbes has expressed a similar view: “... it is the existence of such a u
84 Carter [1983], 229. We replaced Carter’s “Wd” oy “(3-world2”, and “Wc” by “a-
world2”.
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which is in question, ”85 where u is a world in which table a is made
of hunk hn whereas u is a world in which some other table t is made
of hunk hn according to the same plan.
Salmon gives the following reply to these objections. 8® He says
that the temptation to identify the worlds like a-world2 and (3-
world2 by material indiscernibility stems from misconceiving
possible worlds as material objects. According to Salmon’s definition,
worlds are maximal abstract entities, and hence the idea of
identifying worlds by material indiscernibility must be rejected. In
Salmon’s view, the two worlds a-world2 and p-world2 are in fact
discernible: though the two worlds are materially and purely
qualitatively indistinguishable, they differ in their accessibility
relations as well as in which identity facts obtain in them. 87 World a-
world2 includes the fact that a is the table formed from hunk h "
whereas P-world2 excludes this fact. In P-world2, some table distinct
from a is formed from hunk h" according to the same plan. It follows
by the principle of Indiscernibility of Identicals that a-world2 and p-
world2 are distinct.
The above reply is in fact an escape from the real question. One
may still challenge Salmon with the view that the principle of
material indiscernibility of identicals should be applicable to the two
tables, table a in a-world2 and table p in p-world2, which are
material objects qualitatively and materially (in terms of the matter
and the distribution of matter) indiscernible. Salmon cannot agree to
85 Forbes [1985], 183.
86 Salmon [1986], 107. In footnote 25, Salmon indicates that liis reply is made to tlie
objection raised by Carter and Forbes.
87 Salmon [1986], 107.
the identity of the two tables, sinee if the two tables are numerically
identical, a-world2 and (3-world2 will contain exactly the same facts
(the same set of propositions). He must say that the two tables are
distinct, because they differ in how they relate to the real
world—table a in a-world2 is a possible table relative to the real
world and table P in P-world2 is a possibly possible but not a
genuinely possible table relative to the real world. Thus, he gives up
the Supervenience Principle simpliciter—a material object is
supervenient on its matter and form.
An analogous argument can be made with respect to worlds.
Corresponding to the maximal description of the real world there is
a physical real world. Similarly, corresponding to each maximal
consistent set of propositions that are either possible, or possibly ...
possible to the real world, there is a physical entity which will exist if
the conjunction of the propositions in the maximal consistent set
turns out to be true. By “exist” we mean realization. Salmon uses
“worlds” to refer to maximal sets of propositions. We let “P-worlds”
refer to the physical entities corresponding to Salmon’s consistent
worlds. Only one P-world, namely, the physical real world, actually
exists; the other P-worlds have potentials to exist. By h3rpothesis, P-
a-world2 and P-P-world2 are materially and qualitatively exactly the
same throughout their entire history. Carter’s challenge may be
rephrased as: since the material configuration and material make-up
of P-p-world2 is the same as that of P-a-world2—since P-(3-world2
and P-a-world2 are indiscernible atom for atom, quark for
quark—there is a reason to believe that P-p-world2 is P-a-world2,
given the immensely plausible thesis that P-worlds that are physically
indiscernible are identical. Salmon must deny that the two P-worlds
are numerically identical, for if he does not, the distinction between
the two maximal consistent sets of propositions, a-world2 and (3-
world2, is purely nominal—they are one and the same set of
propositions. But if he denies the numerical identity of the two P-
worlds, he must give up the Supervenience Principle simpliciter and
claims that the two P-worlds are distinct because they differ in how
they relate to the real world.
Salmon defends his repudiation of the Supervenience Principle
simpliciter by demonstrating the following thesis which he
numbered (T7):
(T7) For every x and every y, if x=y, then the fact that x=y
is not grounded in or reducible to, qualitative
nonidentity facts about x and y other than x’s
existence, such as facts concerning material origins,
bodily continuity, or memory.
By arguing for (T7) Salmon aims to disprove Forbes’ reductionist
principle and the Supervenience Principle simpliciter, which are
incompatible with the distinction between a-world2 and P-world2 in
his account. 88 Salmon states Forbes’ reductionist principle in his own
words as follows:
[Passage (16)]
All facts about the numerical identity or distinctness of a
pair of objects, x and y-including facts of cross-time and
cross-world identity and distinctness-are metaphysically
88 Salmon [1986], 1 18, footnote 25.
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“grounded in,“ and “consist in,” nonidentity facts about x
and y, so that such identity facts do not obtain
independently and solely by their own hook but only in
virtue of nonidentity facts. ^9
There are two points that we shall make clear before a
discussion of Salmon’s proof of thesis (T7). First, we must be clear
about what is meant by the phrase “grounded in” in Salmon’s (T7)
and in Passage (16) above. The phrase is Forbes’ term. According to
Forbes, saying that the identity of a certain object is grounded in
such-and-such means that the identity of the object supervenes on
such-and-such properties of the object. (Forbes emphasizes that the
identity of an object is intrinsically grounded. This view may be
restated that the identity of an object is grounded in or reducible to
the essential properties possessed by the object.) Since Salmon’s
purpose of arguing for (T7) is to disprove Forbes’ principle, we have
reason to believe that he uses the phrase “grounded in” in the same
meaning.
Secondly, we need to clarify the meaning of the phrase
“qualitative nonidentity facts” in (T7). As commonly understood,
qualitative nonidentity facts of a certain individual object are facts
about the color and the shape of the object, or about from what kind
of matter the object is formed, or about which specie or kind the
object belongs to, etc.. Some nonidentity facts about the individual
object are viewed as non -qualitative facts such as the fact of the
object’s existence and the fact about from which particular piece of
matter the object is originated. It is not controversial at all that in
89 Salmon [1986], 1 18, footnote 25.
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this sense of “qualitative,” two numerically distinct objects may share
the same set of qualities, for example, two distinct pencils can be
qualitatively indistinguishable. However, 1 do not think that the
phrase “qualitative nonidentity facts” in (T7) is used according to our
common understanding of the phrase. If it is, arguing for (T7) will
not fit the purpose of disproving Forbes’ reductionist principle.
Forbes holds that the identity of an object is (intrinsically) grounded
in nonidentity facts about the object. These nonidentity facts need
not be qualitative when “qualitative” is used according to our
common understanding of the word. The phrase “qualitative
nonidentity facts” may be given a broader understanding as referring
to all facts about the object except the identity of the object. The
phrase “qualitative facts about x” in this broad sense may be
understood as facts that can be expressed as a property or relation
possessed by the individual x. Since every fact about x can be thus
expressed, every fact about x is a qualitative fact about x. The fact of
x’s identity is a qualitative identity fact about x and other facts about x
are qualitative nonidentity facts. In this broad sense, the fact of the
existence and the fact about the original matter of x are qualitative
nonidentity facts about x. The word “qualitative” is thus not
important any more. It seems to me that from (T7), Passage (16) and
Passage (17) quoted below, it is more appropriate to interpret the
word “qualitative” in (T7) as being used in this broad sense. An
obvious evidence is that in (T7) Salmon views “existence” as a
qualitative non-identity fact. In fact, only if “qualitative is used in the
broad sense can (T7) be counted as a thesis against the
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Supervenience Principle simpliciter. We shall see that Salmon’s
argument for (T7) can apply to any nonidentity fact whether or not it
is a qualitative fact according to the common understanding of
“qualitative.”
Salmon’s argument for (T7) is succinct as we quote below.
[Passage (17)]
Whatever x may be, the trivial fact that x=x is not at all
grounded in, or reducible to, any facts about x like those
concerning x’s material origins, x’s bodily continuity
through time, or x’s memory of past experiences. If the
fact that x=x is grounded in any other fact about x, it is
only grounded in the mere fact that x exists. Thus x has
the complex property of being such that the fact that x is
identical with it is not grounded in any qualitative
nonidentity facts about x other than x’s existence. Hence,
by Leibniz’s Law, for every y, if x and y are one and the
very same, then y also has this complex property. Thus, if
x=y, then the fact that x=y is not grounded in any
qualitative nonidentity facts about x (which are also facts
about y) other than x’s existence. Indeed, since x and y
are one and the very same, the fact that x=y is just the
fact that x=x. Consequently, the fact that x=y must have
the property of the fact that x=x that it is not grounded
in any qualitative nonidentity facts about x (which are also
facts about y) other than x’s existence—QED.^o
There are three premises in Salmon’s argument. The first
premise is Leibniz’s Law: (J(x=y=3(Px=3Py)). The second premise is
that the fact x=y is the same fact as the fact x=x. The third premise is
that the trivial fact x=x has the property of being not grounded in any
facts about x other than x’s existence. We may think of three possible
understandings of the third premise. We shall see that under the first
two understandings, the argument for (T7) fails to derive the desired
conclusion for disproving Forbes’ redutionist principle and the
90 Salmon [1986], 112-113.
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Supervenience Principle, and that under the third understanding the
argument is circular.
We begin by examining Salmon’s argument under the first
understanding. When regarding the fact x=x as trivial, one is most
likely to have in mind the idea that “x=x” is a statement of self-
identification for object x with respect to any particular context that
X is in. (A context consists of an index of time and an index of world.)
It is uncontroversial that it is a trivial truth that any object is
qualitatively indiscernible from, and numerically identical to, itself
with respect to any context. By this understanding of the fact x=x,
there is indeed a sense in which the truth of the fact x=x is not
“grounded in” any other properties of x. That is, the fact that x is
qualitatively indiscernible from, and numerically identical to, itself at
a particular moment in a particular world is true no matter what
other properties x possesses at the moment in the world.
Given this understanding of the third premise in Salmon’s
argument, we may restate the premise as this: the trivial fact x=x —in
the sense that x is qualitatively and numerically identical to itself at
any context (at any particular moment and in any particular
world)—has the trivial property that the truth of this fact is not
grounded in any other properties x possesses at any particular
context. Since the fact x=x is a trivial self-identity fact about x with
respect to a particular context, it it is indeed true that the fact x=y is
the same as the fact x=x, then by Leibniz’s Law, the fact x=y is also a
trivial self-identity fact about x/y with respect to a particular context,
(“x/y” means “x” and “y” are interchangeable.) Thus, along the line
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of Salmon’s argument, it follows that the fact x=y has the trivial
property that the truth of this fact is not grounded in any other
properties that x/y possesses at any particular context.
Given this understanding of the third premise, Salmon’s
argument for (T7) proves nothing against the Supervenience
Principle and Forbes’ reductionist principle, simply because the
concept of “grounding in” employed in argument is not the same
concept as the one used in Forbes’ principle. Though the argument
reaches the conclusion that the truth of the fact does not depend
on other properties x/y possesses, the tricky point is that the
conclusion is true simply because an object cannot fail to share the
same set of properties with itself in the same context. Thus the
question of what properties an object shares with itself in the same
context becomes redundant in determining self-identity with respect
to the same context. If the phrase “is not grounded in” is explained
in this way, the conclusion of Salmon’s argument is perfectly
compatible with the Supervenience Principle and Forbes’
reductionist principle. In fact, the Supervenience Principle and
Forbes’ reductionist principle are trivially true in the cases of self-
identity with respect to the same particular context.
We now consider the second understanding of the third
premise of Salmon’s argument. There is another way for viewing the
fact x=x as trivial. In this case, “x=x” is understood as x in
context 1 and ‘x’ in context2 rigidly designate the same individual.
Then the fact x=x is trivially true because it is given that the object
referred by “x” on the left side of “=” is the same object referred by
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X on the right side ot As Salmon pointed out in his book,
Reference and Essences, the self-identity of this kind is a trivial
consequence of the theory of direct reference, in which proper
names and variables are rigid designators that designate the same
object in every world (or every context). Surely, given this meaning of
x=x, there is an understanding in which the trivial fact x=x is not
grounded in any fact other than x’s existence, namely, the
designative rigidity of “x” is not determined by any material or
qualitative property of the individual designated by “x.”
The third premise may be restated as this: the trivial fact x=x
aein the sense that the “x” on the left side of “=” and the “x" on the
right side of rigidly designate the same individual in every
possible world throughout the time—has the property that the co-
designation of the “x” on the left side of and the “x” on the right
side of “=” is not grounded in any properties of the individual
designated by both “x”s. The second premise is that the fact x=y is
the same fact as x=x. Given the third premise as stated above, the
fact x=y should be consistently understood as the fact that “x” and
“y” co-designate the same individual. However, since the fact x=x is
trivial, if the fact x=y is indeed the same fact as the trivial fact x=x,
then by Leibniz’s Law, the fact x=y is also trivial, that is, the co-
designation of the two names, “x” and “y,” must be trivially given.
Thus, Salmon’s argument for (T7) with this understanding of the
third premise will conclude that the fact x=y has the property that
the CO-designation of the “x” on the left side ot
“=” and the “y on
the right side of is not grounded in any properties of the
individual designated by both “x” and “y.”
But again, the above eonelusion is not desirable for disproving
Forbes’ reduetionist prineiple and the Supervenienee Prineiple,
beeause the concept of “grounding in” employed in this argument is,
as in the earlier case, not the same concept of “grounding in” as the
one in Forbes’ reductionist principle. The co-designation of the two
names, “x” and “y,” when trivially given, is independent of the issue
whether the identity of an object is reducible to the properties of the
object, and of the issue about the limit of changes that an object can
endure cross-time or cross-world without becoming something else.
We come to the last understanding of the third premise of
Salmon’s argument. There is another sense of “grounded in,”
namely, the reductionist sense employed in Forbes’ reductionist
principle. In this case, the statement, that the fact x=x has the
property of being not grounded in any facts about x other than x’s
existence, should be understood as that the identity relation between
X in context 1 and x in context2 is not supervenient on, or not
reducible to, any material or qualitative properties of x except x’s
existence in both contexts. This is to assert that there is no non-
trivial essential property that x must possess in order to remain to be
itself. However, with this interpretation of the fact x=x, the fact x=x
is no longer trivial.
We may restate the third premise as this: the fact x=x has the
property of being not grounded in any properties of x except x s
existence in the sense that x in context i may not share any property
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with X in context2 except x exists in both contexts. Given that the
fact x=x is the same fact as the fact by Leibniz’s Law, the fact x=y
also has the property that it is not grounded in any properties of x/y
except x/y’s existence in the sense that x in context i may not shEire
any property with y in context2 except x/y’s existence in their
contexts respectively. This conclusion contradicts the Supervenience
Principle and Forbes’ reductionist principle. However, with this
understanding of the third premise, Salmon’s argument for (T7) is a
circular argument—the truth of the conclusion is needed for the
truth of the third premise.
It is certainly illegitimate to start the argument with the phrase
“not grounded in” in either of the first two meanings and conclude
the argument with the same phrase in its third meaning—a fallacy of
changing concept in a deductive argument. One cannot prove from
the redundancy of reducing an object’s self-identity in a particular
context to the properties the object possesses at the context to the
irreducibility of identity in general. Similarly, one cannot prove from
a semantical feature of proper names and variables, namely, their
designative rigidity, the metaphysical point of view that the identity
of object X is not reducible to the properties that x possesses.
Especially, if Salmon is right in arguing that essentialism, or absolute
essentialism, is not deducible from the theory of direct reference,
anti-essentialist or relative essentialist is not deducible from the
theory of direct reference either—they are on a par.
9* Salmon [1981], Part II.
We have reached the following conclusion: Salmon’s
Intransitive Accessibility Solution is a solution to the two Paradoxes
given from a relative essentialist point of view. Our analysis of
Salmon’s defense on the plausibility of his relative essentialist view
shows that none of his attempts has thus far succeeded. We have
shown in Chapter 2 that the restrictive nature of metaphysical
modality in restriction sensei, which is taken by Salmon as an
independent reason from his Intransitive Accessibility Solution to
support the intransitive accessibility relation between metaphysically
possible worlds, has in fact nothing to do with the mode of
metaphysical modality. We have shown in Section 3.3 and this section
that no non -trivial proof of the relative essentialist point of view is
given in Salmon’s Intransitive Accessibility Solution or in his
argument for thesis (T7). Contrary to what Salmon hoped for, the
theory of possible worlds that Salmon embraces, the theory of direct
reference, the trivial truth of self-identity, and Leibniz’s Law, play no
effective role in the attempt of disproving absolute essentialism or
proving relative essentialism.
As 1 see it, Salmon’s acceptance of relative essentialism relies
solely on his own metaphysical intuition. In Salmon’s account, no
substantial defense for the plausibility of relative essentialism, or at
least, for preferring a relative essentialist conceptual system to an
absolute essentialist one, is successfully given. The question about




RESOLUTION TO THE PARADOXES
AND A DEFENSE OF S5 MODAL LOGIC
We showed in the previous chapter that Salmon’s rejection of
modal logic systems S4 and S5 and his acceptance of system T as the
correct logic for metaphysical modality are argued by presupposing
relative essentialism: the a posteriori essential properties of an
artifact are essential to the artifact relative to a certain possible
situation (a certain possible world)—no a posteriori essential
property simpliciter can be asserted for an artifact. On the other
hand, we also showed that a defense for S5 to be the logic of
metaphysical modality ultimately consists in a defense for the
absolute essentialist view that the a posteriori essential properties of
an artifact are essential to the object simpliciter. For those who
incline to view S5 as the logic of metaphysical modality, there are
two tasks: (i) solving the paradoxes, and (ii) providing an account that
elucidates the intuition that a posteriori essential properties of an
artifact are essential to the artifact simpliciter. In this chapter, we
shall analyze what is wrong in the paradoxical inferences, and try to
reveal the intuition that supports the absolute essentialist view. We
start our discussion by considering Forbes’ solution to Chisholm’s
Paradox.
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4.1 Forbes’ Counterpart Solution to Chisholm’s Paradox
Graeme Forbes developed a “counterpart solution” to
Chisholm’s Paradox in which S5 is saved. In his solution, Forbes
holds that (i) the essentialist principles are true92 and (ii) the
Tolerance Principle is an intuitively correct principle. We have
distinguished two versions of the Tolerance Principle, the weak
version (T) and the strong version (ST). We want to see which
version is the Tolerance Principle in Forbes’ mind. Forbes’ statement
of the Tolerance Principle is the following:
[Passage (18)]
Necessarily, any artifact could have originated from a
slightly different collection of parts from any one
collection from which it could have originated.^3
This statement of the Tolerance Principle may be interpreted
as the weak Tolerance Principle (T) stated in Section 1.2. Namely,
the phrase “could have originated from a slightly different collection
of parts” means “could have originated from some slightly different
collection of parts,” but not “could have originated from any slightly
different collection of parts.” We have explained that the weak
Tolerance Principle (T) does not assert a sufficient condition for
inferring any possible matter of the table. Given that table a is made
from p and P' is sufficiently overlapping p, it is still not sufficient to
infer, from (T) and the given empirical information, that it is possible
for table a to be made from p'. However, in presenting Chisholm’s
92 Here we mean Forbes’ essentialist principles similar to principles (N) and (C).
Forbes discusses series of these kind of principles in Forbes [1985], Chapters 5-7.
Tlie essentialist principles concerning artifacts is discussed in Chapter 7.
93 Forbes [1984], 161.
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Paradox, Forbes infers from the Tolerance Principle a sequence of
possibilities for table a’s original construction in exactly the same
way as the sequence of possibilities inferred from (ST) in Salmon’s
presentation of Chisholm’s Paradox. The weak reading of the
Tolerance Principle in Passage (18) is not sufficient to legitimize
such an inference. Suppose that it is given that table a has only two
possible original hunks of matter, p and p', such that P' is slightly
different from p in their collections of components. The weak
reading of Forbes’ Tolerance Principle about table a, “table a could
have originated from some slightly different collection of parts from
any collection from which it could have originated,” is satisfied by
this assumed situation of table a. Thus the weak version of the
Tolerance Principle does not guarantee that there is such an infinite
sequence of possibilities. Therefore, Forbes must rely on a stronger
Tolerance Principle when he infers an infinite sequence of
possibilities. Thus we have reason to think that Forbes has in mind
something like the strong version (ST).
With regard to the nature of Chisholm’s Paradox, Forbes holds




and the intuition of tolerance is more naturally expressed by the
conditional 0M(a,P)^0M(a,P') in the latter formulation, rather than
the necessity U(M(a,P):30M(a,P') in the former formulation. Forbes
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holds that the latter formulation assimilates Chisholm’s Paradox to
the standard form of classieal Sorites Paradox in the following way:
(0) 0M(a,hi)
( 1 ) 0M{a,hi)^0M{a,h2)
(n-1) 0M(a,hn-i)=>0M(a,hn)
(n) 0M(a,hn)
With this presentation of Chisholm’s Paradox, Forbes holds that
the well-known treatment of ordinary Sorites Paradoxes can be
applied. This treatment modifies the two-valued semantics by
introducing a range of intermediate degrees of truths between the
absolute truth and the absolute falsehood. Forbes argues that “Now it
is much less clear that the problem arises because of some fallacious
modal inference, since there is no modal logic in a standard
sorites. ”9"^ His point is this: if Chisholm’s Paradox can be solved
without involving modal logic, it is unlikely that the Intransitive
Accessibility Solution, which criticizes S5 modal logic, provides the
correct answer to the paradox. Forbes’ solution makes use of the
counterpart theory originally proposed by David Lewis. Forbes
explains the reason for his approach in the following passage:
[Passage (19)]
The motivation for this approach comes from taking
Chisholm’s Paradox to be a modal paradox of vagueness.
Tolerance arises because of vagueness or fuzziness in the
limits of the range of sums of wood which possibly
constitute a: there is no sharp distinction between those
94 Forbes [1984], 172-173.




sums which could, and those which could not, constitute
a. Given that there is no fuzziness in the boundaries of
particular sums of wood or in the constitution relation, it
seems that this vagueness must arise from an underlying
vagueness in the concept of possibly being identical to a;
however, in standard modal semantics, such vagueness
could only be represented by vagueness in a’s transworld
identity conditions, and solution of the paradox in which
we think of identity as vague would be rather
unappealing. But it does make sense to think of similarity
as being vague, .... Since the counterpart relation is fixed
by similarity considerations ... and similarity admits of
degrees, the degree-theoretic resolution of non-modal
paradoxes may be transcribable, and in fact can be
transcribed, into the modal logical context.^®
One restriction of counterpart theory is that the domains of
possible worlds are disjoint. With this restriction, an individual object
can exist in only one possible world. In Forbes’ Counterpart Solution
to Chisholm’s Paradox, the real table is denoted by a, and the table
made from hunk hi in world W{ is denoted by ai, where hi and Wi are
as described in Chisholm’s Paradox in Section 1.3. The real table a
exists only in the real world and for each i, ai exists only in Wi.
Forbes assigns each a counterparthood of a certain degree to a.
Table a itself has a-counterparthood of degree 1 (the absolute
similarity) and an. which shares no components with a, has a-
counterparthood of degree 0 (the absolute dissimilarity in term of
their components). For each ai, where l<i<n, ai has a slightly higher
degree of a-counterparthood than the a-counterparthood ai+i has.^^
96 Forbes 11984], 173-174.
97 Tlie statement here is an over-siinpUlication. Forbes has pointed out tliat degrees
of similarity relaUon between possible tables should be determined by various
aspects of tlie tables. But in the present problem only the constitutional components
are allowed to vary and this justified the simplification. See Forbes [1985], Chapter
7.
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Hence each sentence “ai is a counterpart of a” has a truth value of 1-
H n. The conditional
0M(a,hi)30M(a,hi+i)
is translated in counterpart theory as follows:
3u(C(ai,a,u)&M(ai,hi,u))=>3u(C(ai+i,a,i;)&M(ai+i,hi+i,u)),
where C(ai,a,u) means that ai is a counterpart of a in world u. This
translation says that if there is a world u in which ai is a counterpart
of a and ai is made from hi, then there is world v in which ai+i is a
counterpart of a and ai+i is made from hi+\.
The truth value of the conjunctions and conditionals are
determined by the following two evaluation rules:
(Conj): val[A & B| = min { val[A|, val[B] }
1- ( val[A] - val[B]), if val[A] > val[B];
(Cond): val[A B] = {
1, otherwise.
According to these evaluation rules, for each premise of the form
0M(a,hi)=)0M(a,hi+i) in the Sorites argument, the consequent is
slightly less true than the antecedent. Hence, none of the premises is
wholly true. Since the consequent of the preceding premise is the
antecedent of the following premise, the slight decreases in the
degree of truth are preserved and accumulated so that, at the end of
this inference, M(a,hn) has truth value of degree 0. Forbes says that
“each application of modus ponens in the standard paradox commits
the ‘fallacy of detachment’,” and hence “Chisholm’s Paradox is
shown to turn on the fallacy of detachment, just as the paradox ol
smallness does.”^®
98 Forbes [1984], 175.
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Salmon has raised some objections to Forbes’ counterpart
approach. He criticizes the Counterpart Solution as “just a
particularly inflexible brand of essentialism.”99 Salmon argues that, by
denying the existence of a possible state of affairs in which the very
table a is made from ever so slightly different matter, the
counterpart theorist holds that it is absolutely impossible for table a
to be made from matter with even one atom different.
As 1 see it, Forbes’ intention of introducing counterpart
relation to the problem of Chisholm’s Paradox is to give the truth
-
values to the ordinary modal claims about table a that agree with his
intuition. Forbes is certainly not arguing for inflexible essentialism. In
the Counterpart Solution, the counterpart relation is a semantical
apparatus for the treatment of transworld identity—table ai in world
lUi is a representative of table a in w@. It is disputable whether such a
semantic device is acceptable. But even if the semantical device of
counterparthood is not acceptable, it does not follow that the
Counterpart Solution is an inflexible essentialist solution—it only
means that this particular counterpart device does not work in
solving the Paradox. According to Passage (19) quoted above, Forbes’
motivation of introducing counterpart relation is to treat the
vagueness in table a’s possible matter. It seems to me that whether
the counterpart device is acceptable depends upon whether the
vagueness in table oc’s possible matter is, as Forbes suggested, a
vagueness of the kind that admits of degrees. That is, whether the
vagueness in table a’s possible matter is like the vagueness in the
99 Salmon [1981], 236. Also, Salmon [1986], part VI, 95-96.
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concepts of short or bald” which can be said as true in a certain
degree.
Salmon also raises an objection to Forbes' aecount on where
the vagueness is located. He disagrees with the view that the
transworld identity relation is vague. He argues that, though
Chisholm’s Paradox and other modal paradoxes can be formulated in
terms of cross-world identity, they can just as easily be formulated
without identity. Salmon said that “Formally, the erueially vague
expression involved in [Chisholm’s Paradox], according to Forbes’
formal treatment, is ‘0 ... a ...,’ or ‘it might have been that a ...;’ the
crucially vague concept is the one designated by ‘XFOF(a).’ ... Henee,
if there is any vagueness relevantly involved in the modal paradoxes,
it resides in the modal operators themselves, ...” Salmon argues that
standard possible-world semantics can accommodate the vagueness
in modal operators precisely in the way suggested by his Intransitive
Accessibility Solution: “one should treat the accessibility relation
between worlds as itself vague ... When fully worked out, this involves
intransitivity in the accessibility relation via a region of
indeterminacy, ...” The accessibility approach “affords a solution to
the modal paradoxes that accommodates vagueness precisely where
it must arise, ...”^^0
Salmon’s point is that the vagueness in the expression
“XFOF(a)” can be viewed as vagueness in the accessibility relation,
and by doing so, the vagueness in trans-world identity relation
become apparent and can be eliminated. For Salmon, this view
100 All quotations in this paragraph is in Sahnon [1986], 93-95.
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warrants his accessibility approach to the paradoxes. But to me, this
is problematic. Given Salmon’s view that possible worlds are
determined by possibilities and his definition of accessibility relation,
if it is vague whether a world is possible relative to world iv, it must
be case that there are some modal propositions such that whether
they belong to world w is vague in the first place. Then, we ask what
is vague in these propositions. Salmon says that the vagueness resides
in the modal operators themselves. What could this mean? There
should be no vagueness in the meaning of “possible.” A proposition is
possible if it is not bound to be false. Maybe Salmon means that the
mode of “0” and is vague, that is, it is vague which modal system
characterizes “0” and If this is the case, 1 cannot see how such
a vagueness warrants Salmon’s accessibility account. We showed in
last chapter that Salmon’s Intransitive Accessibility Solution
presupposes relative essentialist conceptual system, or say in other
words, the intransitive relative possibility relation between worlds. If
the mode of “0” and (the mode of metaphysical possibility) is
vague, the Intransitive Accessibility Solution just begs the question to
have such a presupposition. Or perhaps he means that the truth of
the possible proposition OFa is vague, that is, whether the modal
proposition OFa belongs to the real world is vague, which in turn
gives rise to the vagueness of the accessibility relation. 11 this is the
case, the same thing can be restated as: whether a has the modal
property OF is vague. Thus we are talking about a’s transworld
identity—whether a could have the property F without losing its
identity. Then, contrary to Salmon’s claim, that the accessibility
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relation is vague in the first place and the vagueness in trans-world
identity relation is apparent and can be eliminated, we find that the
vagueness in the accessibility relation is derivatively based upon the
vagueness in a’s transworld identity.
My criticism of Forbes’ counterpart approach to Chisholm’s
Paradox is different from those of Salmon’s. 1 do not think that the
view that the transworld identity relation is vague is unacceptable,
given that some transworld identity relations of artifacts may be
unknowable to human mind. In other words, since we are not always
in the position to successfully pick out references for an identity
statement, there is nothing wrong to treat theoretically those
identity relations as vague and avoid giving any definite answers about
the truths of them. lOi
My main objection to Forbes’ Counterpart Solution is that it is
not a satisfactory solution to the paradoxes because it fails to conform
our intuition that in some situation we have definite yes-no answers
to the questions about whether a certain hunk of matter could have
constituted the given artifact, and because it fails to explain the
absolute essentialist intuition that a posteriori necessities and
possibilities of an artifact belong to the artifact simpliciter.
Let us consider the following question: can we ever give a
definite truth value to modal assertions such as “this possible artifact
constructed in world w is numerically identical to the actual artifact
X in the real world w@” in non-extreme cases?
Robert Stalnaker has argued for the indeteniiiiiacy of identity in tenns of
indeterminacy of reference. See Austin [1988], 349-360.
The extreme cases concerning artifact x’s transworld identity
are: (i) the cases in which a possible artifact is made from exactly the
same matter as the actual matter of x and is made according to the
same plan in the same historical situation as the one by which x is
constructed in the real world, and (ii) the cases in which a possible
artifact is made from a completely different matter from the one
from which x is made in the real world. We assume that it is not
controversial that in these extreme cases, the modal assertions about
x’s transworld identity are either definitely true or definitely false. By
“definitely true” and “definitely false” we mean simply “true” and
“false;” the word “definitely” is used in contrast with “true-in-a-
certain-degree” and “false-in-a-certain-degree.” The non-extreme
cases about x’s transworld identity are the cases in which a possible
artifact is made from a hunk of matter different but not completely
different from x’s original matter in the real world.
Suppose that Forbes’ answer to the question is “No, we
cannot.” According to this view, there can never be definite yes-no
answers to the questions about x’s transworld identity with respect
to x’s original matter except in the extreme cases. Thus, one cannot
really talk about the transworld identity of x in an absolute sense
except in the extreme cases. But, saying that a possible artilact is
identical to x to a certain degree does not make good sense because
identity relation does not admits of degrees. Hence one can only say
in non-extreme cases that a particular possible artifact is similar to x
in a certain degree. If Forbes’ use of counterpart relation is thus
motivated, the replacement of transworld identity relation by
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similarity relation between counterparts is natural for his view.
However, our intuition is that though there are non-extreme cases in
which no definite answers can be given to the questions about
whether a certain hunk of matter could have constituted x, there are
some non-extreme cases for which definite answers can be given to
such questions. It seems to me, it is counter-intuitive to deny the
existence of those non-extreme cases for which the questions about
table x’s possible matter are definitely answerable.
Suppose, on the other hand, that Forbes agrees with our
intuition and holds that though in some non-extreme cases definite
answers cannot be given to questions concerning the possible matter
of the given artifact, there are non-extreme cases in which definite
answers can be given to such questions. But how can the Counterpart
Solution treat these non-extreme cases? To treat these cases, the
counterpart relation has to be taken to represent identity relation.
One option is to divide degrees of similarity into two or three regions
such that each region represents identity, distinctness and
indeterminate respectively. But this approach, whether it is workable
or not, is really not an option for Forbes, because he holds in Passage
( 19 ) that there is no sharp cutoff threshold between the collection ot
components which could constitute the table and the collection of
components that could not. However, one needs to determine a
sharp cutoff threshold, whether the threshold is a point or an
interval, in order to represent definite identity and distinctness by
the counterparthood. The other option is to view identity as having
degrees. This is conceptually incorrect and, as we have seen in
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Passage (19), unacceptable to Forbes himself. Identity relation may be
vague in some other sense, for example, identity relation may be
vague in certain cases from epistemic point of view. But it is
fundamentally incorrect to view the vagueness in identity relation as
the same as the vagueness in the concept of being “short,” which
admits of degrees and is such that there is no sharp cutoff point
between being short and being not short. Thus, the Counterpart
Solution simply cannot treat the non-extreme cases in which the
questions about possible hunks of matter of a given artifact are
definitely answerable.
In Forbes’ Counterpart Solution, the question about transworld
identity of artifacts is avoided rather than answered. Chisholm’s
Paradox is dismissed—there is no paradox about table a’s transworld
identity—because we do not talk about table a’s transworld identity
any more. No explanation for the absolute essentialist intuition, that a
posteriori essential properties of an artifact are essential to the
artifact simpliciter, can be extracted from Forbes’ account. S5 modal
logic is saved by talking about similarity instead of identity. But in our
view, such a solution cannot be a real solution to the paradox because
the problem of transworld identity of artifacts cannot be so
dismissed.
4.2 A Rejection of the Strong Tolerance Principle (ST)
We analyzed in Section 1.3 two versions of the Tolerance
Principle, the weak version (T) and the strong version (ST). The
weak version (T) asserts only the existence of the possibility that
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table X be made from some hunk ol matter distinet from its aetual
original matter (namely, table x be made from a hunk of matter
which has the same quantity and quality as table x’s original matter
but the collection of components is slightly different from x’s actual
collection of components). The property of “slightly different from
x’s original matter” in (T) is not a sufficient condition for a hunk of
matter to be a possible matter of table x. Thus, (T) is not a principle
for inferring further possibilities for table x from a known possibility
of X. On the other hand, the property of “slightly different from x’s
original matter” in the strong version (ST) is a sufficient condition
for a hunk of matter to be a possible matter of table x. Given a known
possible matter of table x, one can infer in S4 or S5 modal logic a
sequence of possibilities for x from (ST). The Four Worlds Paradox
and Chisholm’s Paradox arise from the inferences drawn from the
Strong Tolerance Principle (ST) and principles (N) and (C) in S4 or
S5 modal logic.
Salmon claims that the three necessary principles, (N), (C) and
(ST) are all true principles. But we can see that there is no inherent
connection between (N) and (ST), or (C) and (ST). In principle (N),
the property of not being made trom a hunk ol matter substantially
different from its actual matter is a necessary condition for table x to
be itself. Principle (N) says nothing about what is sufficient to infer
further possible hunks of matter for table x from any known possible
matter of x. Principle (C) states that no other table could be made
according to the same plan from a known possible hunk of matter of
table X. This is to say that “made according to the same plan” and
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m&cic from 3. possiblo msttor of x form 3n individusl essence of x
that is, a sufficient condition for being x. The content of principle (C)
has nothing to do with how to infer a possible hunk of matter for
table x’s construction. Hence, the point of view stated in (ST) and
the points of view stated in principles (N) and (C) are mutually
independent. One who believes in principles (N) and (C) need not
believe in (ST). In the following, we shall argue that the Strong
Tolerance Principle (ST) is not a correct principle. Principle (ST) is
repeated below:
(ST) If a wooden table x is originally made from a hunk of
matter y according to a certain plan P, then x might
have been made according to the same plan P from
any hunk of matter y' instead of from y, where y' has
the same quantity and quality as y but the collection of
components of y' is slightly different from that of y.
We first ask where this Strong Tolerance Principle comes from and
what is the rationale for those philosophers who accept this
principle as a correct principle.
The considerations about measuring possible variations in the
original matter of an artifact by a certain quantity of change may be
thought as initially from Kripke’s remarks in his faunous lectures:
[Passage (20)]
If a chip, or molecule, of a given table had been replaced
by another one, we would be content to say that we have
the same table. But if too many chips were different, we
would seem to have a different one.’®^
lO^Kripke [1980], 51, footnote 18.
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One might think that Kripke’s remark in Passage (20) suggests a
quantitative criterion for the transworld identity of artifacts.
However, if we relate this passage to its original context, we shall see
that there is no indication that Kripke has the intention to suggest a
sufficient condition for inferring possibilities or impossibilities for
the artifact. The following passage is stated before Passage (20) in the
same context:
[Passage (21)]
... in concrete cases we may be able to answer whether a
certain bunch of molecules would still constitute T [a
table], though in some cases the answer may be
indeterminate. ^^3
A passage closely following Passage (20) is the following one:
[Passage (22)]
... it is not assumed that necessary and sufficient
conditions for what kinds of collections of molecules
make up this table are possible; this fact 1 just
mentioned.
The words, “this fact 1 just mentioned,” refer back to passage (21). It
seems to me that in the context (20), (21) and (22), it is more
appropriate to understand the passage (20) as describing two
situations in which we are likely to have definite answers to
questions about whether the given table is possible to be constructed
from a certain hunk of matter. Given passage (22), it is inappropriate
to understand passage (20) as suggesting a sufficient condition for
inferring possibilities for the table.
[1980], 51.
104 Kripke [1980], 51-52.
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A clear statement of (ST) is found in Salmon [1986). In his
earlier works, he actually uses (ST) in his diseussions of the Four
Worlds Paradox, though (ST) is not explieitly stated. Salmon simply
takes prineiple (ST) as an intuitively eorreet prineiple without any
examination to the intuition. But, we do not think that the intuition
stated in (ST) is so strong as self-evident so that no rationale is
needed to demonstrate its correetness. Indeed, we do have doubts
about this intuition. Let us borrow an example from W. Carter to
convey our objection to (ST).
Here is Carter’s story:
(Passage (23)]
Wilma is a retired eloek-maker with time on her hands.
Realizing that she has more detached cloek parts than
are required for the job, Wilma decides to pass the time
by constructing a clock. The clock that Wilma proceeds
to build— let us call it “Ben”—has never before been
constructed. Ben is constructed out of clock parts ci, C2,
• ••» cioo* ... At the completion of the construction process,
Wilma is left with three unused parts, cioi, c\o2 and cio3-
As it happens, cioi is functionally equivalent to ci, cio2 is
functionally equivalent to C2, and cio3 is functionally
equivalent to 03.^0^
We assume that the plan according to which Ben is construeted
includes the design, the available material, the maker and the
specific project of assembling a clock from the available material
according to the design. We also assume that Wilma’s ehoice of using
one of Cl and cioi, one of C2 and cio2^ ojod one ot C3 and cio3 io the
construction of the clock is accommodated in the plan. That is, given
the plan thus assumed, using either ci or c 101, either C2 or C102. and
105carter [1983], 225-226.
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either C3 or C103 to construet a elock are all eonsidered as
constructing a clock according to the same plan. The counterfactual
worlds can be stipulated exactly the same as the real world except of
realizing some other chances allowed in the plan. Namely, instead of
having {ci, C2, ... cioo} as its collection of components, the clock
made in a counterfactual world has another subset of the set {ci, C2,
... cioo. cioi, C102, C103} (the set of total 103 clock-parts) to be its
collection of components, which is quantitatively and qualitatively
identical to {ci, C2, ... cioo}- la the situation described in Carter’s
story, if the clock in a counterfactual world is made according the
same plan as the one by which Ben is made, the maximum change in
the original matter is a difference of three components. A difference
of three components can be counted as a fairly small amount of
change in the given situation. Thus, nothing intuitively essential to
Ben’s identity is violated in those counterfactual worlds. We seem to
have a case in which we can definitely answer the question whether a
certain collection of components still constitutes Ben—the
collections which are subsets of {ci, ..., C103} arid qualitatively
identical to {ci, ..., cioo} are possible collections of components for
Ben.
We have shown that Ben could be made according to the same
plan from some other collection of components which is slightly
different from but qualitatively and quantitatively the same as its
actual collection of components. This is the intuition expressed in
principle (T). Now, we consider the following question: given the
plan of making Ben as assumed above, is it the case that tor any
collection of components, if it is slightly different from but
qualitatively and quantitatively equivalent to Ben’s actual matter, then
this collection of components could have been made into a table
according to the plan of making Ben?
Let us imagine two other counterfactual worlds. In the first
counterfactual world, the clock made by Wilma is constructed from
the parts C201, C202, C203, C4 cioo where C201. C202, C203 are
qualitatively and functionally equivalent to cioi, C102 and cio3.
However, they are parts that Wilma obtained through a mail-order. In
the second counterfactual world, the clock made by Wilma is
constructed from the parts C301, C302* C303 » C4, ... cioo where C301,
C302. C303 are qualitatively and functionally equivalent to cioi, C102
and C103. But the three parts C301, C302 » C303 are preciously obtained
from another planet, say from the moon, through an extraordinary
exploration on the moon accomplished by Wilma. We want to ask
whether the clocks in the two counterfactual worlds are made
according to the same plan as the plan from which Ben is made.
Given the assumption of the plan of making Ben in the real world, in
both counterfactual worlds the clocks are not made according to the
very same plan. We have assumed that the plan according to which
Ben is made includes the design, the available material, the maker
and the specific project ol how to assemble a clock Irom the available
material according to the design. In the two counterfactual worlds,
the clock is not made from the available material {c\, ..., C103} and not
according to the specific project. By substituting Ben for the table x
in principle (ST), we produce a counterexample to (ST). We showed
161
that in both counterfactual worlds, a clock is made from a collection
of components which is qualitatively and quantitatively the same as
Ben’s actual matter and differs from Ben’s actual matter in no more
than three components. The two collections of components, {C201,
C202, C203, C4 Cl 00} and {C301, C302, C303. C4, ..., cioo}, can be
considered both as slightly different from the collection of
components that actually constitutes Ben. But no clock can be made
from them according to the plan by which Ben is constructed.
Hence, there are some collections of components, which are slightly
different from but qualitatively and quantitatively the same as Ben’s
actual collection of components, such that Ben could not be made
from these collections of components according to the same plan.
This is a denial of principle (ST). In other words, let {ci, ..., cioo} be
P and {C30i, C302. C303. C4 cioo} be 6. The collection 6 is
sufficiently similar to p (S(6,p)) and Ben is made from p according to
plan P (M(Ben,P)&PBen)) in the real world. But it is impossible that
Ben is made from 6 according to plan P (-iO(M(Ben,5)&PBen)) relative
to the real world. This is a denial of the following instance of (ST):
S(6,P)=)U((M(b en. P)&PBen)^0(M(B en»6)&PBen)-
This counterexample to principle (ST) is given based on our
assumption about the plan of constructing Ben. One may hesitate to
agree with this counterexample and question what we mean by a
“plan” and how plausible it is to fix the plan of making Ben as the
way we assumed. Roughly speaking, the word plan in principle (C)
and principle (ST) is used to include (at least) all the essential
aspects of the table except the original matter. Salmon’s explanation
of his usage of the word “plan” in his principle (V') (which
corresponds to our principle (C)) is this: the phrase “according to
the same plan” means that the tables in question are constructed in
precisely the same way so that the same molecule goes to the
corresponding spot in the involved tables. lO® He also thinks that one
may fix “factors as the artisan who constructs [the table], the
artisan’s reason for constructing [the table], the time and place of the
construction, and so on.”!®”^ There is no disagreement in principle
between his usage of the word “plan” in his principles (V'), (1) and
(11) and our usage of the word “plan” in principles (C), (T) and
(ST). 108 Given Salmon’s explanation of his usage of the “plan,” the
plan in his principle (V') and principles (1) and (11) is assumed even
closer to the actual situation.
The question whether the plan of constructing Ben should be
the way as we assumed, or it should allow Wilma’s mail-order or even
Wilma’s exploration on the moon, is a question about possible
tolerances in other essential properties of Ben. There might be
tolerances in other essential aspects of Ben. But the consideration
about tolerable variations in the plan of making Ben does not in
principle change our counterexample. As long as it is not the case
that all changes, no matter how dramatic they are, are always
tolerable, our rejection to principle (ST) will remain the same.
Presumably we can always find counterexamples to (ST) when the
tolerable variations in the plan are specified. For example, if the mail-
’06 Salmon [1981], 210-211.
’07 Salmon [1981], 21 1.
’08 Principle (V') is given in Salmon [1981], 211. Piinciples (1) and (11) are given in
Salmon [1986], 75 and 77.
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order is a tolerable variation of the plan but the moon- exploration is
not, then the collection {C301, C302, C303, C4, cioo} will not be a
possible collection for Ben. Thus, Ben could be made according to
the same plan from some collections of components which are
qualitatively and quantitatively the same as but differ in less than or
equal to three components from Ben’s actual matter, but it is not the
case that Ben could be made according to the same plan from any
collection of components which are qualitatively and quantitatively
the same as but differs in less than or equal to three components
from Ben’s actual matter. This is to say, principle (T) is true of the
case of Ben but principle (ST) is false. Do we have a reason to believe
that not all changes in the plan of Ben are tolerable? The answer is
yes. The intuition here is simple: if all the changes in the plan are
allowable, or if the plan of Ben might vary dramatically, how can it be
at the same time essential to Ben?
Given that the two paradoxes, Chisholm’s Paradox and the Four
Worlds Paradox, are drawn from the three principles (N), (C) and
(ST), our rejection of (ST) results in an immediate resolution to
these two paradoxes. We hold that the arguments in the paradoxes
are unsound because the premise (ST) is an incorrect principle. It is
simply not the case that if the given artifact is possible to be made
according to plan P from collection C, then it is possible tor the
artifact to be made according to the same plan P from any collection
of components which is qualitatively and quantitatively the same as,
but having one (or two, or three, or ...) component ditterent from, the
given possible collection C.
4.3 Considerations that Support the Rejection of (ST)
In this section, we shall consider some viewpoints that we hold
to be correct. Principle (ST) is inconsistent with these views. If the
views expounded below are indeed correct, the inconsistence
between principle (ST) and these views will support our rejection of
(ST).
(1) The physical compatibilities in the possible constructions of
an artil'act.
Kripke has commented on how the questions about the
essences (or essential properties) of individual objects should be
asked;
[Passage (24)]
Ordinarily, when we ask intuitively whether something
might have happened to a given object, we ask whether
the universe could have gone on as it actually did up to a
certain time, but diverge in its history from that point
forward so that the vicissitudes of that object would have
been different from that time forth. Perhaps this feature
should be erected into a general principle about essence.
Note that the time in which the divergence from actual
history occurs may be sometime before the object itself is
actually created. For example, I might have been
deformed if the fertilized egg from which I originated
had been damaged in certain ways, even though I
presumably did not yet exist at that time.
Kripke’s suggestion in passage (24) is that in talking about the
essences or the essential properties of an individual object, we must
first be able to pick out the object, that is, to be clear about which
one this object is. We then consider counterfactual situations that
109 Kripke [1980], 115, footnote 57.
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branch out from the actual world at a certain time closely relevant to
the existence of this actual object and ask how the divergence in the
history of the actual world affects the existence of this actual object.
I think that this view is correct. A question about a particular
object’s individual essence can be asked meaningfully when the
object can be successfully picked out and when the divergence in a
counterfactual situation is comprehensible. Let us say that the
“historical condition” with respect to a certain phase of the
existence of an actual object is the state of history of the real world at
the time when the object is in that phase (it may be a period before
but closely relevant to the existence of the object). If we limit the
meaningful questions about individual essences to those
counterfactual situations as Kripke suggested, we actually assume a
fixed historical condition for what could happen to the individual
object in question. Namely, we assume that the history of a
counterfactual world is the same as the history of the real world up to
a point closely related to the origination of the object. The
divergence in a counterfactual world must be physically compatible
with the given historical condition; otherwise, the world could not be
realized as a whole. In other words, if we use “possible world” in
Salmon’s notion (a possible world is a maximal abstract entity that
could have been realized), a metaphysically possible counterfactual
world must be such that the corresponding P-world (the material
entity which would exist if the counterlactual world, the maximal
abstract entity, had been realized) is a physically compatible one.
^
1 1 0
“p-world" is introduced in Section 3.4 above.
Since there is a unique P-world eorresponding to eaeh eounterfaetual
world (the actual physical world is the P-world corresponding to
world w@, the maximal deseription of the aetual world), it should be
clear when we say that the eounterfaetual worlds must be physieally
eompatible.
In the diseussion of Chisholm’s Paradox and the Four Worlds
Paradox, the essential properties of the given actual table are
presumably viewed in those eounterfaetual worlds in which the
history of the worlds is the same up to a time elosely relevant to the
construction of the table. Thus, the divergence in these
eounterfaetual worlds must be physieally eompatible with the
historical condition at the time the divergence oecurs. Furthermore,
the discussion assumes that the tables in those eounterfaetual worlds
are constructed according to the plan by whieh the given actual table
is constructed. Then, in addition to the historical condition, the
discussion actually assumes that the aspects of the eounterfaetual
worlds with respect to the plan are the same as those of the real
world. Thus, the plan imposes an additional restriction on what can
in fact be metaphysically possible—the divergence must be physically
compatible not only with the historical condition but also with the
aspects of the worlds related to the plan. If (ST) is a correet
principle, then the possibilities inferred from this principle obey
these restrictions.
Salmon has suggested that the eounterfaetual worlds can be
stipulated to be exactly the same as the real world except that in
each eounterfaetual world the table is made trom a different hunk ot
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matter. Given that the counterfactual situations are thus stipulated,
the historical condition and the aspects of the counterfactual worlds
related to the plan are the same as in the real world. Then Principle
(ST) is false, for it is not the case that for any hunk of matter
qualitatively and quantitatively the same as but differing slightly from
the table’s actual matter in their collections of components, there is
always a possible counterfactual world in which it is physically
compatible that the given table (or some other table) is made from
this hunk of matter according to the plan based on the historical
condition. For example, when the counterfactual worlds are
stipulated maximally resembling the real world, it is not physically
compatible that Ben be made from the collection {C301, C302* C303, C4,
• ••, Cl00} according to the same plan.
(2) The physical necessities that are also metaphysically
necessary.
One might suspect that in the above discussion we are saying
that if it is physically impossible for the table in question to be made
from a certain hunk of matter according to the given plan based on
the historical condition, then it is metaphysically impossible for the
table to be so made. Indeed, we do hold that some physical
necessities of an artifact, including the physical necessities
(impossibilities) in the original construction of the artifact, are also
metaphysically necessary. Kripke has expressed the following view:
[Passage (25)]
...
characteristic theoretical identifications like Heat is
the motion of molecules,” are not contingent truths but
necessary truths, and here of course 1 don t mean just
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physically necessary, but necessary in the highest
degree—whatever that means. (Physical necessity, might
turn out to be necessity in the highest degree. ... At least
for this sort of example, it might be that when something
is physically necessary, it always is necessary tout
court.] 1
Kripke also mentioned “Water is H2O,” “Gold has atomic number
79 ” and “Light is a stream of photons” as examples of physical
necessities that are also necessary in the highest degree. Kripke’s
explanation is that these scientific discoveries reveal the nature of
the substances and the phenomena in question. 112 These substances
and phenomena are theoretically identified with their physical
characteristics; they could not have been the very substance or the
very phenomenon without having their physical characteristics. A
necessity of the highest degree must also be metaphysically
necessary. Given Forbes’ view that metaphysical necessities are
fundamentally necessities of conceptual truths, we may restate
Kripke’s view in terms of conceptual truths as follows: the scientific
discoveries mentioned by Kripke are metaphysical necessities
because the discovered physical characteristics form the content of
our concepts of these substances and natural phenomena.
Our claim, that some physical necessities of a given artifact are
also metaphysically necessary, is made for a similar reason. It it is
physically impossible for the given artifact to be made from a certain
collection of components according to its plan under the historical
condition, it is metaphysically impossible tor the given artifact to be
so made, because physical compatibility is part ot the content ot our
^ 1 ^ Kripke [1980], 99.
H 2 Kripke [1980], 125.
concept of an artifact’s being made according to the given plan under
the given historical condition.
(3) Necessities and possibilities that are discovered
empirically.
Kripke has said: “One might very well discover essence
empirically.”! 13 Kripke’s examples are those scientific discoveries
mentioned above: “Heat is the motion of molecules,” “Water is H2O,”
“Gold has atomic number 79,” “Light is a stream of photons” and so
on. What is heat or what is water is a matter of scientific discovery—it
can only be discovered through empirical scientific investigation.
According to Kripke, we can imagine discovering heat and water
differently, but once we discovered that heat is the motion of
molecules and water is H2O, it is essential for heat to be the motion
of molecules and water to be H2O. Kripke expresses a similar view
about individual artifacts: from what substance the given table is made
is a matter of empirical investigation. We can imagine discovering the
substance of the given table differently, but if we in fact discover that
the table is originally made of wood, it is essential for the table to be
originally made of wood.^^ Given that these physical necessities of
the table can only be known empirically, it follows that some
metaphysical necessities must be empirically discovered.
In our opinion, the metaphysical necessities and possibilities
about the original matter of a certain artifact belong to the kind of
necessities and possibilities that must be discovered empirically. In
Salmon’s and Forbes’ discussion of the two paradoxes, it is suggested
! ! 3 Kripke [1980], 110.
H 4 Kripke [1980], 113-115.
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that the reason for the necessities and possibilities about the original
matter of a given table to be a posteriori is that an empirical
knowledge about the artifact’s actual matter is involved in the
inlerences of the necessities and possibilities drawn from the
essentialist principles. But, in saying that the necessities and
possibilities about the original matter of a given artifact are
discovered empirically, we mean more than the involvement of the
knowledge of the actual matter in the modal inferences. Given that
physical compatibility is a necessary condition in claiming possible
matters for a given artifact, one needs empirical knowledge on how
the historical condition and the plan are determined in order to
know what the physical compatibilities are in this particular
situation. The possible collections of components for the original
construction of the artifact may be determined after acquiring this
knowledge. If our view is correct, the Strong Tolerance Principle
(ST), which claims that further possible matters of a table can be
inferred purely from a known possible matter of the table and a
standard for quantitative change in the components, must be
rejected, because this principle is incorrect on how the possibilities
are determined.
4.4 About the Vagueness of the Threshold
In Passage (19) quoted in Section 4.1, Forbes expresses his
view about the vagueness ol the threshold between tolerable
variations and intolerable variations in the original matter of artifacts:
“Tolerance arises because oi vagueness or fuzziness in the limits ot
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the range of sums of wood which possibly constitute a: there is no
sharp distinction between those sums which could, and those which
could not, constitute a.” According to this passage, the boundary
between the tolerable variations and intolerable variations in the
original matter of a is itself vague or fuzzy. Moreover, let us combine
Passage (19) with the following passage:
[Passage (26)]
To specify the essences of such entities, we need to find
some way of representing the thought that il' an entity of
this sort is made up (without leftovers) of parts from a
given set, then as we consider sets of parts which have
less and less in common with the given set, it becomes
less and less possible for the entity to ave been
constructed from the set under consideration.
We see that, according to Forbes, the hunks of matter sharing more
parts with the original matter of the given table is more possible for
the original construction of the table, whereas the hunks of matter
sharing less parts with the original matter of the given table is less
possible for the original construction of the table. There is no sharp
boundary separating possible matters and impossible matters lor the
given table.
Salmon’s intuition of vagueness is different from that of Forbes,
as we can see from the following passage:
[Passage (27)]
The first two principles [equivalent to our principle (T)
and (Ml)] ... imply that a certain amount of variation is
possible in the original constitution of a table, whereas
principle (0) [a principle weaker than our principle (N)
by letting z be a hunk of matter which shares no
1 72
115 Ibid.
component with table x s original matter y] implies that
the amount of allowable variation is something short of
total. ... It follows that there is some threshold ... such
that one more change in original constitution must by
necessity result in a numerically distinct table. ... even if
the threshold is some exact and very precise amount of
overlap, from an epistemic point of view we can never be
in a position to specify with adequate justification just
what the threshold is—except by means of some vague
locution like ‘sufficiently substantial overlap’.”^
In Salmon’s view, the threshold itself is not vague. Salmon does say
that “it seems more realistic to suppose that the threshold consists
in some interval, perhaps some range of numbers of shared
molecules.” 1 But, whether the threshold is a point or an interval,
there is a definite threshold such that:
[Passage (28)]
For any hunk of matter y' that shares a greater number of
molecules with the actual matter y of the table x than any
number in this range[the threshold] ... is determinately
true of X that it might have originated from y' instead of
from y. For any hunk of matter z sharing fewer molecules
with y than any number in the range, it is determinately
true of X that it could not have originated from z. For any
hunk of matter y” whose number of shared molecules
with y lies within the range, it is indeterminate ...
whether x could have originated from y
" instead of from
y.118
We can see from Passage (28) above that in viewing the threshold as
an interval, Salmon has in mind a threshold with two sharp cutoll
points that separate all hunks of matter into three regions—the
hunks from which table x could have originated, the hunks from
1 16 Salmon [1986], 76-77.
11^ Salmon [1986], 76.
1 1 6 Salmon [ 1986], 76-77.
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which whether x could have originated is indeterminate and the
hunks from which x could not have originated. Salmon uses the word
“vague” to refer to the epistemological indeterminacy of the truth
value of the proposition that “x could have originated from y".” But
this is a different issue from the question of whether the threshold
itself is vague. The cognitive indeterminacy of the truth value of those
propositions does not mean that the threshold is itself not clear.
Salmon actually argues that there must be a cutoff threshold between
possible hunks of matter and impossible hunks of matter of an given
artifact. For his, what is vague about the threshold is only the
human cognition of the threshold—we ean never be in a position to
specify with adequate justification what the threshold is.
Despite the difference between the views of Salmon's and
Forbes’, these two views have something in common:
(i) They both hold that we can never find out where the
threshold lies. For Forbes, it is because there is no sueh a thing in
reality. For Salmon, it is because human cognition is limited.
(ii) They both hold that the possibilities regarding the original
matter of a given table can be determined solely by a quantitative
measure of the variations in the original matter of the table. For
Salmon, any collection with a number of changed components
smaller than the quantitative threshold is a possible hunk of matter
for the given table, and any collection with a number of changed
components greater than the threshold is an impossible hunk ol
matter for the table. For Forbes, a hunk with less variations from the
1 Salmon [1986], APPENDIX, 1 10.
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actual matter is more possible and a hunk with more variations is less
possible for the origination of the given table.
We have already rejeeted principle (ST) in Seetion 4 .2 . The
example of Ben shows that it is not the case that Ben eould be made
according to the same plan from any eollection of eomponents that is
slightly different from but qualitatively and quantitatively the same as
Ben’s actual collection of components. There are some such
collections from which Ben eould not be made aeeording to the same
plan. It seems to me that it is the intuitions stated in (ii) in the
previous paragraph that lead Forbes and Salmon to their belief in
principle (ST). The example of Ben shows that Forbes and Salmon’s
intuitions stated in (ii) are ineorrect. The eloek Ben, whieh is aetually
constructed from collection {ci, C2, ... cioo}^ is possible to be
constructed according to the same plan from collection {cioi, c\02,
C103- C4 ••• cioo}> but not possible to be construeted aeeording to the
same plan from collection {C301, C302, C3, ... cioo}. Hence, though it is
true that any variation with more changed components than the
threshold is an impossible hunk of matter lor Ben, it is not the ease
that any collection with fewer changed components than the
threshold is a possible hunk of matter for Ben, and neither it is the
case that a hunk with less variations from the actual matter is more
possible for the origination of the given table but a hunk with more
variations is less possible. The threshold of tolerable variations in
Ben’s original matter, a maximum difference ol 3 components, is a
necessary condition for determining possible collections, or say, is
sufficient for determining impossible collections ol components, but
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it is not by itself sufficient for determining possible collections for
Ben. Any possible collection of components of Ben must satisfy this
quantitative measure, but not all collections of components that
satisfy this quantitative measure are possible collections for Ben.
We now consider the views of Forbes and Salmon stated in (i)
above that the threshold is unknowable. It seems to me that there is
a reasonable consideration from which we may agree that the
threshold is unknowable: since there are tolerable variations in
various related essential aspects of artifacts and we are likely not to
be able to achieve a complete certainty about what these variations
are, we may never know for sure the threshold of tolerable variations
in the original matter of a given artifact—at least it may be too
complicated for human mind to figure it out. But notice that this
consideration is not the reason by which Forbes and Salmon think
that the threshold is unknowable. In the discussion of two modal
paradoxes, the plan, namely the set of essential properties of the
given artifact other than the original matter, is given and assumed to
be correct. Therefore, more precisely, Salmon and Forbes hold that
even if the plan of making the artifact is correctly given or is known,
the threshold for the tolerable variations in the original matter of the
artitact is still unknowable. Specilically, we may understand Forbes as
saying that since in reality there does not exist clear threshold
between tolerable variations and intolerable variations, we can never
find it out; and we may understand Salmon as sa3dng that we can
never have sufficient reason to identity the threshold even it the plan
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is explicitly given. We shall see that both of these views are incorrect
in the case of Ben.
Recall our discussion of Carter’s story. We concluded that the
case of making Ben is one in which we can definitely answer the
question whether a certain collection of components could have
constituted Ben. The clock Ben, made actually according the plan
from the collection {ci, C2, ... ciooK could have been made according
to the same plan from other collections of components which are
subsets of {ci, C2, ... cioo^ cioi, cio2 . cios) and qualitatively and
quantitatively the same as {ci, C2, ... cioo}- Given our assumptions
about the plan and a fixed historical condition, an empirical
investigation will discover that any collection containing a
component not in the set {ci, C2, ... cioo^ c\o\, cio2 , cios} is a
collection of components from which Ben could not have been made
according to the same plan under the fixed historical condition. In
this case, any hunk of matter differing from the original matter of
Ben in more than three components is an impossible matter of Ben.
Thus, disagreeing with Forbes, we conclude that there is a sharp
cutoff threshold, namely a maximum difference of 3 components, so
that any possible variation must be within this threshold and any
variation surpassing the threshold is an impossible variation. In other
words, given the plan and the historical condition, the threshold for
the possible variations in the original matter of Ben, that is, a
maximum difference of 3 components, is itselt clear, not vague.
Furthermore, the threshold is knowable from philosophical analyses
and empirical investigations. That the threshold is knowable in the
case of Ben implies that there is a sufficient reason in the case of Ben
tor identitying the threshold. In our view, the sufficient reason for
identifying the threshold for the tolerable variations in Ben’s original
matter is the defendableness of the threshold. Given the plan and the
historical condition, we can show why it is the maximum difference
of 3 components, but not 2 components or 4 components, that is the
threshold.
We believe that there are concrete cases like the case of Ben,
and we think that these cases are the only ones in which we can talk
about transworld identity of artifacts. But we do not claim that every
concrete case is like Ben’s case—there might be cases such that even
if the historical condition and the plan of making the artifact in
question are given, it is still vague what are the possible variations in
the original matter of the given artifact. This may be shown by the
follovdng revised story of Carter’s: The retired clock-maker Wilma
decides to pass her time by constructing a clock from the detached
clock parts available in her hands. As a matter of fact, the clock, call
it Ben*, is constructed out of clock parts c\, C2 , cioo* After the
completion of the work, however, she is left with twenty, instead of
three, unused parts, cioi, •••, Ci20^ each cioo-t-i is qualitatively and
functionally equivalent to Ci.
As we did in the case of Ben, we assume that the following is
the plan of making Ben*: the plan according to which Ben* is
constructed includes the design, the available material, the maker
and the specific project of how to assemble a clock from the available
material according to the design. We also assume, similar to the
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assumption given in the case of Ben, that Wilma’s choice of using one
of Cl and cioi, one of C2 and cio2 , ••• and one of C20 and C120 in the
construction of her clock is accommodated in the plan. This is to say
that given the plan thus assumed, using either ci or c 101, either C2 or
C102. ... either C20 or C120 in the construction of clock are all
considered as constructing a clock according to the same plan.
In this revised case, given the assumption of the plan of making
Ben*, Wilma is possible to assemble a clock according to the plan
from any other collection which is a subset of {ci, ..., C120} and
qualitatively and quantitatively the same as Ben*’s actual matter.
Thus, there is a counterfactual world in which Wilma assembles a
clock according to the plan from the collection of components, {cioi,
...» Ci 20 » C21 ...» cioo}. The question is whether this clock is
numerically identical to Ben*. A twenty-component difference in a
collection of one hundred components is not likely to be a slight
difference. Given Principle (N), one might think that this clock is not
Ben*, or at least, one may suspect that this clock is not Ben*. Thus
we encounter a situation in which even if the plan is unambiguously
given, it is still vague what counts as possible variations in the
original matter of the artifact in question.
Perhaps the plan is fixed too loosely. That is, perhaps not ail
the choices of using C{ or cioo-i-i iri the construction ot Ben* should be
accommodated into the plan. It is conceivable that if the plan is fixed
close enough to the actual situation, the physically compatible
III assmning the plan of making Ben*, we did exactly tlie saine as we did in
assuming the plan of making Ben. But because of the particularity of each
individual object, tliere is no reason to suppose that the essendal pr<g)erties m Uie
plan of Ben* must correspond to tlie essential properties in the plan of Ben.
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variations will be luniteci to a fairly small amount. However, whether
or not the plan of making Ben* should be speeified eloser to the
actual situation, it seems that we have no convincing reason to
suppose that whenever we encounter a case like the case of Ben*,
there is always a justified reason to tighten the plan.
We have shown that the situation of Ben is a situation in which
the threshold of tolerable variations in the original matter of the
artifact is itself clear and knowable, whereas the situation of Ben* is a
situation in which the threshold of tolerable variations in the original
matter of the artifact is vague—either the threshold is itself vague or
we lack the cognitive ability to recognize it.
It may be true that when the original matter of a given artifact
is considered alone, we can only have a rough idea about what might
count as slight change in the original matter of the artifact and what
might be the threshold. But this vague conception can be sharpened
in some concrete situation when various essential aspects of the
artilact are given and considered in connection. A situation in which
our vague conception about the threshold of tolerable variations in
the original matter of a given artifact can be sharpened is a situation
in which our two conceptions concerning the identity of the artifact,
the conception about how the plan should be determined and the
conception about what may count as slight change in the original
matter of the artifact, conform with each other. In the example ol
Ben, given the intuition of how the plan should be determined, the
physically compatible variations in the original matter of Ben are
fairly small. Our initial idea about the plan of making Ben and the
allowable variations in the original matter of Ben conform with each
other. The characteristic of Ben’s kind of cases is that a sufficient
defense of the threshold can be given. Namely, given the historical
condition and the plan as thus fixed, we can explain convincingly why
any possible variation in the original matter of the given artifact
within this threshold is, and why any variation surpassing this
threshold is not a possible variation for the artifact.
On the other hand, the situation of Ben* is a situation in which
our vague conception about the threshold of tolerable variations in
the original matter of the artifact cannot be sharpened, or cannot be
sharpened to the extent such that the threshold can be identified. In
Ben*’s kind of situation, our conception about how the plan should be
determined and our conception about what may count as a slight
change in the original matter of the artifact cannot conform with
each other. In the situation of Ben*, given the plan as we assumed,
the physically compatible variations can still be considerably
significant. Thus our conception about the plan and our conception
about the tolerable variations do not conform with each other.
Whichever number i, where l<i<20, that one may think is the
threshold of the tolerable variations for the original matter of Ben*, it
seems that there is no convincing argument to show why the
threshold is i, not i-1 or i+1. We remain unclear about which
collection is possible for Ben* and which is not, even if the plan is
clearly determined.
One might object to our view on the distinction between Ben’s
case and Ben*’s case. One may say that if the plan ot making Ben is
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loosened in some way, then the situation of Ben may become similar
to the situation of Ben*. Thus, we may not really have the distinction,
and in general we may not really have the kind of cases in which our
vague conception about the threshold of tolerable variations in the
original matter of the given artifact can be sharpened. It is true that
by loosening the plan, some of Ben’s kind of situations will become a
Ben*’s kind of situation. Our reply to this objection is this: The
presupposition of the discussion about possible variations in artifacts’
original matter is that the plan is given according to our best
understanding of what is essential to the artifact in consideration. We
claim that once the plan is determined as such, there can be two
kinds of situations, Ben’s kind and Ben*’s kind. Just as it is not
reasonable to suppose that it is always justified to tighten the plan
closer to the actual situation, it is equally not reasonable to suppose
that it is always justified to loosen the plan further from the actual
situation. Especially, it is not plausible to suppose that it is always
justified to loosen the plan to the extent of making a case of Ben’s
kind as one of Ben*’s kind.
The cases of Ben’s kind are the cases in which we are able to
determine (to know) which collection of components is possible lor
the given artifact, whereas the cases of Ben*’s kind are those in
which we are not able to determine (to know) which collection is
possible for the given artifact. In Ben’s kind of cases, we are also able
to determine impossible matters for the artifact, whereas in Ben* s
case, we are able to determine impossible matters for some hunks of
matter but not for all. Our view is that if we are able to determine
both possibilities and impossibilities about the original matter of the
given artifact, our conception of the threshold is clear, not vague—at
least, our conception is clear to the extent that the threshold can be
defended. On the other hand, if our conception of the threshold is
vague, we are simply not in the position to determine possibilities
and impossibilities for the original matter of the artifact.
4.5 The Absolute Essentialist Intuition
By distinguishing the two kinds of cases, Ben’s kind and the
Ben*’s kind, the absolute essentialist intuition that the a posteriori
essential properties of an artifact are essential to the object
simpliciter can be defended. In order to defend the absolute
essentialist point of view, one must show that the possibilities and
impossibilities for the original matter of the given artifact will be
determined the same in every counterfactual world regardless what
is the forming matter of the artifact in each world in which the
artifact exists. This is exactly what we can see in the Ben’s kind of
cases. In the Ben’s kind of cases, our vague conception about the
tolerable variations in Ben’s original matter is sharpened by
investigating the historical condition and considering the plan and
the physical compatibility in the situation. A set of collections of
components, which satisfy our intuition about the individual essence
of Ben, is identified by these philosophical analyses and empirical
investigations. The actual matter of the given artifact is just one
collection in this set that happens to be realized. The realization ot
the actual matter cannot in any way aftect the discovery of the set of
possible matters for the given artifact. The same holds for the other
collections in the set in the corresponding counterfactual worlds.
The historical condition, the plan and the physical compatibility are
assumed to be the same in the counterfactual worlds. Thus, had the
artifact been made from some other possible collection, the set of
possible collections for the artifact would still be the same. In the
example of Ben, given the historical condition fixed up to the time
when Wilma uses the available clock-parts to assemble a clock and
the plan of making Ben as we assumed earlier, the possible
collections of components of Ben determined in the real world w@
are those subsets of the total 103 clock-parts that are qualitatively
and quantitatively equivalent to Ben’s actual collection {ci, C2,
cioo}- Consider a counterfactual world Wi, possible relative to the real
world w@, in which Ben is made from a collection of components
{ciOT C2, cioo} which is different from {c\, C2, cioo} in one
component. In Wi, the historical condition, the plan and the relevant
physical (or natural) laws are the same as they are in w@. The only
difference is that the u)@-possibility of making Ben from {cioi, C2,
Cioo} is a truth of tVi. Imagine conducting a similar philosophical
analysis and empirical investigation on the historical condition, the
plan and physical compatibility lor Wi in order to determine the set
of possible collections of components for Ben’s original matter in Wi.
We can see that the set of possible collections of components for Ben
found in ivi will be the same as the set found in w@, because nothing
involved in the determination of the set in w@ is changed in Wi. The
same holds for counterfactual worlds other than Wi, in which Ben is
made from some other eollection in the set. Thus, if it is possible for
Ben to be made from eollection such-and-such, it is possible for Ben
simplicitev. On the other hand, if it is unpossible for Ben to be made
from collection such-and-such, it is impossible for Ben simpliciter. In
the case of Ben, given that our conception about the threshold is
clear, we may substitute the word “slightly different” in the instance
of principle (N) concerning Ben by the identified threshold—in this
case the threshold is 3 (also make corresponding substitutions in the
principle so that the principle becomes one about clocks). Given the
above discussion, any a posteriori necessities derivable from the
instance of (N) concerning Ben is necessary to Ben simpliciter. A
similar consideration can be given to the a posteriori necessities
derivable from principle (C) as well.
What about the case of Ben*? The case of Ben* is one in which
our vague conception about the threshold of tolerable variations in
the original matter of the artifact cannot be sharpened. We have
stated the view that if our conception about the threshold cannot be
sharpened, we are simply not in the position to determine the
transworld identity of the given artifact in term of its matter.
However, Salmon seems to hold that even if our conception about the
threshold is vague, we can still determine transworld identity for the
given artifact by inferences drawn from the Strong Tolerance
Principle (ST). In the following we shall explain our reason for
disagreeing with his view.
It is easy to see that the Strong Tolerance Principle (ST) is
incorrect even in the cases like the the case ot Ben*. Given what the
plan is, the collection {C301, C2, CiooK where C301 is a component
from the moon, is not a possible hunk of matter for Ben* even though
it has only one component different from Ben*’s actual matter. But
suppose that “a wooden table” is replaced by “a clock” and the
quantifier “any” in principle (ST) is restricted as ranging over only
all the collections that are subsets of {ci, ..., C120} and are qualitatively
and quantitatively equivalent to the collection {ci, ..., cioo}- That is,
the restricted principle (ST) about clocks says; If a clock x is
originally made according to plan P from a collection y, then x might
have been made according to the same plan P from any collection y'
such that y' is a subset of the set {ci, ..., C120} and has the same
quality and quantity as y, but the collection of components of y' is
slightly different from that of y. Is this restricted (ST) a correct
principle for the case of Ben*?
Paradoxical arguments similar to Chisholm’s Paradox and the
Four Worlds Paradox can be produced in this specific situation by the
restricted (ST) in S4 or S5 modal logic. According to the restricted
(ST), if the clock were made from the collection {cioi, C2, cioo}. it
would be Ben* because one component difference from Ben*’s
original matter is a slight difference and the collection {cioi, C2,
cioo} is a subset of the set {ci, C2, •••, C120} and is qualitatively and
quantitatively equivalent to Ben*’s original matter. But if so, by the
same consideration, the clock made from the collection {cioi» cio2>
C3, ..., cioo} would also be Ben* since it is identical to the clock made
from the collection {cioB C2, •••. cioo}» and that clock is Ben .
Repeating this argument 19 times, one will conclude that the clock
made from the eolleetion, {cioi? •••, Ci 2o- C21 CiooK is Ben*. But at
the same time, one may suspeet that the eloek made from {cioi,
C120. C21 •••, cioo} is not Ben* beeause a differenee of 20 eomponents
is not likely to be a slight difference.
But we must consider carefully that given that the threshold for
the tolerable variations in the original matter of Ben* is vague,
whether it can be the case that the possibilities inferred from this
restricted (ST) for Ben* are all true possibilities of Ben*. Here we
need not consider whether the possibilities inferred by the
transitivity and the symmetry of S5 modal logic are the true
possibilities of Ben*; we may just consider that whether the
possibilities inferred directly from the restricted (ST) for Ben* are
all true possibilities of Ben*. In other words, we may think that the
logic of the inferences from (ST) is system T and consider whether
the possibilities inferred from the restricted (ST) for Ben* in T are
all true possibilities of Ben*.
As we explained earlier, Salmon holds that there is in reality a
definite threshold separating the possible collections ot components
from the impossible ones, but epistemically we cannot know where
the threshold lies. This view implies that there is a missing link in
our cognition of reality. Whether the restricted (ST) is correct for
the case of Ben* depends on whether it is the case that the
threshold separates the possible collections ot components trom the
impossible ones in such a way that all the collections with a smaller
amount of change from Ben*s actual matter than the amount set by
the threshold are possible collections for Ben*, and all the
collections with a greater amount of changes impossible ones. Our
concern about inferring from the restricted (ST) in the case of Ben*
is that the threshold for the tolerable variations in Ben*’s matter may
not separate the collections in the way described. In the case of Ben,
we see that the threshold eliminates all collections with variations
surpassing the threshold as impossible matters for Ben, but not every
collection which differs from Ben’s actual matter in a smaller amount
is a possible matter of Ben. There may be a similar situation
concerning Ben*. It may be the case that the threshold of Ben*
eliminates all collections which differ from Ben*’s actual matter in a
greater amount than the threshold as impossible matter for Ben*, but
not every collection which is a subset of the set {ci, ... C120} and with
a smaller amount of variations is a possible matter of Ben*. If this is
in fact the case, the inferences from the restricted (ST) in modal
logic system T may derive false possibility for Ben*. According to
Salmon’s view, we lack the ability to know what is the threshold. If
so, we seem to lack the ability to know how the threshold separates
the possible collections from the impossible ones as well. Thus, the
correctness of the restricted (ST) is at best unknowable for the case
of Ben*, if what is the threshold for the tolerable variations in Ben*’s
original matter is unknowable in Salmon’s sense. TTie same holds tor
other cases like the case of Ben*. We conclude that there is no
justified reason tor using the restricted (ST) to infer possible matters
for Ben*. The case of Ben* is one in which the question which
collections of components could have constituted the artifact has no
definite answer, at least from epistemic point of view. Given the
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above discussion, we think that cases of Ben*’s kind raise no real
challenge to S5 modal logic.
Finally we have some comment on Forbes’ Counterpart Solution
with respect to the restricted (ST). We explained earlier that Forbes
holds that there is in reality no sharp cutoff threshold between the
collections of components that could have constituted the given
artifact and the collections that could not. The more components a
collection has in common with the actual matter of the given artifact,
the more possible for the given artifact to be constructed from the
collection; the less components a collection has in common with the
actual matter of the given artifact, the less possible for the given
artifact to be constructed from the collection. Given this view, no
definite possible matter of Ben* other than the actual matter can be
inferred from the Tolerance Principle. In fact, in Forbes’ Counterpart
Solution to Chisholm’s Paradox, the possibilities inferred from the
Tolerance Principle are viewed as true in a percentage less than
wholly true. With respect to this aspect, it does not really make a
difference whether to use (ST) or the restricted (ST) in the
inference. Of course, the Counterpart Solution with (ST) will assign a
truth value of true in 79 percent to the proposition “Ben* is possible
to be constructed from a collection which is qualitative and
quantitatively the same as but differs in 21 components from Ben s
original matter,” whereas with restricted (ST) the Solution will
assign truth value 0 to the same proposition. We have rejected
Forbes’ view that there is in reality no definite threshold between
possible matters and impossible matters by the case of Ben. But we
want to consider whether this Forbes’ view is eorrect with respeet to
the particular kind of cases like the ease of Ben*. We hold that the
case of Ben* is one for whieh the threshold for possible matters of
Ben* is unidentifiable, but that is not suffieient to show that the
threshold does not exist. To show that the threshold does not exist,
one needs to show that if there is a threshold, there will be a
contradiction. But we fail to see what this contradietion ean be, so we
are at least not convinced that Forbes’ view is eorreet in Ben*’s ease.
On the other hand, even if it is eorreet that there is no
threshold in Ben*’s case, we do not think that it makes a good sense
to view necessity and possibility as true in a pereentage less than 1.
We have argued that it is counter-intuitive to view identity as true in a
certain percentage. Similarly we think that possibilities and
necessities are either true or false in a certain world, but eannot be
true in a certain percentage and at the same time false in a eertain
percentage in the same world.
If the degree-treatment of possibility has any plausibility, it has
to be understood other than attributing real modal properties to
artifacts. In our view, the degree-treatment oi possibility may mean
the following. The intuition that the possible collections of
components for Ben* should differ from Ben*’s actual matter in a
small amount may support a kind of probabilistic thinking that the
more components a collection has in common with the actual matter
of Ben*, the more probable for the collection to be a possible matter
of Ben*, whereas the less components a collection has in common
with the actual matter of Ben*, the less probable for the eollection to
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be a possible matter of Ben*. There is no eertainty about whieh
collection is or is not a possible matter of Ben*. If one wishes, one
may use a degree-based similarity relation to depict this probabilistic
feeling about the collections. But this similarity relation is not
supposed to be a technical device for representing identity
relation—it is similarity literally. Also, the degree of similarity is not a
scientific probability; it can only be taken as an illustration of the
intuition that the possible collections for Ben* should differ from
Ben*’s actual matter in a small amount.
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